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The James Madison University Mine Action Information
Center is celebrating 10 years of service to the mineaction community. Director Dennis Barlow looks back
on 10 years of accomplishments.

by Dennis Barlow [ Mine Action Information Center ]

W

e at the Center have seen and
been a part of much that has
transpired in the mine-action
realm since that summer day in 1996 when
the U.S. Department of Defense decided
to create an independent clearinghouse
for humanitarian-demining information.
Having faith in the passion and dedication
of those in an academic setting, they asked
for this Center to be created not in a bustling
metropolis like Washington or New York, but
instead in the heart of  Virginia’s Shenandoah
Valley, at James Madison University.
Behind-the-Scenes Support
Like everyone else, we’ve had our ups
and downs, but we feel pretty good about
the efforts we’ve made and the fruits grown
and harvested from those efforts. Unlike
many of the larger and more powerful organizations involved in mine action, the
MAIC at JMU has played the role of junior partner. We understood early on that
the United Nations, sovereign nations, regional agencies, global nongovernmental
organizations and large corporations would
rightly dominate the play of humanitarian
mine action. But we also felt that a university, with a passionate altruism tempered
by an abiding neutrality, could—nay,
should—play an integral role.
So the MAIC was established as a
public-policy center with a small central
staff augmented by the part-time work of
professors with key subject-matter expertise
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and students with unflagging energy and
dedication. It has not been easy to maintain
the balance of such a small vessel on a sea
amid some very tall ships, but it certainly
has been exciting.
As JMU reaches this milestone, we hope
to be forgiven the egotism of looking back
over our 10 years and reflecting on some of
our accomplishments. I do this knowing
that sometimes the tall ships catch most of
the wind and make it harder for the smaller
MAIC craft to unfurl its flag.
MAIC’s Far-reaching Impact
We’re proud to say that we have inspired
many of our students to become part of the
mine-action arena. Several of our students
and interns have gone on to bigger and
better things in a variety of mine-action or
humanitarian organizations. Stacy Smith
is now working for RONCO Consulting
Corporation; Keith Feigenbaum works
for Science Applications International
Corporation; Juan Carlos Ruan is at the
Organization of American States; Craig
Finkelstein was the U.S. Department of
State’s Humanitarian Demining Fellow;
Kurt Chesko went to work for HALO
Trust as a deminer in Afghanistan; and
Erin Snider worked at Adopt-A-Minefield.
Others are still looking for the right position: Sarah Sensamaust will move to Egypt
in late summer 2006, where she will pursue
a master’s degree at the American University
in Cairo, and Owen Uscher is currently

Asking the Hard Questions
Given the independent nature of the MAIC,
we have been able to ask politically sensitive
questions or raise controversial issues and provide a forum in which they could be debated.
The Journal of Mine Action is now in its 10th
year and a perusal of its index will indicate the

Top-level Training and Conferences
Of course, as a university-based organization, the MAIC at JMU has contributed as a source of mine-action training and education. Using UNICEF best
practices, a JMU team of clinical psychologists and health educators wrote and
developed a mine-risk education curriculum, which was implemented by the
Women’s Union and the Committee for Public Education in Quang Tri province of Vietnam in 1999. We foresaw the need to revamp that curriculum to base
it on community standards, while fostering collateral capacity-building projects
in central Vietnam. The MAIC also sent a team of Geographic Information
System professors to support the Southeast European Mapping Project and taught
GIS skills to deminers in the Balkans. In May and June 2006, the Center conducted its fourth Mine Action Senior Managers Course for the United Nations
Development Programme.
Mine-action Software and Publications
The MAIC worked with an exceptionally motivated team of JMU students
and professors to create various global information system products. The JMU
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A Decade of Service:
   The MAIC is

by providing information and advice, working with the GICHD, and hosting seminars
to determine the requirements for a mineaction information system, subsequently
helping to determine these requirements. The
MAIC again worked closely with GICHD to
define and fine-tune the need for and shape of
casualty data within the framework of the
IMSMA system.

Journal of Mine Action staff, April 2001.

evaluating several offers related to mineaction organizations.
Keeping Up the Standard
The MAIC was instrumental in getting
the International Mine Action Standards
process under way and maintaining it. At a
global conference convened by JMU in 1997,
we highlighted standards as an agenda item,
and the U.N. Mine Action Service stepped
forward during that meeting to take the lead
in establishing this very important program.
Since then, JMU has convened focus groups,
maintained the IMAS Web site, and worked
with the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining in updating technical notes, modifications and additions to
the standards.
In the initial development of the
Information Management System for Mine
Action, the MAIC played a primary role

breadth of topics covered. We note with pride that the JMA
was cited over 100 times in the GICHD’s comprehensive book, A Guide to Mine Action. The JMA and many of
the seminars and workshops convened by JMU have focused on specific themes and topics critical to the effectiveness of mine-action campaigns and programs. This
same openness to ideas drives our vision related to Webbased polling questions and our non-refereed lessonslearned database.
A Por tal to Mine-action Information
We’ve found that many in the mine-action community use the MAIC Web site as a gateway to mineaction information and resources. Not only does the
MAIC maintain an up-to-date registry of mine-action
organizations, but it furnishes links to every significant
mine-action group in the world, reports significant mineaction news on a daily basis, distills an up-to-the-minute
review of “what’s new” in mine action, and provides “help
desk” access to those who want to know more about mineaction activities.

The MAIC hosts a conference in Miami, Fla., on regional mine-action issues of Latin America.

GIS team first modified the best off-the-shelf geographical software packages to
make the products user-friendly, then added mine-action features to make them
useful to the field. The same team created the Spatial Data Information Center,
a database of GIS-related products available to landmine-afflicted countries.
This product was issued in concert with an educational database that offered a
comprehensive, easy-to-use online geographical tutorial.
Over the years, the MAIC has produced various publications in addition
to the Journal of Mine Action. In 1997, the MAIC was selected to produce the
book Sustainable Humanitarian Demining, a compendium of trends, technologies
and mine-action techniques. In 2001, the MAIC, in support of the U.S. State
Department’s joint conference with Rotary International, produced the first primer on mine action, entitled The Landmine Action Smart Book, which is today in its
second printing and was recently made available in a web version on the MAIC
Web site.
From the beginning, JMU has been able to call on its resident sources of
expertise to provide strong bases for mine-action policy, planning and operations. MAIC-produced studies have investigated such issues as critical-incident
stress, operator requirements, the use of casualty data, the application of military skills to humanitarian demining, and planning and phasing of mine-action
campaigns. JMU studies and surveys can be accessed on the MAIC Web site (see
contact information).
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In Summary
As I sit here and allow the sights and
sensations of the past 10 years to drift by,
I realize two things: that in spite of my efforts to do so, I cannot possibly recall more
than a few of JMU’s achievements. Most of
them are not measurable—ah yes, the final
and ultimate obstacle to gauging effectiveness. They are indeed subjective and if I can

An Alternative Perspective on

quote a respected colleague, Hendrik
Ehlers of Menschen gegen Minen, the
effectiveness of our programs “can
only be measured by the smiles on
the faces” of a reclaimed people.
Secondly, our (all of us involved
in mine action) efforts are indeed performing one action, one person, one
event at a time, making the “whole”
quite indiscernible from the component parts. Mine action is a little like
looking at an American quilt. You can
admire the details that go into its making, but when you step back to look at
the whole, the component parts are lost
in the overall beauty.
It is our hope that over the past decade we at the JMU MAIC have helped
stitch this wonderful quilt together and
that our contributions, as subjective as
they may be, have helped give it shape,
beauty and function.

Landmines and Vulnerable
Populations
By offering a different view on the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’
dominant message concerning mine ac-
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MAIC, the Catalyst
JMU’s MAIC is especially proud of the
role it has played in facilitating partnerships
and highlighting capabilities and contributions. Often, as in Bangkok or Miami, the
MAIC has conducted conferences dedicated
to bringing together various groups in a
region who we felt could learn from each
other. We try to spot these opportunities
whenever we can and do our best to bring
diverse groups closer together for integration
and coordination. Such a meeting occurred
in Tampa, Fla., in 2000, when militaries
from 27 countries working on landmine
clearance came together to share ideas and
commonalities. It has also happened at every
Senior Managers Course we have taught.

tion, this article presents an argument for
possible alternatives. The author brings
up such points as a lack of discussion
and an acceptance of facts without
proper checking of research. In addition, suggestions of constructive use of
The MAIC has made many contributions to
the mine-action community over the past
10 years, including holding conferences,
providing training courses and producing
various publications.

Dennis Barlow, Director of the JMU
MAIC since 1997, is a retired U.S.
Army Colonel who previously was the
Director of Humanitarian Policy in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the first leader of the Humanitarian
Demining Task Force in the Pentagon.
He has coordinated civil-military
actions with NGOs and the United
Nations in Panama, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Kurdistan and Haiti.

Dennis Barlow
Director
Mine Action Information Center
James Madison University
MSC 4018
Modular Building, Room 119
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Tel: +1 540 568 2756
Fax: +1 540 568 8176
E-mail: barlowdc@jmu.edu
Web site: http://maic.jmu.edu
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landmines in the defense of vulnerable
populations are made to refute the idea
of a necessary worldwide ban.
by Shelby Weitzel [ College of the Holy Cross ]

P

eople living in areas infested with landmines are
quite aware of the impact these mines have on
their well-being. For those of us living in “the developed world,” public awareness of the impact of landmines is due largely to the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines. From this campaign we have learned of
the physical, psychological, economic and environmental damage caused by landmines left over from past conflicts. We have also learned of ways in which, contrary
to the dictates of responsible use, landmines are used to
terrorize civilian populations. That the most vulnerable
populations in the world sustain much of this damage
makes this senseless violence particularly heinous.
From what we have heard, we might easily infer that
landmines are inherently problematic. However, focusing solely on these harms gives the false impression
that only bad consequences result from landmine use.
Furthermore, these arguments fail to consider that bad,
perhaps worse, consequences can result from a failure to

Minefields can be used to create barriers to defend vulnerable populations.
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use landmines, obscuring the fact that there
also have been and continue to be constructive uses for landmines with respect to vulnerable populations. I argue that landmines
have de facto served to protect vulnerable
populations. Consequently, the wholesale
stigmatization of the production and use of
landmines exacerbates the vulnerability of
some of the populations that the ICBL intends to protect.
Anti-landmine Rhetoric
Genuine, open dialogue and debate
regarding the production and use of landmines has been rather restricted. There are
at least three possible explanations for this,
which need not be mutually exclusive:
1. The superiority of the arguments
against landmines has more or less
resolved any questions that would
generate open dialogue and debate.
2. The ways in which the arguments
against landmines are presented, rather
the content of the arguments, tend to
shut down open dialogue and debate.

3. The people with the kind of field experience and insight to revise or reject
the arguments against landmines
must “toe the line” if they want to
keep their jobs, lucrative contracts,
power and prestige that comes with
managing the response to the landmine crisis.
As long as explanation Nos. 2 and 3 remain
viable, we should be skeptical of No. 1. I will
focus on explanation No. 2.
The strategy of ban proponents is fairly clear. According to Canadian Deputy
Permanent Representative Ambassador to
the United Nations Gilbert Laurin, “Meeting landmine survivors—most of them civilians and almost half of them children—is
the best way to dispel forever the myth of
‘responsible use’ of landmines. It is the most
powerful way of convincing all states that an
outright ban on this weapon is the only feasible way forward.”1
The landmine survivors are not there
merely to attract attention, although that is a
necessary first step. Their plight is to be taken

as a moral argument that refutes any claims
that landmines can be regulated or designed
to prevent such incidents in the future.
Most of us will never meet a landmine
survivor; instead, we are shown graphic photos and are presented with disturbing details
of their suffering.2  Without the photos, many
people could not begin to comprehend what
is at stake for a landmine victim; the images
jar us from our complacency. One scholar describes this as “priming” the audience.3
Problems with the strategy emerge after
the audience has been primed. The audience has not merely acquired new facts with
which to make more informed judgments.
Emotional reactions to the photos include
shock, disgust and anger. Fortunately, these
reactions urge us to help. Unfortunately, because the photos and stories are shown in the
context of supporting the ICBL, the ICBL
has commandeered allegiance to the victims
by linking the images of the injured civilians to their agenda. The implication is that
if one believes that landmines might serve
useful purposes in present and future con-

IDGA’s 3rd Annual Asymmetric Warfare Conference
The Institute for Defense and Government Advancement will host the third-annual Asymmetric Warfare
Conference Oct. 16–18, 2006. It will be held at the Westin Arlington Gateway Hotel in Arlington, Va.
IDGA’s Asymmetric Warfare conference, “Explosives Detection, Avoidance, and Removal Technologies
in the Land Environment,” is a high-level, technology-focused event that will bring together
government, military, academia and industry to discuss information on existing warfare detection
capabilities, ongoing and future research and developments, requirements for explosives detection,
and avoidance and removal technologies.
Workshop topics will include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Countering the trends in improvised explosive device usage
Helping to defeat the IED threat: advanced handheld detection (AHED)
Protecting our troops in hostile regions
Next generation jamming technologies: staying one step ahead of the enemy
Developing improved explosive ordnance disposal tools and equipment
Reliable detection of IEDs in operationally significant environments
Information resources and delivery systems to enhance response capabilities
Robotic systems for mine detection: removing the threat
Developing and improving automatic mine recognition algorithms (ATR): numerical simulation
as a tool for developing countermine technology
• Better identifying the presence of explosives through sensor technology
• Addressing and combating chemical and non-conventional threats

For more information or to register for the conference, visit www.idga.org or call +1 800 882 8684.
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texts, then one must not be taking seriously
enough the trauma inflicted on children resulting from landmines left over from past
conflicts.4 Believing this, many people are
reticent to express skepticism.
The lack of discussion also allows unsubstantiated, if not outright indefensible,
claims to go unchallenged. Cited figures
exaggerate the number of mines deployed,
the likely costs of demining and the expected number of civilian and deminer
injuries. Other claims are technically correct but function as distortions because
they are taken out of context. As Kenneth
Rutherford, Co-founder of Landmine
Survivors Network, explains, “Many of the

in landmine issues is “against” the vulnerable populations that are being victimized.
Military personnel who use landmines in
campaigns to protect civilian populations,
as in the case of Sarajevo, are not against
the victims, nor are the engineers who
design “smart mines” with self-destruct or selfdeactivating mechanisms. Proponents of the
ICBL simply do not merit an exclusive claim
to concern for the civilian victims of mines.
The unwillingness to question arguments
put forth against present landmine use further obscures what is really going on. When
someone in a position of authority claims that
meeting a landmine survivor can “dispel forever the myth of responsible use,” we ought at

about the moral legitimacy of the use of
landmines per se.
Why Use Landmines?
The purpose of landmines and the reasons for their effectiveness in war have been
clearly articulated elsewhere. Two uses are
relevant here. First, landmines reduce the
mobility of opponents. Second, landmines
are “force multipliers,” meaning they are
a factor that increases the effectiveness of
military force. What this means is that just
about anyone can erect defensive barriers
cheaply and effectively. Landmines achieve
these ends because they inspire fear. The
injuries sustained are particularly brutal in

“I argue that landmines have de facto served
to protect vulnerable populations.”

statistics generated by NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], however, are inflated and, more significantly, regurgitated
by the media and policymakers without
proper fact-checking and research. Some
of the over-inflated figures have become
so widely used that original sources and
methodological data-collection techniques
are unknown.”5
Consequently, “some landmine figures
are repeated so often that they are now regarded as fact.”6 There are good reasons to
question the accuracy of these “facts.” If we
don’t know how they were gathered, then we
can’t tell if they are unwarranted extrapolations. If we don’t know who conducted the
research, then we can’t be sure that the research design and interpretation of the data
are unbiased.7 Concern for landmine victims
is laudable, but not if it ignores or abuses the
truth in the quest to help.
Lastly, the lack of balance in the debate
has allowed the blurring of distinct issues.
The ICBL reports on “the problem” as if
there were only one.8 If there is only one
problem, then we need only one solution—
theirs.9  The real picture has been distorted.
We can begin to clear away the hyperbole by recognizing that the strategy of using photos to promote an anti-landmine
agenda is a red herring. No one involved

least to ask him for clarification. When someone like James P. Grant, former Executive
Director of UNICEF, claims, “Given the
destruction and damage anti-personnel
landmines can cause to children and to their
development and living environment, arguments in favour of such weapons cannot be
morally justified” 10 (emphasis added).
We should ask, “Cannot? In what sense?”
Why, for instance, would it be worse to accept the risk that some villagers, including
children, may be killed or maimed by landmines than to allow an entire village, including all of the children, to be raped, tortured
and killed because they lacked the means to
defend themselves? Poor inferences, absolutist language and conflations of distinct concerns distort landmine issues.
In order to properly evaluate the moral
legitimacy of the use of landmines, one
must do more than view vivid photos and
selective statistics. Photos and sound bytes
may prime an audience, but they do not
constitute an argument. Those who malign
the production and use of landmines seem
to have overlooked what the outcome would
have been without mines in many troubled
regions. While the humanitarian crises resulting from decades’ worth of abandoned
mines are real, they should not prevent us
from conducting an honest, open inquiry

both the short and long term. Witnesses to
the trauma are often traumatized themselves,
creating a wider demoralizing effect. Hence,
much of the strength of landmines lies in
their obvious deterrent effect.
In the military, one does not always have
the choice to avoid entering a minefield.
Part of what we find so upsetting about the
civilians who are injured is that they too
had no real choice but to enter mined territory, whether compelled by hunger or the
lack of understanding to avoid mines. But
there are those people who do have a choice,
namely aggressors and profiteers. In these
cases people may be trying to protect their
own territories from aggressors or bandits.
For the mines to be effective, the would-be
aggressor has to know where mines are in
the area, therefore there is little to no risk
of injuries sustained by landmines so long
as people heed the warning. What follows
are examples of contexts in which the impact of the presence of landmines is considerably more complicated than one might
otherwise have thought. Although these
examples are not sufficient to prove that
production and use of landmines is morally
justified, they do suggest that our response
ought to be more nuanced than proclamations that propose nothing short of a complete ban is remotely justifiable.
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Shelby Weitzel received her Ph.D.
in philosophy from the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in
2002. She is currently the BrakeSmith Assistant Professor in Social
Philosophy and Ethics at the College
of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Mass.

Shelby Weitzel
Department of Philosophy
College of the Holy Cross
Box 20-A
One College Street
Worcester, MA 01610 / USA
Tel: +1 508 793 3454
Fax: +1 508 793 3841
E-mail: SWeitzel@holycross.edu
Web site: http://www.holycross.edu
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Protecting vulnerable populations
from armed forces. Whether or not one
believes a line between combatants and noncombatants can or should be maintained,
the fact is many aggressive parties are willing
to force noncombatants into their conflicts.
Whether the noncombatants are “innocent”
or are implicated by association and by providing indirect support to combatants, they
require defense. To the extent landmines
help to provide that defense, they protect
children and farmers, viz, those people who
tend to be the focal point of the humanitarian campaign to ban landmines.
If we take the moral argument against
all landmine use seriously, then we have to
conclude that it is wrong to use mines to
defend these populations. If we join supporters of the ICBL in stigmatizing landmine use, we must also stigmatize people
who want to defend these populations. We
would have to stigmatize people who are
glad mines are used to defend them from
rape and murder. We would have to stigmatize families of soldiers who are glad that
their spouses and children have one more
means of ensuring that they come home.
Suppose for the moment the choice to use
mines is mistaken. Even so, what this warrants is education, not vilification. But there
are many cases where the choice to use mines
was not mistaken; the choice to use mines
saved lives. For instance, it was thick belts of
landmines that protected thousands of residents in Sarajevo from meeting the same fate
as Srebrenicans. Perhaps next to the photos
of people who were injured by landmines, we
should add the photos of women and girls
who were not raped, and fathers and sons
who were not removed in the night.
Self-defense of vulnerable populations. Although proponents of the ICBL
often work in or come from countries afflicted by landmines, the framework that
they have developed does not seem to take
into account all that it should. There is
something wrong with the strategy to the
extent that it includes vilifying those who
try to protect parties who do not wish to be
included in conflicts. But perhaps an even
more troubling problem pertains to cases
of landmine use, which the general public
tends not to hear about. The way one learns
of these cases is by speaking to people in
the field: deminers and the people who live
there. Consider the following example:
Cambodians have endured a longstanding problem with bandits. Kidnappings associated with the Khmer Rouge received
attention but are now dismissed as a thing of
the past. At least some of the deminers who
were working in Cambodia in the 1990s

know that at times it was the villagers who
were laying mines to protect themselves from
attack and theft by dispersed Khmer Rouge
and other bandits.11 Travel Web sites assure
us that it is now safe to travel to Cambodia.
Perhaps for tourists, it is.
Let us return to the case of Sarajevo.
Deminers are currently assisted by maps
showing where conflicting armies deployed
mines. However, their mission is considerably more difficult because not all mines
were deployed by military forces. According
to Dino Bulsuladzic of the University of
Western Australia, “There are  zones that
were not mined by the military but rather
by civilians themselves. One example is that
of houses and gardens, more or less isolated,
[that] were mined by their owners for protection out of fear of being attacked. The
minefields of Sarajevo, in reality, are many
more than those marked on the maps.”12
These were civilians using mines to protect
themselves while United Nations peacekeepers watched as everything these citizens held
dear was being destroyed.
Conclusion
To demonize landmines per se is to demonize not only the guerrillas and the oppressive regimes that are effectively judged
by their aims and methods anyway. There
are people who use mines for their own
defense in the longstanding absence of adequate protection from police, the military
and even the United Nations. To pretend
that landmines do not serve these purposes
is to obfuscate the conditions of the vulnerable populations who are compelled to
use them to defend themselves when no one
else will.
Although people who oppose all landmine use have not caused the acute problems faced by vulnerable communities, I
would suggest that the stifling of debate and
the willful overlooking of such cases implicates them in terms of skewing our response
to these communities. If noncombatants
turn to landmines for self-protection, they
must be particularly vulnerable. When the
self-appointed authorities on the matter fail
to acknowledge such cases exist, it makes it
sound like there are no such cases, rendering the extent of their vulnerability invisible.
And when we pretend landmines never help,
we worsen the situation of some communities. Because by denying them recourse to an
effective tool, we make them more vulnerable. And by denying ourselves recourse to
an effective tool, we make it easier to give
ourselves permission to claim that there is
nothing we can do either.
See Endnotes, page 109

A Firm Foothold:
f o c u s

Protecting vulnerable human populations. The ICBL has done a great service in raising awareness about the damage
caused by landmines. Much of their case
rests on the fact that mines do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. As we know, the damage extends far
beyond the physical injuries themselves.
The social stigma and the added economic
burden that a loss of a productive person
creates for victims and their families are
additional harms.
Further harm results not from actual
detonations, but from the belief that landmines are present in the area. The threat of
mines blocks access to vital resources such
as land, water, housing, public buildings,
infrastructure and transport. Avoiding injury requires curtailing or refraining from
securing subsistence or additional economic
productivity. To make matters worse, mined
roads prevent the transport of goods once
collected or grown, thereby preventing income and trade.
However, while landmines can be used
by someone on the outside to keep a group
contained within a confined territory, so too
can they be used to protect a group within a
circumscribed territory by keeping dangerous persons out. Landmines were originally
intended for purposes of defense; the fact
that some now use them on the offense does
not mean that landmines cease to play this
defensive role.

RONCO Operations in Sudan
Over the past four years, RONCO has established a continuing presence in Sudan,
following the Nuba Mountains ceasefire, with the deployment of quick-response teams
to conduct emergency mine-clearance tasks. Currently, RONCO is creating and
sustaining an indigenous mine-clearance, survey and disposal capacity in southern
Sudan on behalf of the United Nations. In addition to the threat of extensively mined
roads and infrastructure, RONCO had to overcome a number of obstacles, including
inclement weather, disease and an increasing security threat due to rebel activity.
Sudan’s austere and hostile conditions
are not dissimilar to those RONCO
experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq,
but as RONCO has discovered in those
two countries, the long-term impact of
the work far outweighs its challenges.
by John Lundberg [ RONCO Consulting Corporation ]

S

udan presents a variety of problems for mineaction operations. Control of the country, which
had been at war since 1983, is now divided between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), with
government forces claiming the majority of the north
and both sides maintaining some control in the
south. Both the government and the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Army used landmines throughout the civil
war and as a result, landmines now pose a serious threat
to civilians. For example, the United Nations reports that
in 2004, landmines were responsible for more than 15 
deaths and 30 injuries. The actual number of deaths and
injuries has likely been higher but goes unreported due to
the difficulty of access throughout much of the south.
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RONCO’s MDD teams were integrated with manual and mechanical
mine clearance operations in South Sudan.

Flooding during the rainy season made the roads in Malakal impassable at times.

Internally displaced persons fleeing conflict
areas such as the Darfur region are at particular risk because they have little or no local
knowledge of potential threats and are often
forced to move regardless of the potential
landmine problem.
Both the Sudanese government and the
SPLA have accepted assistance from the
United Nations, which is in the process of
implementing a plan to eliminate Sudan’s
landmine threat. In 2002, the United Nations
established the National Mine Action Office
in Khartoum, along with regional offices
in central and southern Sudan, and various
suboffices scattered throughout the country.
From these locations, the United Nations carries out all aspects of mine action, including
mine clearance, mine-risk education, survivor assistance and stockpile destruction. The
NMAO is responsible for coordinating those
efforts and helping build a lasting mineaction presence in the region. Unfortunately,
its operations have often been interrupted by
the ongoing conflict.
Following the most recent peace-treaty
agreement between the government and the
SPLA in January 2005, the United Nations
moved quickly to establish the U.N. Advance
Mission in Sudan with the goal of helping to ensure a lasting peace. It was quickly
evident that mine-affected roads severely
curtailed relief efforts and prevented development aid from reaching its destination, also
hampering peacekeeping activities and affecting the food supply of more than two
million people.
The RONCO Response
As a result of the above conditions, in
May 2005, the United Nations contracted
RONCO to provide the mine-action capacity necessary to support its programs.
In response, RONCO deployed two international clearance teams to conduct
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emergency clearance tasks and a training
team to develop a Sudanese demining/
explosive ordnance disposal capacity in
Wau and Malakal. Local capacity was to be
developed in the following areas:
• Emergency EOD
• Mine clearance
• Battle-area clearance
• Bunker and stockpile clearance
RONCO was uniquely prepared to quickly respond to the United Nations’ needs,
having extensive experience creating and
deploying its Quick Reaction Demining
Force, a Mozambique-based team developed
to respond to emergency tasks on short notice. RONCO initially deployed this force
to Sudan in 2002, following the ceasefire
agreement, where it greatly aided the safe
return of internally displaced persons and
increased the flow of humanitarian assistance through the Nuba Mountains. But
the 2005 Sudanese deployment necessitated
a more permanent force and the rapid development of local capacity. RONCO’s assistance included a management team, two
international clearance teams and two training teams—each complete with medical and
support staff, interpreters and all administrative, technical and logistical resources
required. In just one month, this force was
fully operational. It had established a liaison office in Khartoum, completed recruitment of local nationals, established two base
camps in Malakal and Rumbek, begun all
training preparations, and completed all certification requirements. Moreover, the force
was flexible enough to take on a variety of
EOD/demining tasks, quickly and efficiently train a local capacity, and cope with the
unique challenges of demining in Sudan.
In September, under two additional U.N.
contracts, RONCO began training EOD,
battle-area clearance, demining and minerisk education teams to increase capacity in

the cities of Juba and Ed Damazin. Eight
mine-detection dog teams were also trained
in Kadugli, in central Sudan, where they are
assigned to support RONCO’s demining
teams, although they have also briefly
deployed in support of two other clearance
organizations in the south. Finally, a survey
capacity was deployed to Wau. Since the
initial training of the Sudanese mineaction team in May, RONCO teams have
been involved in a variety of clearance tasks
critical to U.N. operations, including the
destruction of weapons caches, battle-area
clearance on future U.N. sites, and roadclearance tasks crucial to the relief effort in
southern Sudan.
The Challenges of Operating
In Sudan
Based on their long history of operating in austere environments, most recently
in Iraq and Afghanistan, RONCO’s teams
were prepared for the challenges of operating in a remote and hostile environment.
Nevertheless, operations in southern Sudan
proved far from routine, and the difficulties of security, supply, lack of transportation infrastructure and the inhospitable
weather proved to be a persistent challenge
to RONCO operations in the country.
Security concerns. The Lord’s Resistance
Army, a rebel group that routinely crosses the
border from Uganda into southern Sudan,
is a concern for demining operations in
the area. The group recently ambushed a
Fondation Suisse de Déminage convoy near
Juba and killed two deminers. As a result of
this incident and a continued LRA presence
in the area, RONCO was directed to close its
forward camp and fall back to its base camp
at Juba until the situation stabilized. A number of areas in the south are now considered
off limits, and many areas require the presence of armed escorts. As discussed below,

concern over the operations of the LRA had
a major impact on RONCO’s operations on
the Juba-to-Yei road.
Another major security concern arose
in August, following the death of Dr.
John Garang, the newly elected First Vice
President of Sudan. As a result, the United
Nations directed RONCO to suspend operations in Malakal for six days. In addition, security authorities were in the area
stopping RONCO’s local nationals during
their pre-dawn travel to the training/work
sites. These precautionary detentions were
impacting RONCO’s ability to train and
operate. In response, RONCO created identity cards for its local nationals to vouch for
their employment.
Supply challenges. Keeping operations
supplied is hardly routine in Sudan, as road
access throughout much of the south is difficult due to inadequate infrastructure, security issues, the presence of landmines
and weather concerns, particularly during
the rainy season. Supplying operations in
Malakal proved especially difficult, as there
is no road access to the city, necessitating the
airlifting or barging of supplies down the
Nile—a five-day trip from the nearest port,
Kosti. In addition, the limited road access between Wau and Rumbek and the total lack of
access between Rumbek and Juba also made
air transport a necessity, even though it is expensive and, in Sudan, unreliable, sporadic,
and sometimes extremely limited.
RONCO’s supply challenges didn’t end
there. Getting equipment into the country has proven challenging; the Khartoum
custom authorities continue to be slow in
releasing shipments, not only for RONCO,
but for the United Nations and others. Incountry construction materials such as steel
are expensive to procure, and bricks are
smaller and of lesser quality than elsewhere.
Gasoline has been of poor quality and very

expensive, averaging as much as US$5.50
per liter (US$20.82 per gallon).
Weather and disease. Weather is a major
factor in Sudan, and it can severely hamper
operations. The daytime temperature can
reach more than 122 F. During 2003, excessive heat precluded operations for 14  days
in June, 10 days in July, 25 days in August
and 20 days in September. During the rainy
season, dirt roads turn to a thick mud, slowing operations to a crawl and hampering the
mobility of all vehicles.
The terrain in southern Sudan also lends
itself to flooding. The ground is low and flat
with virtually no natural drainage, and the
soil saturates quickly, resulting in standing
water even during the brief periods when
it is not raining. At times, some areas have
been under as much as six to 10 inches of
standing water. In Malakal in particular,
the mud made operations almost impossible
for three-and-a-half months in 2005, from
August through November, forcing the relocation of RONCO training of local nationals
from Malakal to the Nuba Mountains. While
flooding was not quite as bad in Rumbek,
RONCO operations there were shut down
due to weather for more than 40 days in
2005. Bruce Burnett, RONCO’s Chief of
Party in Sudan, summed up the relentless
difficulties of the country’s weather: “In
the wet season, nothing moves; and in the
dry season, the ground is very hard, which
makes demining extremely challenging.”
Disease, particularly malaria, is also a
serious problem in Sudan—a problem exacerbated by the general lack of adequate
medical facilities throughout the south.
Instructing personnel on the proper use of a
malaria prophylaxis has proven to be crucial
in maintaining operational tempo. Rats and
poisonous snakes are also a serious health
hazard; tents that seal at the bottom and zip
to the top are necessary to keep them out.
Overcoming the Challenges
Historically, RONCO’s experience is
that the impact of clearance operations frequently outweighs its challenges. Despite
medical, security, transportation and weather issues, along with extended downtime
during clearance operations for the U.S.
Department of State from 2003 to 2005,
RONCO cleared hundreds of kilometers1 of
roads. Within weeks of clearing the road to
Kudru, the population grew from 15 to 90,
and after the road to Luba was cleared, the
population grew from 20 to over 100, significant increases that illustrate the importance of mine clearance in allowing refugees
and internally displaced persons to return to
their homes.

Clearance of the road from Juba to Yei
involved overcoming numerous obstacles;
since its completion in November, the impact of the operation is already having a
visible effect. The United Nations designated the road as a high priority for clearance
despite its location in the center of a highly
dangerous area near the known location
of LRA forces. While an armed section of
U.N.-supplied Bangladeshi soldiers provided
security at the task site, they were unable to
provide an armed escort for supply runs into
Juba, forcing re-supply by air. The cleared
road now serves as a much-needed route for
aid organizations and returning refugees and
IDPs, and its clearance has facilitated trade
with Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, providing for the economic
revitalization of the region.
RONCO is pleased to commit to building a local mine-action capacity in Sudan
and to bringing long-term stability and development to the country. With this help,
Sudan will soon have a growing ability to
independently sustain its own demining and
clearance operations.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Opening Roads to
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Angola’s Future

cleared. Over 200,000 people living within
five kilometers (three miles) of mined roads
can now safely use these roads to get water
from nearby rivers, access their farmland,
sell their products in markets, and send
their children to school. It also helps them
gain access to food aid and medical help, as
other nongovernmental organizations and
the World Food Programme are now able
to use the cleared roads to deliver food and
medicine. New infrastructure and development projects as well as commercial trade
and traffic, previously impossible because
of mined roads, will now commence and
benefit the population of the whole region,
almost two million people in total.
Up Close and Personal
The project is making a real and immediate difference in the lives of the Angolan
people, as Francisco Luca and his colleague
Laurindu Kutu (also a former soldier) told
me during my recent visit to Angola. HDI
was responsible for closely monitoring the
l traffic.
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Local villagers washing clothes near the Bridge of a Thousand Mines.

Angola’s Road Threat Reduction Project, funded by the Humpty Dumpty Institute, cleared heavily mined
roads in the country’s Planalto region. The project made safe travel possible among the over 200 small
communities and other bordering nations. With help from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and HALO
Trust, HDI opened several roads for the Angolan people, creating new possibilities for the developing government.

School children crossing the Bridge
of a Thousand Mines, while
HALO’s deminers conduct mine cleara
nce only feet away.

by Daniela Kempf [ The Humpty Dumpty Institute ]

“N

ow I have no fear any more of going to my farm down the road,”
said Francisco Luca, farmer and
resident of Chitembo, one of the hundreds
of communities located along a 200-kilometer (124-mile) stretch of a crucial provincial
highway recently made safe from landmines
in Angola’s Bie province. As a former soldier
and landmine victim from Angola’s devastating civil war, Luca knows about fear.
HALO Trust, a U.K.-based demining organization, has found and destroyed booby
traps and anti-tank landmines on this road
leading from Kuito to Menongue,1 a major
section of the only road between Angola
and Namibia.
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Milk Sale Clears Mines
The Humpty Dumpty Institute funded
the Road Threat Reduction Project with
a grant made possible through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. HDI received
US$770,000 from the sale of 500 metric
tons (551 tons) of surplus dried milk. HDI
used the proceeds from this USDA grant
to fund HALO Trust’s landmine clearance
operations in the Planalto region, once the
most fertile and now the most densely mined
part of Angola. As a rebel stronghold, it was
the site of the heaviest fighting between
União Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola forces and the Angolan government during 26 years of civil war. Since the

conflict ended in 2002, thousands of refugees are coming back to find their farms and
access roads mined. Many villages are completely isolated from the outside world due to
landmines found in the roads; aid agencies
cannot reach the villages and farmers cannot take their produce to market. The mines
have a stranglehold on Angolan post-conflict recovery and economic development.
HDI helped change that. As a result
of this project, over 350 kilometers (217.5 
miles) of previously mined roads have
been opened for traffic. An additional
15,000 square meters (161,458  square feet)
of densely mined land around bridges,
markets, farms and houses have also been

project and meeting the USDA’s strict
reporting requirements.
The only way to travel from Luanda,
Angola’s capital, to the Planalto region is by
plane, as the roads are mined and in otherwise bad condition. I flew to Huambo on a
small, rickety plane. After landing, I then
set off on a nine-hour, gut-wrenching Land
Rover ride via recently cleared sections of the
road to reach the current location of HDI’s
demining project in Chitembo. I camped
there that night with HDI’s demining teams
and shared with them a food called funge 2
for dinner while sitting around the campfire.
The following day I visited Rio Cusseque to
observe a manual demining team clearing a

crucial, very densely mined bridge, followed
by a visit to a mechanical task site on a nearby section of the road.
The “Bridge of a Thousand Mines”
The manual task at Rio Cusseque was declared a high priority by the Angolan government because children use the bridge every
day to go to school and villagers come to the
river to wash their clothes. The local people
call it the “Bridge of a Thousand Mines” and
HALO Trust confirmed in surveys that there
were literally over 1,000 landmines spread
out in the four corners of the bridge and
along both banks of the river, laid in 1985.3
HALO first cleared a small path to the river
and the top of the bridge itself, so the villagers could have at least limited use of it until
everything was cleared and declared safe.
While I was there, several women came
to wash their clothes in the river and gingerly walked on the narrow path that had been
cleared and marked, just inches away from
the still-mined section. I also saw a group of
25 children cross the bridge that morning on
their way to the nearby school, laughing and
running past the deminers who were in full
gear going about their dangerous work just
a few feet away.
Since then, a total of 1,102 mines have
been found at the bridge and destroyed, with
9,514  square meters (11,379 square yards)
cleared. An additional 2,260 square meters (2,703 square yards) have been “threat
reduced” by heavy rollers. All of the area
currently not under water has been cleared.
The final part of the mine line by the river
bank is expected to be cleared later in the
year when the water level is low.3
Making Roads Safe
I also visited HDI’s Road Threat Reduction demining team on the road from
Kuito to Menongue, which is an important and long stretch of the only road from
Angola to Namibia. This task was being
conducted with a multi-drive truck that had
a large loop metal detector in the front and a
trailer with weights in the back to detonate
any mines not found by the detector. A team
of manual deminers followed the truck and
conducted manual verification with metal
detectors. I was briefed by Gabriel Duarte
Marques, the leader of the team, and talked
to some of the deminers about their work
and how it affects them and their families. All the deminers hired for this project
have come from local communities affected
by the landmine problem in Huambo and
Bie provinces, and demining has provided
them jobs, skills and a steady income. Two
of the deminers I talked to, Alberto Rafael

Catimba and Pedro Domingo Nambi, who
both have large families, were well-aware
and proud of the positive impact their landmine clearance operations have on the community and the future of their country.
Landmines and Democracy
Clearing landmines and opening up the
roads also has political implications: Angola
is preparing for the first free parliamentary
elections next year, and these newly opened
roads will allow election officials to set up
polling places and send international monitors to previously isolated and unreachable
villages. When the day comes, voters will be
able to go to the voting booth without the
fear of landmines.
Angola is now free from war, but its
people are still struggling with destruction,
death and obstacles to development. In order
to truly begin post-conflict reconstruction
and set itself on the path toward democracy,
Angola needs to be freed from the plight
of landmines. The partnership among the
Humpty Dumpty Institute, the U.S. government and HALO Trust is helping to
clear Angola’s roads for a better future, safe
from the risk of landmines.
See Endnotes, page 109
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In Eastern Africa
Mines Awareness Trust has been involved in
many mine-action programmes that are aiding the
mine-clearance process and improving the way
of life for the people of eastern Africa. MAT has
performed needs assessments in Uganda and
has supervised the Ugandan Army. It has also
developed a partnership with the International
Mine Action Training Centre, which resulted in a
state-of-the-art mine-detection dog training facility
in Kenya. MAT’s collaboration with and assistance
to eastern African organisations has put the area
on the path to becoming mine safe.1
by Nigel Howard [ Mines Awareness Trust ]

I

The Sky News film crew interviewing the Johnson family.
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n January 2003, the Anti-Mine Network–Rwenzori asked MAT
Operations Director Ben Remfrey to conduct an assessment of
the Kasese district in western Uganda.   Reports from Uganda
stating there was a landmine and unexploded ordnance threat to the
local population drove the deployment.
Like many African countries, Uganda has experienced bloodshed
as a result of major internal conflicts during the years since independence, and today internal security problems remain with organisations like the Lord’s Resistance Army. The legacy of this fighting
is areas of land contaminated by anti-personnel mines and UXO as
well as approximately 1.4 million internally displaced people. These
problems are exacerbated by a recent influx of Sudanese refugees into
northern Uganda.
The Allied Democratic Forces further contaminated the western
region, particularly the Rwenzori Mountains, during the infiltration
and heavy fighting in the late 1990s. The most heavily contaminated
region, however, is still northern Uganda; it has been the area of some
of the fiercest fighting between the LRA and the Ugandan People’s
Defence Force.

Uganda Needs Assessment
The plight of the Johnson family became
a catalyst for action, and MAT set out to secure funding to conduct a needs assessment
and implemented a mine-risk education programme. The MAT report was sent to the
United Nations, which incorporated large excerpts as part of its official inter-agency report
in July 2004. Comic Relief 3 donated £50,0004
to MAT in June 2004, which enabled MAT to
conduct an eight-month needs assessment in
the western districts of Uganda.
Adrian Sahatciu, who had been a
member of the MAT Kosovo Mine Risk
Education Programme in the aftermath of
the Kosovo conflict in 1999, was the principal Needs Assessment Coordinator and was
assisted by Netsa Soloman, who had worked
for MAT previously in her home country of
Eritrea in 2002. The NA team based itself in
the Kasese district and, in conjunction with
Anti-Mine Network–Rwenzori, the team
members immersed themselves in the local
communities. During the two-week buildup phase, MRE Assistants were trained in
interview techniques, methods of systematic
collection and analysis of data, map reading,
radio transmission procedure and first aid, as
well as the preparation of reporting and briefing documents. After an initial three months,
the teams underwent a one-week refresher
course, primarily concentrating on map reading, ground appreciation5 and data analysis.
The objectives of the needs assessment
were to appraise the level of contamination in the subcounties of Kasese, identify
and record all known or suspected dangerous sites in the areas assessed, and identify
and/or verify all landmine/UXO casualties. The NA also sought to evaluate the
existing knowledge of the local population regarding the threat of landmines and
UXO, calculate the “at-risk” section of the
local community and analyse the socioeconomic impact of the landmine/UXO
contamination on the district.
Motorbikes proved to be a highly valuable asset to the team, as they were used to
access the most remote villages and thereby

obtain the information required to satisfy
NA objectives. With a determined and creative approach, the project staff managed
to gain the respect and trust of the people
of the Kasese district and gleaned valuable
information and data that can now be used
toward implementing an effective National
Mine Action Plan.
This NA is still the only detailed study
of any district in Uganda, and it identified
57 suspected dangerous areas. However, the
most heavily affected districts in the north
are yet to be fully surveyed. Additional donor funding is required to implement future
MRE and clearance programmes.
A New Partnership in Kenya6
The U.K.-funded International Mine
Action Training Centre opened 17 Feb.
2005. In under a year, the Centre has
trained and equipped 370 African deminers to International Mine Action Standards7

countries were needed. Consequently, the
IMATC sought a suitable organisation to
provide the technical ability and discovered
MAT working in Uganda.
A new partnership has now evolved
whereby IMATC trains the various African
armies/police units to conduct particular aspects of humanitarian mine action (whether
that be manual mine clearance, battle-area
clearance, EOD or Technical Survey), and
MAT provides the Technical Advisors to ensure the training occurs and that standards
are rigorously maintained.
The IMATC is ideally located in
Nairobi, Kenya, on the doorstep of some
of the most deeply affected African nations. The IMATC is currently involved in
training personnel for demining operations
in Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda and
Somaliland. With the majority of mineaction nongovernmental organisations that
operate in and around eastern Africa having
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Mines Awareness Trust

During his time in Uganda, Remfrey
met the Johnson family, who survived the
tragedy of the war that raged around them.
They returned from their displacement to
their devastated village with their five children and set about rebuilding their home
and livelihood. The children were playing
to the rear of their home when there was
loud explosion. They had found what is now
believed to be an M79 submunition, 2 and it
detonated, killing three of the children instantly and severely injuring the other two.

Ugandan police officers undergoing demining training at the IMATC.

to conduct demining, battle-area clearance
and explosive ordnance disposal operations
on U.N. missions or as part of their national
programmes in their own countries.
The IMATC offered to train and equip
the Ugandan People’s Defence Force Army
engineers for humanitarian-demining operations. The overall plan is for up to 140
UPDF engineers to be trained and seconded8 to the Ugandan Mine Action Centre.
The IMATC has trained and equipped
20 UPDF soldiers and 40 Ugandan Police
Officers to conduct demining and EOD
operations with an aspiration to train an
additional 80 soldiers in 2006. It was soon
discovered that training alone would not
be sufficient for this programme to be fully
effective. Supervisors with the necessary experience and expertise to supervise, monitor and mentor the teams in their home

their regional offices in Nairobi, this new
partnership between MAT and the IMATC,
along with additional assets that MAT is currently developing, will provide other NGOs
with a constant source of mine-action assets
for use in a plethora of ways.
Both the IMATC and MAT were the
subjects of a Sky News documentary at the
end of 2005, where the MAT operations team
accompanied Derek Tedder (Sky News correspondent) and Kevin Capon (British Army
cameraman) to the Rwenzori Mountains in
Uganda to interview Mrs. Johnson and other
landmine survivors. They then returned to
Kenya to film the Ugandan police officers
undergoing EOD training at the IMATC.
Positive Action
The programme to train the UPDF
soldiers and Ugandan police officers at
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M79 submunitions.

balance10 that the MAT team has to manage,
as there must be some close supervision to ensure standards are maintained while allowing
the command element to develop.
The government of Uganda’s mineaction aspiration is to free the country from
the most severe humanitarian and economic
effects of landmines and UXO by 2009. The
prioritisation of mine-action tasks will be
in accordance with the government’s newly
published document, “National Policy for
IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons],”11 taking into consideration the government’s rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements.
In order to implement this policy effectively,
the staff needs a great deal of cultural sensitivity and empathy to ensure that the right
capability is employed to maximum effect.
Concurrently, MAT has secured additional funding from the UNDP to conduct another needs assessment, which will
concentrate on the two northern districts
of Lira and Soroti. With the desire for this
NA to incorporate even more districts, there
is a creditable drive by all involved toward
securing more funding to make this possible
so that valuable and critical information
required for a focused and efficient mineaction plan can become a reality.
Mine Detection Dog Programme
At IMATC
With the development of Uganda’s
mine-action capacity, MAT has started

to build a mine-detection dog training
facility on the grounds of the IMATC.
A continued partnership with Securatec,
a German-owned commercial dog-training
company that operates globally, means that
the supply of high-calibre and well-trained
MDDs will soon be well-established in
eastern Africa to move and support a myriad of mine-action
programmes/agencies in countries such as Uganda, Rwanda,
Somaliland and South Sudan.
Damian Leitch, the MAT
Technical Advisor and head of
the MDD training facility, the
Dirk-Ridge Dog Centre, controls the day-to-day running of
the centre and occasionally assists
the instructors from the IMATC
during the course. Leitch provides
specific EOD knowledge from his
experiences gained during his career in a British Army EOD team
operating in countries such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and
Macedonia. Andreas Steineberg, the
MDD TA employed by Securatec,
is responsible for the actual dog and
handler training beyond the standard required by the IMAS.
Once the MDD teams are trained, MAT
will deploy them to countries that have
a need for MDDs, and with the help of
NGOs/commercial organisations, will put
the MDDs to work, utilising them in area
reduction and quality assurance as part of a
national mine-action programme.
The Future
MAT has provided programmes in
Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo for many years. It is now implementing mine clearance and needs assessments
in Uganda and developing an MDD capability in Kenya. MAT aims to consolidate
these activities and to expand its “toolbox”
method of clearance.
With the influx of mine-action activity
in Sudan and as donors are re-educated to
the plight of Africans living with the threat
of landmines and UXO, a concerted effort
to use every method available to clear land is
needed so the people can return to their way
of life without fear of death or injury. Without
a multifaceted mine-action programme fully
implemented at the U.N. or national level,
Uganda will be unable to free itself from the
threat of landmines and UXO.
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
focus/howard/howard.htm/#addlrefs
See Endnotes, page 109

Picking the Right Tool for the Right Task:

Mine Clearance with the MineWolf
Machine in

Sudan

In 2005, Norwegian People’s Aid used the mechanical mine-clearance
machine MineWolf to aid in the demining process in Yei, South Sudan.
The MineWolf system combines both the tiller and flail systems. The mineclearance team overcame several challenges to transport the 25-ton machine
to South Sudan. Once there, the MineWolf was used to clear over 280,000
square meters (69 acres) of land, including a school complex, a planned
housing complex and a teacher-training centre.
by Christoph Frehsee [ MineWolf Systems GmbH ]

S

udan has been embroiled in a civil war for all but 10 years
of its post-independence existence, making its internal battles
part of Africa’s longest running conflict. The civil war has
created a considerable problem with landmines and unexploded ordnance in Sudan. In general, the mines are located along communication and logistical lines and around towns and military facilities. In
2002, the United Nations reported that landmines on key logistical
routes were a great impediment to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Consequently, much of the aid has been delivered by air at tremendous cost. The involved parties have specified clearance of the road
network as the first priority, the second priority being access to water
and the third, food security. Almost four years after setting these
priorities, they are still struggling with the first one.
In 2005, Norwegian People’s Aid decided to support its mineaction program in Yei with a mechanical mine-clearance machine
called the MineWolf. The MineWolf is a German machine that
combines the advantages of both the tiller and flail systems. It is
designed as a multi-purpose toolbox to provide maximum flexibility
for the user, especially in the challenging environment of Sudan. As
a result of a feasibility study in January 2005, it became clear that in
order to support and move a 25-ton machine in South Sudan, a wellequipped and perfectly organized team must be formed to deliver
cost-effective results. The main challenges would be transportation,
hard ground conditions during the dry period and dense vegetation
after the rainy period. Based on its experience in the Balkans,
MineWolf Systems provided NPA with a tailor-made transport and
support solution.
Getting There and Moving Around
To achieve operational flexibility and maximum deployment,
the system needs its own transport and support assets. Taking into
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its national regeneration plan and assign essential funding and personnel.
At present, MAT Chief Technical Advisor
in Uganda Danny Danenbergsons is assisting in the development of the national mineclearance programme and will then deploy on
operations with the UPDF. It is a very delicate
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the IMATC to become humanitarian
deminers and EOD technicians respectively, was funded by the British government’s
Department for International Development
and the U.K. Ministry of Defence. MAT
has been contracted through the United
Nations Development Programme by the
Department for International Development
to provide the Technical Advisors to supervise the Ugandans in their new role, ensuring that the International Mine Action
Standards are maintained and the teams
operate at their maximum capability.
Upon completion of the course and repatriation to Uganda, MAT was essential
in helping to shape the strategic policy for
the deployment of these newly trained forces. The Office of the Prime Minister and
the mine-action Technical Advisor for the
UNDP have agreed to acquire the necessary life support9 and operational funding
for the teams to undergo refresher training
and deploy to the field to conduct clearance
operations. This has by no means been an
easy feat, and with this new approach to
national capacity building, there is now a
heavy emphasis on the local governmental
infrastructure to include mine action within

MineWolf, a mechanical mine-clearance machine, working in Yei, South Sudan.
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Yei, South Sudan, after MineWolf clearance.

account the poor road conditions en route to
and within Sudan, the team faced off-road
challenges. MineWolf chose an ex-military
MAN—an 8x8  off-road truck equipped
with a mobile workshop—to pull the 16wheeled customized off-road trailer from
the port at Mombasa, Kenya, through
Kenya and Uganda into Sudan. In addition,
a Magirus 6x6 crane vehicle with bridging
equipment and spare parts was supplied.
The first stage of the journey brought the
team from Mombasa to the International
Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi,
Kenya, where a demonstration of the equipment was given to various donors and other
mine-action agencies. On Oct. 7, 2005, the
two trucks left Nairobi to drive to Koboko
in northern Uganda.
Getting Started
Ten days after leaving Nairobi, the
MineWolf convoy reached its final destination in Yei, South Sudan. Upon arrival,
the camp was set up, and training of the
Sudanese staff began, conducted in four
major stages. First, Michael Kelly, Senior
Technical Advisor for MineWolf Systems,
and Christoph Frehsee, Director of Product
and Services, conducted a general introduction to the MineWolf mechanical mine
clearing machine. Second, they gave indepth lectures on the operating procedures
for all team members. After that, specialized
case-study modules were taught for field coordinators, section leaders, operators, medics and deminers. Finally, the team had to
mechanically prepare a training area as if it
were a real minefield.
Only one month after the equipment
arrived in Africa, the NPA MineWolf team
started operations in the Ronyi community
on the Yei-Kaya Road. This first task was
covering the perimeters of the abandoned St.
Augustine Seminary School complex. Due
to heavy fighting in this area, the school was
moved to northern Uganda. The whole danger area accounted for more than 150,000
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Service by Joseph Lemi.

square meters (37 acres). Forces from the
government of Sudan protected Ronyi from
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army operations using landmines. There were numerous
reports of stake mines (POMZ1), which were
only visible in the dry season, as well as mine
accidents involving locals gathering building
materials from the abandoned school and its
gardens. During the first week of operations,
the MineWolf cleared 70,000 square meters
(17 acres) and activated two fragmentation mines along the main road. On a visit,
Aggrey Cyrus Kanyika, Executive Director
of Yei River county, and Matata Khamis
Charles, the Yei Community Development
Officer, inspected the task and confirmed
the high socioeconomic impact of the results
for the community. Furthermore, Kanyika
thanked NPA for deploying the MineWolf in
Yei county since “it certainly speeds up the
process and gives confidence that the mine
problem of Yei will be solved soon.”
Let’s Keep Things Running
Within 17 working days, the team completed the task and was ready for the next
deployment. The next tasks for the NPA
MineWolf team were to clear the area of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’
planned housing compound. The minesuspected area was located directly next to
a major road within Yei town. In order to
ensure maximum safety, guards had to block
the road and confirm that no one entered the
dangerous area during operations. Within
five working days, the team had cleared
28,000 square meters (7 acres) and handed
the land back to UNHCR.
After several mine incidents near the
teacher training centre in Lutaya, 3.5  kilometers (2 miles) west of Yei town, the NPA
MineWolf team was deployed as a rapidresponse task force.
On the morning of November 30, the
fully mobile team left the NPA camp. After
the team arrived onsite, the equipment was
unloaded, a control point installed and a site

SOP training.

reconnaissance conducted. The MineWolf
then cleared 13,000 square meters (three
acres) and activated five AP mines. The next
evening, only 36 hours after deployment,
the whole team arrived back at NPA’s main
camp with all its equipment.
For the next task, the NPA MineWolf
team was called to extend the Yei airfield.
With Yei having become the most important
entry point from Uganda, the 1.2-kilometerlong (3/4-mile) runway was too short for bigger cargo or personnel airplanes. To maintain
its important role in transporting the food
supply into South Sudan, the runway had
to be extended by another half a kilometer
(about a third of a mile) into the bush.
Based on these first promising results,
the NPA MineWolf Team was deployed by
the U.N. World Food Programme to open
the Yei-Juba Road, one of the most important transport lines from Uganda into South
Sudan. With Juba becoming the new capital of South Sudan, it is of great importance
that the road is opened for safe passage not
only to distribute food but also to develop
infrastructure and enable local trade. The
danger area was located on the old demarcation line between government of Sudan
and Sudan People’s Liberation Army forces
and was heavily mined from both sides.
Within the first 13 working days, the
MineWolf detonated five heavy anti-tank
mines, crushed eight AT mines to pieces
and activated 14 anti-personnel mines while
clearing more than 62,000 square meters (15 
acres) of road.
Hard Ground, Heavy Vegetation
And AT Mines
Depending on ground conditions and the
mine threat, NPA could choose to operate
the MineWolf with either the open tiller or
a standard flail. The use of quick couplings
facilitates replacement of the demining tool
attachments in less than 30 minutes. Both
tools are equipped with a proven depthcontrol unit for quality control.

After the team tried both methods, it
concluded that the tiller proved its sustainability and had a clear advantage over the
flail, especially against heavy vegetation
and hard ground. Furthermore, a tiller has
the advantage of continuously penetrating
the ground to the required depth since, in
contrast to a flail, the rotor is a solid piece
mulching the ground. Consequently, the
deployment of the tiller allows groundprocessing results unmatched by common
flail systems, particularly with respect to
vegetation and ground penetration.
The patented open-tiller design showed
unprecedented results when used against
both AP and AT mines. The basket-type

segment structure allows the mine blast to
expand through the tiller to avoid or reduce
damage. Nevertheless, the tiller is designed
in such a way that every 43.4  millimeters
(1.7 inches), a chisel with a diameter of 44 
millimeters hits the ground, ensuring that
every piece of soil is processed. This guarantees that even the smallest AP mines like the
M142 or the PMA23 will be hit.
In total, the machine cleared more than
280,000 square meters (69 acres) within the
first nine weeks of operation. The tiller successfully withstood several Type 72,4 M155
and TM-576 AT mines and also reliably
destroyed 21 AP mines, like the M14, and
bounding fragmentation mines like Type
69.7 No intact mines have been found behind the machine. The clearance result of
the MineWolf allows safe and fast manual
quality control as well as mine detection
dog follow-up.
In a recent issue of the Journal of
Mine Action, A. Griffiths of the Geneva  
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining stated, “Demining should be
about reducing the extent of the world’s
mined areas in as short a term as possible. Machines are here to do just that.”8
MineWolf Systems is committed to putting
this statement into practice.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Australia Rejects Anti-vehicle Mine Ban
Citing legitimate military use, the Australian government refused to support an
international ban on anti-vehicle mines, which the government last emplaced in
World War II.
Though the government has supported global restrictions to ensure the easy detection
of mines, it said anti-vehicle mines, which contain more explosive material and
require more pressure to detonate, still have legitimate applications.
Australian officials said the last time the government used the larger mines was
in 1942 during the Battle of El Alamein, Egypt.

10.1 | august | 2006 | journal of mine action | focus | 21  

ALL GR AP

the international community because it
lacks the resources to effectively sell the
programme’s needs and the progress that
is being made. To combat this problem,
Mauritania has obtained the assistance of a
Senior Technical Advisor from the United
Nations Development Programme and has
developed a clear strategy and transparency
in mine action.
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Near a minefield, objects like these are used in mine-risk education by BNDH and NGOs to alert the population
that an area is mined.

Conflict with neighbouring Western Sahara has left Mauritania
with a significant landmine problem. The country has taken
steps to reduce the impact of mines and with international
help, hopes to be rid of this scourge in time to meet its Ottawamandated deadline.
by Major Alioune ould Mohamed El Hacen [ National Demining Office ]

T

he mine and unexploded ordnance
problem in Mauritania results from
its involvement in the conflict in
Western Sahara. After Spanish withdrawal,
Mauritania occupied the southern third of
this country from 1975 to 1978. Along with
Moroccan forces, Mauritania fought the
Polisario Front independence movement for
the region.1
The exact scope and limits of the mine
problem in Mauritania are currently undefined because no Landmine Impact Survey
has been conducted, no records exist and
only limited information-gathering has
taken place. Mauritania, Morocco and the
Polisario all engaged in heavy mining, primarily around urban centres and key economic targets.1
Mines and explosive remnants of war are
found in the northern part of the country in
the regions of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Adrar
and Tiris Zemmour, mostly around the urban centres of Nouadhibou, Zoueratt and
Bir Moghrein. Mines can also be found close
to the towns of Choum, F’derick, Boulenoir
and at more remote locations all along the
northern and western borders.
A variety of mine types are present in
Mauritania, although the most common are
the French APID 51 (anti-personnel)2 and
ACID 51 (anti-tank).3 The mine situation has
a direct impact on the lives of nomads, people
known for their freedom of mobility, moving
daily, following their camels in the desert.
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Impact of Mines and UXO
Seventy percent of the previously nomadic population has become urbanised, a consequence of which is urban expansion into
the areas of defensive mine belts. Many of
these nomads still follow pastoral practices,
which has resulted in mine accidents involving people and valuable livestock, particularly camels. Northern Mauritania is known
as the best place to raise camels, so it attracts
all the nomadic populations in the region.
Finding landmines does not make people in
these areas want to move, because they have
heard stories that other regions are likely to
bring sickness to their camels, resulting in
poverty. The key economic activities of metal ore extraction and fishing are also affected
by the presence of mines.
Mauritania is developing as a tourist
destination and has seen a revitalisation in
the last few years; however, mines present a
significant threat in the desert areas popular with visitors. According to the Zoueratt
Regional Hospital, a national network of
NGOs and the military in charge of evacuation, the last mine accident in northern
Mauritania killed one Mauritanian and injured two Qatari tourists, and it illustrates
the potential impact mines have on tourism.
Mine Action
The Mauritanian government signed
and ratified the Ottawa Convention in
2000, becoming the 100th State Party.4

Mine-affected zones in Mauritania.

To implement a real programme for  humanitarian demining, the Mauritania government created two mine-action entities in
2000 following the implementation of the
Ottawa Convention: the Bureau National
de Déminage Humanitaire and the National
Committee in charge of implementing the
Ottawa Convention.
The BNDH, a dedicated entity within
the Mauritanian military engineers, is responsible for all mine-action-related activities in the country. This national agency is
the only demining capacity in the country,
conducting both mine/UXO clearance and
mine-awareness activities with partners.
The National Committee includes ministries involved in the mine-action issue—
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and
Justice, Parliament and nongovernmental
organizations. This committee is responsible for establishing the work plan for the
National Demining Office, including national priorities, and giving an annual report
on the implemented tasks to the BNDH and
national government.
Achievements to Date
Since the end of the war in 1978, the  
military engineers have been mainly responsible for clearing mines in Mauritania.
Between 1978 and 1999 these efforts resulted in the destruction of approximately 7,000
mines and 5,000 pieces of UXO. This clearance was conducted with limited technical
resources and utilising military techniques.
In 1999, the military adopted standard
operating procedures for humanitarian mine
clearance. These standards have improved
the safety and quality of the clearance itself,
but rigid adherence to foreign standards has
drastically reduced the clearance results.
After ratifying the Ottawa Convention,
the BNDH approached many donors in order to raise funds for implementing all the

Ottawa pillars.5 Mauritania received its first
support from the U.S. government, enabling
the national office to be built, have equipment and train Mauritanian deminers on
SOPs for quality assurance and control.
The BNDH also contacted other potential
partners—Mines Advisory Group, Halte
aux Mines Antipersonnel, States Parties and
other mine-action stakeholders—to begin
developing good relationships and to obtain their support. From 2004  to 2005,
Mauritania enacted a mine-risk-education
project made possible through funds from
Canada and the support of UNICEF.

9,000 students and Nouadhibou: 43 schools;
12,387 students). This field and school campaign used 33,000 posters and 35,000 schoolbooks to deliver the message.
Stockpile Destruction
Mauritania completed its stockpile destruction in December 2004. It took two
years for the country to destroy the 5,728 
anti-personnel mines, and it did so with
funding from Canada and support from the
United Nations Development Programme.
The country has retained 728 AP mines for
training purposes.1

Routes cleared and reopened

202 kilometres (126 miles)

Areas cleared

6,750,000 square metres (2,606,190 square
miles) (with quality control)

UXO

Over 2,300 items

Mines

Over 4,200 items

Conclusion
Mauritania can be free of landmines7 in
a short time with a little support from the
UNDP and the international community.
With this much-needed support, it should
be possible for Mauritania to meet its completion initiative by January 2011.
See Endnotes, page 109
Mauritania’s National Capacity
•
•
•
•

120 deminers (150 by mid-2006)
12 demining instructors
6 mine-awareness instructors
Specific equipment for clearance  (detectors, vehicles, etc.)
• With support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the BNDH has installed the
Information Management System for
Mine Action database.

Table 1: Mauritanian mine/UXO clearance.6
That project is the most important activity
carried out in the last two years by the mineaction programmes.
The results that have been achieved since
the introduction of the 1998  International
Mine Action Standards are listed in Table 1.
Mine-risk Education
UNICEF conducted the country’s main
mine-risk education activities in northern
Mauritania from 2004–2005  with funding
from Canada. The program focussed on nomads and children. UNICEF and the BNDH
trained 160 national NGO members to deliver the MRE messages in this region. The
trained national NGO members addressed
10,650 nomads (5,000 male, 2,500 children
and 3,150 female) with this extensive field
campaign. In addition to the nomads, 73
schools were included in the campaign, covering 21,387 students (Zoueratt: 30 schools;

Challenges
Shifting dunes. Many landmines are
known to be covered by dunes in the desert
and sometimes close to urban areas like
Zoueratt. As a result, it is very difficult to
have an accurate database. The dunes are
constantly moving; one day the mines are
visible and the following day the dunes cover
them to a point deeper than normal for buried mines. This presents a challenge in clearance because mine detectors may not work
to these depths. Mauritania is approaching
other programmes and specialised institutes,
for example the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining, to learn how
to best handle this situation.
Fundraising. To date, the main funding
source for Mauritanian mine action is the
Mauritanian government. The Mauritanian
programme for mine action has had difficulty getting financial support from
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Angola
Project
by Megan Wertz
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

R

oots of Peace, based in California,
was founded in 1997 by Heidi Kuhn
with the goal of freeing the world
from landmines. The organization takes a
unique approach to mine clearance, turning minefields into farmland. Currently,
Roots of Peace is working on two projects
in southeastern Angola. A 26-year civil
war resulted in landmines and unexploded ordnance being scattered throughout
the country and also created an unstable
economy. Roots of Peace is working with
Conservation International to clear access
corridors for elephants and with World
Vision to help Angola increase agricultural production.
Restoring Nature’s Balance
Landmines and unexploded ordnance
have not only affected the people of Angola,
but also disrupted the lives of elephants in
northern Botswana, blocking access to historical foraging areas in Angola and Zambia.
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Harvesting Hope
The landmine situation in Angola has
had a severe impact on the socioeconomic
state of the country. Landmines and UXO
have blocked roads, bridges and access to
farmland, resulting in an inability to meet
domestic food requirements. Blocked access
has also made it hard to provide medical attention and education on HIV/AIDS and
mines, specifically in the war-torn provinces
of Huambo, Bie and Benguela.
Roots of Peace and World Vision seek
to combine demining and redevelopment
efforts, stimulating the economy and agricultural development. The project consists
of three parts:
1. Clearing and rebuilding roads,
bridges and other priority areas:
Roots of Peace will conduct a mine
survey including mapping and education efforts. The organization
will also demine and reconstruct
roads and bridges, opening access to
regions in need of assistance.

2. Strengthening agri-business development and improving food security: World Vision will focus on its
already established Pro-Rural1 model
program, as well as food security
through subsistence farming.
3. Producing and exporting highvalue crops: Roots of Peace and
World Vision will work together on
this aspect of the project, executing
a plan to grow and market highvalue crops.
Bringing Back Security
Each project will raise US$10 million
over the next three years. The long-term impact of the projects will be great, helping the
people of Angola return to a self-sufficient
lifestyle and preserving the environment.
Working collaboratively with other organizations, the projects headed by Roots of
Peace are expected to increase the safety, security and stability of these regions.
See Endnotes, page 109

Survivor Assistance

through Technology Transfer in

Tanzania

This article describes how cutting-edge technology is being developed and disseminated in
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People are not the only ones affected by landmines; when
deminers open access corridors, these elephants will no longer
have to forage far and wide for food.

Landmines form a barrier separating
the Chobe region of Botswana from
the upper Cuando and Zambezi
Rivers. The elephant range within the
Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier
Conservation Area (KaZa TFCA)
has been reduced to a fraction of
its size by the landmine barrier.
Surpassing 130,000, the elephant
herd is increasing by approximately
5  percent each year, an unsustainable growth rate given the current
confinement. The growing herd is
disturbing local communities and
destroying the surrounding environment by overgrazing the area.
Working with Conservation
International, Roots of Peace
plans to implement a program to
open elephant access corridors,
conserve wildlife and stimulate
economic development. Roots of
Peace will head a demining operation to remove landmines from
historic elephant foraging areas,
coordinating with the government
of Angola, the provincial government of Cuando Cubango, and the
U.N. Development Programme–
Angola. Conservation International
will then work on ecotourism development based on wildlife conservation within the Luiana Reserve. It
is expected that the return of the
elephants to these historic habitats
will stimulate the economy through
an increase in tourism in the areas.

landmine-affected countries. Focusing particularly on
the Tanzania Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists, the authors examine how a process of appropriate, resource-effective casting is being advanced and
then shared through training workshops. Improved
technology and its successful transfer are vital to better assisting landmine survivors, a goal the Center for
International Rehabilitation is working to achieve.
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by Mary Stanton and Kim D. Reisinger [ Center for International Rehabilitation ]

A

lthough Tanzania does not have a significant landmine problem, the nation serves as home to the most recognized prosthetic and orthotic training institution in Africa. The Tanzania Training Center for Orthopedic
Technologists (TATCOT) trains practitioners from all parts of Africa, who are
then able to provide prosthetic and orthotic services to survivors of landmine and
other war-related injuries in their home countries. Based in Moshi, Tanzania,
TATCOT is currently the only training center in the developing world that has
received Category I certification1 from the International Society for Prosthetics
and Orthotics.
To disseminate innovations in prosthetic technology to landmine-afflicted nations, the Center for International Rehabilitation has been conducting a series of
hands-on training workshops in training centers and rehabilitation clinics around
the world. In collaboration with TATCOT, the CIR organized and implemented a one-week workshop to train professionals in the use of the CIR Transtibial
Prosthetic Casting System in June 2004. The objective of the workshop was to
transfer the knowledge developed at the CIR to faculty and students in order to
improve the quality of care available to landmine survivors throughout Africa.
The casting system, developed by CIR Research Director Yeongchi Wu, M.D.,
provides an appropriate, resource-effective solution for prosthetic socket fabrication. The system uses local materials to fabricate a prosthetic socket and artificial
limb in less than one hour. As a result, a landmine survivor can visit a clinic and
leave with a custom-made prosthesis in a matter of hours. The success of prosthetic
service provision and training in landmine-affected areas depends largely on the
technology used and the degree to which it fits with the local environment.

Dr. Yeongchi Wu, inventor of the CIR Transtibial Prosthetic Casting
System, demonstrates how clay can be applied to a positive plaster model to create a pressure relief in the final socket.

Appropriate Prosthetic Technology
It has been well-established that hightech Western prosthetic technologies are
not always suitable for developing countries.
The International Society for Prosthetics and
Orthotics stressed the use of appropriate technology at its Consensus Conferences in Cambodia 2
and Tanzania,3 defining appropriate technology as
“a system providing proper fit and alignment based on
sound biomechanical principles [that] suit the needs of
the individual and can be sustained by the country at
the most economical and affordable price.”2 There are
a significant number of efforts underway to develop appropriate prosthetic technologies for landmine-affected
countries; however, many have been designed and produced without accounting for key factors such as the
environment, local resources and culture.
Furthermore, many new technologies continue to
rely on older methods and resources that still require
a fully operational prosthetic clinic. It is necessary to
develop new products and fabrication methods that do
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not rely heavily on electricity, which can be
unstable in war-torn countries. These products and methods must also be portable to
rural communities in order to provide services to the many amputees who cannot afford to commute into urban areas to obtain
a prosthesis.
In response to the continued need for
appropriate technologies, the CIR operates a Rehabilitation Engineering Research
Center   4 on Improved Technology Access
for Landmine Survivors. Funded by
the U.S. Department of Education’s
National Institute on Disability and
Rehabilitation Research,5 the RERC
carries out research and development,
education and training, and technicalassistance activities. Much of the RERC’s
work has focused on the development
of assistive technology and prosthetic
solutions for landmine survivors. RERC
products and methods are designed for
global applications; although researchers must work with limited resources,
the new technology still adheres to the
high biomechanical standards for rehabilitation services.
The RERC has also developed multilingual training modules for use in its
technology transfer workshops and the
CIR’s distance-education program.
Throughout all landmine-affected countries and the developing world in general,
there are not enough qualified prosthetists
to serve the amputee population adequately; greater numbers of technicians must be
trained in order to meet the need for prosthetic service. One of the RERC’s goals is
to help meet this need by providing educational materials and workshops to improve
training opportunities for students and
professionals in the targeted areas.
Development of the CIR
Casting Technology
Along with the need for more
training, another barrier to increasing prosthetic service delivery is the
time-consuming customization
process of the prosthetic socket.
In many parts of the world, traditional prosthetic techniques
using plaster of Paris are still
being used for the fabrication
of sockets. Traditional casting and socket fabrication
methods require the prosthetist to cast the patient
on the first visit, using
a plaster bandage to obtain a negative mold of
the residual limb. The
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plaster is then poured into the negative
mold to produce a positive model, which is
then modified by the prosthetic technician.
Finally, the socket is fabricated over the positive model. The entire process can take up to
two days. These techniques require multiple
visits between the patient and prosthetist, as
well as non-reusable imported resources that
are costly in many developing countries.
The CIR Transtibial Prosthetic Casting
System, which has been the focus of many

An amputee tests out the CIR Transtibial Prosthetic Casting
System at the CIR training workshop at the Tanzania
Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists.

CIR workshops, exemplifies how appropriate
technology can be used to maximize time,
money and resources at rehabilitation clinics. Using vacuum power and sand in place
of plaster, the system produces a positive
model of the residual limb of a transtibial
(below-knee) amputee for prosthetic socket
fabrication in less than one minute. The
practitioner can modify the positive model
immediately in preparation for the formation of the customized prosthetic socket.
The system drastically reduces the amount
of labor and time previously needed for the
prosthetic fabrication process; it also utilizes
recyclable sand, lowering material costs.
Technology Transfer: Training
In Action
As the main regional prosthetic and orthotic training center for eastern Africa,
TATCOT offers a Bachelor of Science in
prosthetics and orthotics, as well as one- to
three-year diploma and certificate programs
in prosthetics and orthotics and a oneyear course for wheelchair technologists.
According to the United States Agency
for International Development, graduates
of TATCOT are currently employed in
more than 19 countries. 6 Additionally, the
International Committee of the Red Cross
created a program with the Tanzanian

government that includes the provision of
prostheses for up to 50 amputees each year.7
The CIR’s training approach involves
direct, hands-on interaction among the
workshop leaders and practitioners in attendance. By traveling directly to TATCOT,
CIR’s experts were able to explain the casting technology and gain a better understanding of TATCOT’s resources and needs. The
school’s objective of providing improved
training and increasing the number of orthopedic practitioners in Africa8 aligned
well with the CIR’s goals for distributing
its technology throughout the parts of
the world affected by landmines.
Twenty-four participants from
TATCOT and centers throughout
Tanzania attended the training workshop. Handicap Inter-national sent one
of its field managers, also a trained orthopedic technologist, from Sierra Leone
to participate in the workshop. Led by
Dr. Wu, the training covered a review of
existing technologies, a demonstration
of the system and intensive work with
patients. Participants were divided into
small groups to work on patient evaluation, casting and socket forming.
During the second half of the workshop, the participants learned about
proper prosthetic alignment and assembly and evaluated the gait of the patients
they had served. The workshop concluded
with an open discussion about the system
and its applications in the clinical setting.
Participants had the opportunity to exchange information, share their experiences
and gain new methodologies for the treatment of landmine survivors.
Future Progress
Through post-workshop reports from
TATCOT, the CIR learned that the participants continue to use the system periodically. TATCOT Director and International
Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics Resident Harold Shangali has been working
to further develop the system to accommodate transfemoral (above-knee) amputees
as well. With the technology successfully
transferred, follow-up communication between the CIR and TATCOT is ongoing.
Researchers at the RERC are developing
new generations of the system for further
testing and distribution worldwide.
In addition, the RERC has been working on other research and development related to assistive technology. These projects
include a prosthetic socket fabrication system, a wheelchair designed for use in rugged environments, a prosthetic alignment
measurement system and development of

new prosthetic foot designs. Testing for the projects has been carried out in field locations
including Nicaragua, El Salvador, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
To continue to foster communication among rehabilitation centers and create opportunities
for new partnerships with organizations serving landmine survivors, the CIR has created a network of 20 centers worldwide to disseminate its technologies and training materials. Through
the network, each partner organization serves as an extension of the CIR by way of its work in
landmine-affected countries and other developing regions of the world. Potential endeavors in
the future include additional collaborations with TATCOT and other rehabilitation centers and
organizations in Africa. The CIR continues to make efforts to work with international agencies
to find new ways to address the issues of effective survivor assistance in Africa and worldwide.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Earth-friendly Explosives?
Researchers in the United States report they have
developed “green” chemicals that can serve as a
viable replacement for lead-based materials used
as primary explosives to detonate all types of
explosives. Primary explosives ignite powerful
secondary explosions and are, while relatively
weak, very sensitive. More problematic, according
to recent studies, are toxic plumes released when
lead-based explosives are fired.
Chemists have long struggled with finding safe
chemicals to replace primary lead-based explosives
because of a need for a proper balance between
stability and sensitivity. One of the major
obstacles to developing a suitable replacement
has been that the new chemicals lose sensitivity
when wet.
Currently the chemicals used to make traditional
lead-based
primary
explosives
involve
high
levels of risk; therefore, most manufacturers
opt to import those components. The new “green”
chemicals, however, are not active until dried,
and can be stored indefinitely in their wet form.
The use of “green” chemicals could lead to safer
and more controlled production, make explosives
less sensitive, while also eliminating collateral
toxic plumes.
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Sudan
Mine Action Authority
Launches National

On 7 March 2006, the Government of National Unity in Sudan with
assistance from the United Nations Development Programme–Sudan
officially launched the country’s National Mine Action Authority at
Friendship Hall, in Khartoum, Sudan. The new NMAA gathers the other
mine-action entities in the country under its umbrella and represents
Sudan’s commitment to confronting and eventually eliminating its
landmine and explosive remnants of war problem.
by Qadeem Khan Tariq [ United Nations Development Programme ]

T

he Republic of Sudan is one of Africa’s most heavily landmineand explosive-remnants-of-war-affected countries. The true
extent of the problem in Sudan largely remains unknown as a
country-wide Impact Survey has just recently been initiated to measure both the scope and impact of the situation. However, current assessments indicate that Africa’s longest civil war has left 21 of the 26
states of Sudan affected by landmine- and ERW-contamination that
threatens the daily life of civilians, impedes the country’s economic
recovery and development, and delays the safe return of internally
displaced persons and refugees to their hometowns.
     The United Nations Development Programme is the lead U.N.
agency providing comprehensive management, technical and financial support to the relevant national authorities in Sudan on mineaction capacity-building issues. The UNDP is assisted in its mission
by the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the United Nations Mine
Action Service, UNICEF and several national and international organizations. The primary objectives of UNDP–Sudan mine-action
efforts include assisting Sudanese authorities to:
• Put in place the required legal and institutional frameworks for
mine action
• Build the capacities of concerned authorities to plan, manage,
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate all mine-action
activities in the country
• Build sustainable national capacities to undertake mine-risk
education, demining and victim-assistance activities
• Mainstream mine action into national recovery and development plans and the national budget
• Ensure physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine/ERW victims
• Develop a long-term resource-mobilization strategy
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The Republic of Sudan signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban
Convention1 on 4 Dec. 1997, and following its ratification on 23 Oct.
2003, the Convention entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004.
Establishing the NMAA
With technical and advisory support from UNDP–Sudan, the
National Mine Action Authority was established by Presidential
Decree No. 299, dated 24  Dec. 2005, in accordance with Article
58 (1) of the Interim Constitution for 2005 and Chapter VI (8.6.6)
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.2  The NMAA is composed
of four elements:
1. National Mine Action Committee
2. General Secretariat of the NMAC
3. National Mine Action Center (based in Khartoum)
4. Regional Mine Action Center in southern Sudan (based in Juba)
The NMAC is co-chaired by the Minister of Humanitarian
Affairs and Minister of National Defense, with the State Minister
of Humanitarian Affairs designated as the Secretary-General of the
NMAC. The NMAC is composed of representatives from 13 ministries of the Government of National Unity (GONU), two representatives from the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and one
representative from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.
The establishment of the NMAA addresses one of the key
requirements of the Mine Ban Convention in terms of implementation
measures. The NMAA will serve as the national policy and regulatory
body for mine action in the country. In addition, it will deal with
all matters related to the obligations of Sudan under the Mine Ban
Convention, which includes mine-action legislation, development
of national mine-action implementing structures, identification
and clearance of suspected mined areas, destruction of stockpiled

anti-personnel mines, and assistance to
landmine/unexploded ordnance victims.
Finally, the NMAA will ensure allocation of
funds for mine action in the national budget.
The Official Launching Ceremony
Opening session. About 250 representatives from various government ministries and
departments, diplomatic missions, the donor
community, U.N. agencies, national and international civil-society organizations, investment bodies and oil companies attended
the NMAA’s official launching ceremony.
Several national and deputy ministers of the
GONU, representatives of the GOSS and
senior officials from the United Nations including UNMAS, the UNDP, UNICEF,
the World Food Programme, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and the United Nations Mission in Sudan
also participated. Additionally, the opening
session was attended and addressed by:
• Republic President, His Excellency
Mr. Omar Hassan Ahmad El-Bashir
• His Excellency Mr. Kosti Manibe,
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
• Lt. General Abdel Rahim Mohamed
Hussein, Minister of Defense
• His Excellency Mr. Ahmed Mohamed
Haroun, Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs (and SecretaryGeneral of NMAC)
• Dr. Francis M. Kai-Kai,  Representative for the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General/
Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator of the U.N. System in Sudan.3
All the speakers welcomed the establishment of the NMAA and described it
as a milestone in the establishment of a national mine-action legislative and institutional framework.
In his opening address, Haroun highlighted the key responsibilities of the
NMAA. On behalf of the GONU, the
GOSS and the NMAA, he extended his
gratitude and appreciation to the U.N. community, the donor community, and all national and international organizations for
their valuable support to Sudan in addressing its landmine- and ERW-contamination
problem. He also expressed his hope that
this support would not only continue but
increase in the years to come.
Addressing the opening session on behalf
of the Deputy SRSG/Humanitarian and
Resident Coordinator of the U.N. System in
Sudan, Kai-Kai congratulated the government and people of Sudan for the bold and
progressive move to establish the NMAA
in order to address one of the most serious
challenges of post-conflict rehabilitation

and reconstruction. He
expressed hope that this
body will provide a national
platform for the coordination and consolidation of all
mine-action-related issues and
activities in Sudan and serve in
the best interests of landmine-  
and ERW-affected communities,
landmine survivors and the larger
Sudanese population.
Kai-Kai highlighted the fact
that within the U.N. system,
UNDP is the focal agency for the
development of national mine-action
capacities. UNDP will work closely
with the NMAA to develop the required institutional framework and
operational capacities to pave the way for
active national engagement, national ownership and national leadership. At the end, he
assured the GONU, the GOSS, the donor
community and civil-society organizations
of the United Nations’ determination and
commitment to provide all possible support to Sudan in addressing its landmine/
ERW contamination.
Addressing the opening session, President El-Bashir highlighted the importance of establishing the NMAA as one
of the first fruits of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement signed on 9 Jan. 2005,
and as a strong indication of the commitment and determination of the Republic of
Sudan to address its landmine- and ERWcontamination problem.
El-Bashir re-affirmed that, as a State
Party to the Mine Ban Convention, the
Republic of Sudan is committed and
determined to achieve a complete and comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines in
the country. This can happen through the
development and implementation of a comprehensive national mine-action framework
and strategy. Such a strategy will include the
establishment of the necessary legislative
and institutional frameworks. Additionally,
this strategy will require the development of
national management and operational capacities in order to undertake the provision
of mine-risk education, survey and clearance
of mine-affected areas, assistance to landmine survivors, and the destruction of stockpiled AP mines. The NMAA will serve as the
national focal body for achieving the mineaction goals and objectives of the country.
El-Bashir asked the institutions within the
governments of GONU and GOSS, as well
as the United Nations, the donor community and all concerned, to unify and increase
their efforts in addressing the landmine- and
ERW-contamination problem in Sudan.

El-Bashir also said the GONU has included mine action in its national budget for
2006 and will allocate funds for mine action
in the coming years. Realizing the long-term
nature of Sudan’s landmine- and ERWcontamination problem, El-Bashir urged
that GONU streamline mine action into all
reconstruction, recovery, and development
plans and projects. He highlighted that,
given the magnitude of the landmine/ERW
contamination, Sudan would need financial
and technical support as well as the cooperation of the donor community, the United
Nations, and national and international institutions for many years to come.
Working session. During this session,
representatives of the National Mine Action
Center and key U.N. mine-action agencies
(UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and
UNHCFR) gave presentations highlighting
the magnitude of the landmine- and ERWcontamination problem in Sudan, achievements to date, ongoing activities/projects,
the funding situation, challenges faced and
future plans. In particular, presentations
highlighted the following: Of the 950 suspected mined areas identified so far, 240
have been cleared; 3,221 kilometers (2,001
miles) of roads have been verified as safe; 617
kilometers (383 miles) of roads have been
cleared; and more than 571,000 Sudanese
citizens have received mine-risk education.
In addition, the importance and urgency
of the development of sustainable national
mine-action capacities to enhance Sudanese
ownership and leadership in addressing
the country’s landmine/ERW problem was
stressed. Availability of limited funding
for mine action, complex political and administrative systems, limited air and land
access to various parts of the country, and
the country’s poor communication system
were identified as a few key challenges in
addressing landmine/ERW contamination
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Ethiopian Mine Action Office:

Tackling Landmine Problems in

Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s landmine/unexploded ordnance problem is largely due to past wars and conflicts.
The Ethiopian Mine Action Office was created in an attempt to alleviate the situation. This article
in the country. The Commissioner General
of Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission
also presented highlights of the government’s vision and plans for addressing  the
landmine- and ERW-contamination  problems in the country and priority areas
for assistance.4
The presentations were followed by an
hour of open discussion and comments
among various ministries, national and international organizations, U.N. agencies
and individuals. The main discussion points
included the following:
• All the parties appreciated and
welcomed the establishment of the
NMAA and stressed that addressing the landmine/ERW problem in
Sudan must be taken as a “one country approach,” with unified national
planning, coordination and implementation across Sudan.
• Sudanese ownership and leadership
are vital to addressing Sudan’s
l a nd m i ne / E RW- c ont a m i n at ion
problem in the long term through the
development of a pool of qualified,
trained and experienced national staff.
• The building of local and national
capacities should be given priority
in the projects implemented by the
United Nations and international organizations.
• The NMAA will review, revise,
validate and consolidate all previous memoranda of understanding/
agreements, policy frameworks and
strategic frameworks related to mine
action in Sudan.
• The NMAA will hold broad-based,
comprehensive consultations and discussions with all concerned national
bodies, the United Nations, the donor community, and national and international civil-society organizations
in order to develop a comprehensive
strategy based on practical work
plans. The NMAA will re-convene as
soon as these consultations and discussions have taken place.
Closing session. The launching ceremony came to end with the statement of
Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice
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President of the Republic of Sudan and
President of the GOSS.
Mayardit thanked the United Nations,
the donor community and all other organizations and institutions that have assisted
and supported the Sudanese authorities and
people in addressing the landmine/ERWcontamination problem in Sudan. He welcomed the establishment of the NMAA as
a milestone in addressing the landmine/
ERW problem in the country and requested
all concerned national bodies, the United
Nations, the donor community and all national and international operators to work
closely with the NMAA in addressing the
landmine- and ERW-contamination problem in Sudan. Mayardit stated that in addition to the efforts of the GONU, the GOSS
will take all necessary measures in support of
the NMAA to establish an effective nationalcoordination mechanism by providing a national platform to all mine-action actors and
stakeholders in the country.
Mayardit further stated that the Republic
of Sudan and its people will ultimately have to
address the landmine/ERW-contamination
problem in the long term. Therefore, he made
a strong appeal to all the U.N. agencies, the
donor community and all other national and
international bodies to work closely with the
concerned national authorities within the
framework of the NMAA. This support will
contribute to building national management
and operational capacities, thereby enhancing national ownership and leadership. In
addition, he appealed to the donor community to allocate special funds to build local
and national mine-action capacities.
Conclusion
With the highest level of political commitment, establishment of the NMAA and
heavy involvement of the United Nations
and the international donor community,
the prospects of mine-action developments
in Sudan seem very positive. Of the 1,000
suspected mined areas identified so far, 270
have already been cleared by the implementing partners of the United Nations and
national and international organizations.
A number of key supply and access routes/
roads in the central and southern parts of the

country have already been verified to be safe
or cleared. With these positive developments
taking place, the problem of landmine/ERW
contamination in Sudan may be contained
very soon and Sudan will able to meet its obligations under the Mine Ban Convention.
The NMAA will further assist Sudan with
continued mine-action progress.
See Endnotes, page 109
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discusses the country’s history and the efforts made to make it safe.
by Zewdu Derebe [ Ethiopian Mine Action Office ]

E

thiopia has suffered from a landmine/unexploded ordnance problem
for more than seven decades due to
the following succession of conflicts, wars
and disputes:
• The Italian invasion in 1935
• The Ethiopia and Somalia conflict,
1977–1978
• The dispute with Sudan in 1980
• The Ethiopian Civil War, 1975–1991
• The recent conflict with Eritrea,
1998–2000
Though the Ethiopian Landmine Impact
Survey results need further verification, the
preliminary findings of the survey indicate
that 2,443 square kilometres (943 square
miles) of land contain mines. Over 1.9 million people in Ethiopia live in landmineimpacted communities, and the survey
identified 1,492 communities as impacted
by landmines and UXO. Three regions in
particular are contaminated: Tigray, Afar
and Somali.
To address this problem, EMAO was
established by the Ethiopian government
through the Council of Ministers
Regulation No. 70/2001, under the Office
of the Prime Minister. EMAO acts as the
government’s focal point for management
of mine-action operations and related
activities. It is responsible for planning,
prioritization, accreditation, monitoring,
resource mobilization, acquisition of the
mine-information database and other mineaction activities that support the nation’s
development program. EMAO is working
to apply the International Mine Action
Standards to the Ethiopian context. It seeks
to reduce the threat to the returning populations in the target areas by removing and/or
marking mines to international humanitarian standards and by raising the capacity as well as the productivity of demining.
EMAO gives first priority for clearance of
areas in close proximity to dwellings, second
to land used for agriculture and third to any

land used for grazing. As a result of EMAO’s
humanitarian-demining operations, which
began in May 2002, more than 20.28 million square metres (about 8 square miles) of
land infested with mines has already been
cleared. About 1,291 anti-personnel mines,
209 anti-tank mines and 20,410 pieces of
UXO have been found and destroyed, with
an immense number of fragments collected
and eliminated.
In the coming years, EMAO plans
to increase its output considerably. This,
of course, can be accomplished through
proper utilization of its experience and
by employing additional demining assets
including machines.
In light of these facts, and if the ELIS
data is more or less considered to fall around
2,443 square kilometres (943 square miles),
then the impacted communities and mineinfested lands would take a number of years
to tackle. Therefore, the EMAO would like
to employ further accident-prevention methods including using demining flail machines
and taking various technical measures, and
it is seeking additional funding to do so. The
Ottawa Convention,1 which Ethiopia ratified in the fall of 2004, obliges the country
to remove and destroy its emplaced antipersonnel mines within 10 years.
At present, the six manual demining
companies, the mechanical demining machines and the dog teams are deployed on
the boundaries of the three affected regions of Ethiopia. These prioritized areas
are all found in the country’s three heavily mine-affected regions. Each company
is comprised of three 18-member platoons
(one Technical Survey and two clearance
platoons). Additionally, each company
is assigned a Quality-assurance Officer.2
Mine-risk education and communityliaison activity around the demining area
are also core activities run by EMAO’s
skilled professionals. The EMAO MRE
program was established in March 2002 and

is provided by many village-level task forces.
Community-liaison Officers are found in
Gulomekeda, Ahferom, Tahtay Adiabo,
Merebleke, Kafta Humera (Tigray) and
Elidaar (Afar).2
EMAO plans to acquire more mechanicaldemining machines and expand the minedetection dog program to be deployed in the
next mine-clearance activities, which will
be integrated with its existing integrated
mine-clearance forces.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Chad

C O U

by Megan Wertz
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

T

he mine and unexploded ordnance
contamination in Chad is a result of
decades of internal conflict, the 1973
Libyan invasion and intensive mining during Libya’s occupation of the Aouzou Strip
in the north from 1984  to 1987. Most of
the known mined areas are in the BorkouEnnedi-Tibesti region in the north and the
Biltine and Quaddai regions in the east.
Areas such as the Wadi Doum Military Base
are also contaminated with abandoned missiles, munitions and other explosive remnants of war.
Chad signed the Ottawa Convention1
on July 6, 1998, ratified it May 6, 1999,
and became a State Party Nov. 1, 1999. A
Landmine Impact Survey conducted from
December 1999 to May 2001 identified 249
mine-affected communities in 23 of the 28 
departments surveyed and a total contamination of over 1,000 square kilometers (386
square miles), not including the Tibesti region.2 Chad is not known to have produced
or exported anti-personnel mines and has not
retained any mines for training purposes.
The LIS showed mine contamination
directly interferes with the livelihood and
safety of over 280,000 Chadians, blocking
access to water, pasture, agricultural land,
roads and trails. A lack of comprehensive records and the shifting of mines due to rainfall
and drifting sands make marking mine and
unexploded ordnance locations difficult.
In 2004, there were at least 32 new casualties due to mines and explosive remnants
of war in Chad; seven people were killed
and 25 injured. In January 2005, a child injured his hand when an unidentified device
exploded near a borehole in the town of Bir
Goz. Animals are also regularly killed in
minefields; in April 2005  a herd of eight
camels was killed after walking into a minefield in Wadi Doum.
Mine-action Strategy
In conjunction with the United Nations
Development Programme, the United
Nations Office for Project Services and the
Chadian government, the mine-action program has been developed in three phases.
Phase One, completed in 2001, established the High Commission for National
Demining to plan and coordinate mineaction activities. A national demining
capacity was developed and a national

database established. Phase Two, initiated in
2002, aims to establish a mine-clearance and
explosive-ordnance-disposal capacity and
complete the LIS. Due to lack of funding,
only parts of Phase Two have been completed.
Parts of the third phase began in 2004; this
phase consists of the operational deployment
of the mine-clearance/EOD capacity in areas
identified as national priorities by the government. Teams have been deployed to a number of locations, including but not limited to
N’Djamena, Massenya, Faya Largeau, Kalait,
Fada, Ounianga Kebir and Wadi Doum. In
2003, Chad completed one of its obligations
under the Ottawa Convention, destroying its
stockpile of 4,490 anti-personnel mines.
Mine-action Coordination
HCND has three regional offices, located
in Fada, Bardi and Wadi Doum, with a logistical center in Faya. Its role is to coordinate
and plan mine-action activities and assure
quality control. The organization prioritizes
clearance and survey mainly according to
impact scoring in the LIS, the discovery of
new minefields, and the arrival of refugees.
Priorities are agreed upon in consultation with
local authorities and selection of survey areas
is also based on developmental priorities.
In 2004, HCND implemented mineaction operations through the support of the
United Nations Development Programme,
the nongovernmental organizations HELP
and Mines Advisory Group, and the
Chadian Army. Several deminers resigned
in 2004 due to apparent funding problems;
deminers were not being assigned demining
tasks and thus not getting paid. There were
also delays in paying salaries. Clearance operations in Chad started through a United
Nations Office for Project Services contract
in 2000 with HELP, which was the only
operator from August 2000 to October
2004. From September 2001 to October
2004, HELP cleared minefields and battlefields, including the main battle areas along
the Sudanese border from Adre to Bahai
from July to October 2004. MAG replaced
HELP in 2004 and was the only NGO until
December 2005.
In October 2004, through a bilateral
contract with the United States and Chad,
MAG was chosen by the U.S. Department
of State to implement a three-year program
to clear mines and ERW from water access
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points in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region.
Due to lack of funding, the MAG/UNOPS
contract ended in December 2005  and the
deminers are waiting for a new contract. The
deployment of three EOD teams was planned
for April 1, 2006, but due to logistical problems and security issues, the teams have not
yet deployed.
Toward a Mine-safe Future
Over 19,768  mines and over 875  tons
of UXO have been destroyed; 1,658,659
square meters (409 acres) of land have been
cleared and returned to the community. The
Convention-mandated deadline for Chad to
be mine-free3 is November 2009; however,
without additional funding and signing of
the Tibesti Peace Agreement, that goal is
not attainable. If donors increase funding
to approximately US$20 million per year,
the known and accessible high-priority areas (not including the Tibesti region) can be
cleared by the end of 2007.4
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/chad/chad.htm/#endnotes.
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by Daniele Ressler
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

E

gypt is one of the most heavily mined
nations in the world, with estimates
ranging from 16.7 to 22 million
landmines/pieces of unexploded ordnance,1
or an estimated one-tenth of the world’s 200
million landmines.2 Seventeen million landmines and pieces of UXO3 are estimated to
be located in the Western Desert, a result
of intense fighting during World War II
between Allied and Axis forces at the ElAlamein perimeter. Approximately five million3 additional landmines were spread across
the Sinai Peninsula and Red Sea coasts,
largely from the Arabian-Israeli conflicts of
1956, 1957 and 1973. The Egyptian military estimates 19.7 million mines and pieces
of UXO still exist, after nearly three million
mines/pieces of UXO were cleared between
1983 and 1999, mostly in the Sinai.4
Casualties/Incidence
The Egyptian government has regarded
landmine/UXO contamination as a sensitive
issue and limits information on the extent of
the problem. Mines/UXO are distributed
over approximately 287,000 hectares (1,108 
square miles) with civilians reportedly using
mine-affected areas for cultivation, grazing,
infrastructure projects and housing.5 There
is no national data-collection mechanism,
so many mine incidents likely go unreported, particularly in the Western Desert area
among nomadic Bedouin tribes. The 2005 
Landmine Monitor Report states casualties
have occurred on a regular basis in Egypt.
Between 1999 and 2002, there were at least 70
mine/UXO casualties, and in 2004, at least 10
civilians were injured, including five children.
No casualty total is known, but some officials
estimate the number at over 8,000.5
Survivor assistance varies for civilian and
military casualties. While there are military
hospitals and rehabilitation facilities, emergency services remain inadequate for civilians. Additionally, in 2005  there were no
known nongovernmental or international
organizations with special programs for
mine survivors.5
Challenges in Egypt
Egypt faces specific technical challenges to demining efforts due to geology and
the aging of weapons. In the Suez Canal

and coastal areas, swamps make demining
work difficult, and in the Western Desert,
sand dunes and wind move and conceal
landmines/UXO.6  The aging of UXO items
makes them increasingly unsteady and prone
to detonation. It is estimated that of Egypt’s
approximately 19.7 million abandoned munitions, only 25 percent are actual landmines
while the remaining 75 percent are pieces of
UXO.4 Furthermore, there are few records of
minefields, and many mines are low-metal
mines, a fact that inhibits detection.4
Another challenge is the lack of national and international commitment to
and funding for mine action/demining in
Egypt. Though Egypt has stated it supports
a ban on anti-personnel mines for humanitarian reasons, it has not acceded to the
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention7 due
to concerns regarding security and general
principle.8 The government claims a right to
self-defense, saying landmines are necessary
to protect its expansive borders. Egypt also
argues that the Ottawa Convention does
not require countries responsible for laying
mines to remove them or provide assistance
in mine clearance. Presently, cleanup is estimated at US$250 million. Due to Egypt’s
use of landmines and refusal to sign the
Convention, international funding to the
country has been limited. Nearly all mineclearance operations have occurred through
the Egyptian Army, with a few commercially
funded projects and no reported humanitarian clearance operations.5
Progress
Progress is being made, however. Until
recently, Egypt was listed as a producer of
landmines, but in December 2004, the
Egyptian government announced a moratorium on the exportation and production of
anti-personnel mines. Since 2002, Egypt has
taken a development-focused approach to its
mine problem with the National Committee
to Develop the Northwest Coast and Mine
Clearance by working on an ambitious 20year strategy to develop Egypt’s north coast
to attract tourists. This includes removal of
landmines, which block development efforts
in 22 percent of the area.9
Although national mine action has been
slow, the increase in population and limited
non-desert residential areas mean Egypt is
feeling the pinch of growth; in light of this
fact, demining will likely be an increasingly high priority for the government.
Landmines/UXO also stand in the way
of land needed for agriculture and water,
blocking three million feddans10 of cultivable land and 300 million cubic meters (392
million cubic yards) of underground water.9

As Egypt is a quickly developing and growing country, land will become increasingly important.
Facing the Future
Egypt faces competing issues of security,
which may determine future progress made
in demining. A major demining effort is
needed for economic growth and national
development within the country, yet Egypt’s
refusal to sign the Ottawa Convention7 may
prevent the country from adequately addressing these key questions: Who pays for
and is responsible for Egypt’s costly, arduous demining? Can Egypt actively join the
movement and stop laying landmines for security when there is still political and military instability in the Middle East?
The two-day International Conference
for Development and Landmine Clearance
in late December 2005, organized by the
National Council for Human Rights, highlighted the gravity of Egypt’s landmine problem to the world. It ended with participants
urging two things: that Egypt reconsider
its position on international conventions
concerning landmines and that the international community offer Egypt funding and
technical support even if Egypt is not a State
Party to the Mine Ban Convention.
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/egypt/egypt.htm/#endnotes.
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Eritrea
by Megan Wertz
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

E

ritrea’s landmine and unexploded
ordnance contamination problem
began during World War II when
British and Italian forces fought on
Eritrean soil. A long struggle for independence (1962–1991) and a border war with
Ethiopia (1998–2000) followed, exacerbating the problem. Eritrea has never produced
or exported anti-personnel mines; all mines
used in the past were stolen from Ethiopian
forces from minefields or storage facilities
during the War of Independence. There are
no mine stockpiles except for 214 mines retained by the Eritrean Demining Authority
National Training Center for training and
development. Eritrea acceded to the Ottawa
Convention1 Aug. 27, 2001, and it entered
into force Feb. 1, 2002.
Extent of Contamination
The Landmine Impact Survey, completed in June 2004, found 481 of 4,176 communities affected by mines and UXO, with

C O U
33 communities considered high impact,
100 medium impact and 348  low impact.
According to the LIS, there are 914 suspected mined areas and 113 UXO-contaminated
sites. Though the problem is nationwide,
the Shilalo area (Gash Barka region in the
southwest) is the most mine-affected area.
The mine- and UXO-contaminated
areas affect over 655,000 people in Eritrea.
The hardest hit members of the population
are rural inhabitants, nomadic people, landmine survivors, internally displaced persons
and refugees. Refugees and IDPs are often
prevented from returning home due to the
threat of mines in IDP- and refugee-camp
areas and in their home communities.
Humanitarian Challenge
Food security is unstable because much
of the agricultural land is contaminated
with mines. The problem has also impeded
building social-support systems for the most
vulnerable population groups and creating
linkages with recovery, reconstruction and
development. The scattered nature of the
mines and UXO, combined with changes
in weather patterns and seasonal activities,
puts the civilian population at particular
risk. During the harvest season (April–May)
or periods of drought and dramatic crop
failure, civilians often migrate far from local
areas seeking food and water into areas that
may have unmarked mine fields. Due to the

Ethiopia
by Daniele Ressler
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

E

thiopia’s 70-year history of internal and international armed
conflict, from the Italian invasion of 1935 to the EthiopianEritrean War (1998–2000), has contributed to significant
landmine and unexploded ordnance contamination. Ethiopia is one
of the world’s 10 most heavily mined countries, with the government
estimating it will take decades to clear.1 The most extensive contamination is in the Tigray, Afar and Somali regions. It is estimated that
during the recent Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, Ethiopian forces laid
150,000–200,000 landmines and Eritrea laid 240,000 mines over
the disputed border areas.2
Norwegian People’s Aid completed a nationwide Landmine
Impact Survey in 2004. The LIS found 1.9 million people were at risk
and identified 1,492 landmine-impacted communities.3 Within the
past two years, 1,295 victims were recorded (including 588 fatalities),
with two-thirds reportedly engaged in herding or farming at the time

34 | country profiles | journal of mine action | 2006 | august | 10.1

N

T

mine-contaminated areas, the country is
unable to expand its road and transportation
network, other infrastructure projects and
the tourism industry.
Government Mine Action
In 2000, the United Nations Mission
in Ethiopia and the Eritrea Mine Action
Coordination Center was established. The
Center increased humanitarian mine-action
efforts, including support from international nongovernmental organizations and
U.N. agencies. In March 2002, the United
Nations Development Programme initiated the Mine Action Capacity Building
Program. The MACBP was designed to assist the Eritrean Demining Authority and
Eritrean Demining Operations in building
their capacity and implementing programs
including mine clearance, victim assistance
and mine-risk education.
The MACBP was later revised and updated to take into account changes in the mineaction sector resulting from Proclamation
123/2002 issued by the government of
Eritrea. The proclamation officially established the EDA and EDO in July 2002.
The EDA is the national authority responsible for policy regulation of the mineaction sector. EDO is the national institute
engaged in the operational aspects of mine
action. Under Proclamation 123/2002,
UNICEF assisted the EDA and EDO in

of the incident.3 The LIS also calculated 15,321 victims before 2002;
however there is “no comprehensive or systemic ongoing data collection mechanism in Ethiopia” for casualties, so actual casualty rates
are under-reported and unknown.4
Landmine/Explosive Remnants of War Action
After the end of the most recent conflict with Eritrea in 2000,
the government of Ethiopia ratified the Ottawa Convention5 Dec.
14, 2004, and it entered into force June 1, 2005. In 2004, a national capacity for quality assurance was established to regulate
humanitarian mine-action activities based on the International Mine
Action Standards.4
EMAO. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office was formed in
2001 to implement humanitarian mine action, as well as manage and coordinate clearance and mine-risk education nationally.
In late 2005, EMAO had six manual-clearance companies, three
mine-detection dogs and three ground-preparation machines.3
With the support of the United Nations Development Programme,
EMAO is also working to develop a national mine-action strategy
that addresses the socioeconomic impact of mines on communities, as there is no national capacity for dealing with mines in the
long term yet.
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development and implementation of the
national mine-risk education program. In
April 2005, the MACBP and UNICEF
suspended all support to EDA and EDO
operations because government authorities
impounded all EDA and EDO mine-action
vehicles due to a pending fuel crisis.2 Future
U.N. support will depend greatly on whether these vehicles are released.
According to Eritrea’s National Plan,
from 2005  to 2009 mine-action activities
will seek to fulfill four strategic objectives:
1. Return of displaced persons. Expand
resources to complete Technical
Survey and task-assessment planning, clearance, marking, and integrated mine-risk education and victim assistance to permit the return
of IDPs, returnees and refugees.3
2. High- and medium-impact communities. Clear high- and mediumimpact communities, and integrate
MRE and VA.
3. Low-impact communities. Conduct
MRE activities to reduce new casualties and assist clearance of UXO in
344 low-impact communities.
4. Victim support. Establish a victimsupport system that will provide effective assistance to victims.
RONCO Consulting Corporation, funded by the U.S. State Department, established

the Eritrean mine-detection dog capability,
and in 2006 EDO will have 18 MDDs supported by manual clearance teams. RONCO
trained two demining companies to operate
the latest demining technology and equipment. All RONCO fieldwork is fully integrated with EDO manual-clearance teams.
During 2004  and 2005, RONCO cleared
2,374,381 square meters (587 acres) of
land. MECHEM began operations under the UNMEE MACC coordination in
December 2004. MECHEM seeks to enhance the MACC’s existing manual capacity
through a training component, 10 MDDs
with five dog handlers, four mini-flails and
four mine-protected heavy vehicles with
steel wheels for ground preparation.
A Mine-safe Future
The vision for Eritrea’s mine action is
“an Eritrea with a physical environment that
will permit free movement, uninhibited development and poverty-reduction initiatives;
where victims are assisted and integrated
into society, and no new victims are occurring due to mines and UXO.”4 According
to Yohannes Embaye, Head of Plans and
Operations at EDA, the goal is to be minefree5 in 10 years.
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/eritrea/eritrea.htm/#endnotes.

EMAO reported that in 2004, 10.9 square kilometers (4.2 square
miles) of land were cleared and 478 anti-personnel mines, 67 antivehicle mines and 8,352 pieces of UXO were destroyed.4 EMAO’s
mine-risk education department (assisted by UNICEF) was established in March 2002 and works in coordination with other partners
such as the Rehabilitation and Development Organization, with a
particular focus on using community liaisons to provide MRE in
areas where mine clearance takes place, and who are attached to demining teams.
UNMEE MACC. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea Mine Action Coordination Center was set up in 2000 to
operate within the Temporary Security Zone, a 25-kilometer (16mile) post-conflict buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The
MACC coordinates mine-clearance operations to support UNMEE
Peacekeeping Forces, ensuring their safety and securing mobility for
them while they are monitoring the TSZ. The MACC also provides
MRE to peacekeepers and communities living within the TSZ and
adjacent areas.
In 2005, the MACC cleared 6,282,083 square meters (two square
miles) of land and 1,639 kilometers (1,018  miles) of road and destroyed 348 mines and 11,109 pieces of UXO; that same year, there
were 45 casualties and 10 people killed within the TSZ.6
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RaDO. The Rehabilitation and Development Organization is an
indigenous nongovernmental organization that has been implementing MRE in the Tigray and Afar regions with financial and technical
assistance from UNICEF. In 2006, the organization has appealed for
funding for a victim-assistance project in the Somali region providing
physical rehabilitation to landmine/UXO victims.
Challenges and Hopes
Ethiopia has been identified as one of the “24 State Parties with
the greatest needs and responsibility to provide adequate survivor
assistance.”  4 In 2004, Teklewold Mengesha, Head of EMAO, estimated that at rates of demining at the time, it would take 20 years to
make Ethiopia impact-free of mines/UXO and continued significant
funding is required.7
By the end of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 2000 there were
an estimated 360,000 internally displaced Ethiopians, most of
whom came from the Tigray region as a result of the border dispute.8 As of November 2005, 62,000 people still remain displaced
while others have returned to their homes and are presently facing
both continued insecurity and landmines.8 The result is that many
are unable to use their land and are left dependent on food aid;
Continued on page 37, ETHIOPIA
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Landmine Situation
Libya has a significant landmine problem that raises petroleum exploration costs
and affects the development of grazing and
industrial projects. One such industrial project was the construction of the Great ManMade River, which is a 3,380-kilometer
(2,100-mile) network of pipes that transports
water to the northern and southern regions.
The Great Man-Made River was affected by
the presence of landmines, whose removal
significantly increased the construction cost
for the project. In 1977, the Libyan Army
emplaced two million landmines and in
2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated
that there were approximately 1.5  to three
million landmines in the ground.3 In June
2005, Libya asked all the countries that had
emplaced landmines in its territory to hand
over maps of the minefields. Italy provided
maps to Libya showing where the landmines
were placed during World War II. Although
there are landmine maps of the conflict
along the borders of Libya and Egypt, there
are no recorded maps for the mines along
the Chadian border.
Landmine Casualties and
Survivor Assistance
The Libyan government does not have a
mechanism to collect data on landmine casualties; thus, exact figures are not known.
The compiled report from the Libyan police
states there were 11,845 landmine casualties
and between 1940 and 1995, 6,749 people
were killed and 5,096 were injured.3 Another

T

clearance; therefore, the funding was given to
other countries. The Anti-Mines Association
was established in 2005 and, as of May 2005,
had not yet conducted mine-clearance operations. Libya says that from the end of
World War II to 1981, it cleared 14.5 million
landmines.3 The Civil Protection and the
Engineering Corps of the Libyan Army conduct some mine clearance every year, but this
demining is not made public.3

by Wendy Waldeck
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

ibya is one of the world’s largest socialist republics and has been ruled
by many different foreign powers.
Libya’s official name is the Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. During
the Turk-Italian War of 1911, there was a
constant battle between the Libyans and the
Italians until the Italians seized the country
in 1939.1 It was also the major battleground
in northern Africa when Italy entered World
War II, which left many landmines scattered
throughout Libya. Landmines were also emplaced along the border during the conflict
with Egypt in 1977 and again in 1980–87
when Libya entered a conflict with Chad.2

N

source, the Libyan Jihad Center for Historical
Studies, claims that between 1952 and 1975,
12,258  mine causalities occurred, including
3,874 people killed and 8,384 injured.3
Libya offers survivor assistance in the capital, Tripoli, and in Benghazi, the second largest Libyan city. Located in northeast Libya,
Benghazi has a hospital with general medical
services and surgery. However, there has been
no recent survey of facilities in rural areas,
which are likely to be scattered. Companies
looking to establish themselves will inevitably
need to develop their own remote site facilities and staff health programs.4 Physical rehabilitation services and psychosocial assistance
for mine/unexploded ordnance survivors in
Libya are also insufficient.3
The Ottawa Convention
At a seminar held in Tripoli May 12,
2005, Engineer Seif al-Islam Gaddafi asked
his country to join the Ottawa Convention5
and to set a timeframe to remove the mines
from the Libyan borders with Egypt and
Chad. Most countries are encouraging
Libya to sign the Convention, which will
increase funding assistance for Libya to remove the mines. However, some people like
Dr. Mohamed Taher Sialla, Secretary for
Cooperation Affairs and chairman of the
National Program to Remove Landmines and
Rehabilitate Land, believe the Convention
will not tackle the mine problem and will
not require responsibility for those who laid
the mines.2
Seventy-five percent of the world’s countries have joined the Ottawa Convention.2
If Libya joins the Convention, it would be
accountable for its landmine removal and it
would also have lawful authority to ask for
assistance not only from countries that laid
mines during WWII, but from all 144 signatories of the Convention.2 Some of Libya’s
neighboring countries, such as Algeria,
Chad and Sudan, have already signed the
Convention, which gives Libya additional
incentives to sign it.2
Mine Clearance
In 2002, Libya failed to meet Italy’s
deadline to provide information on how
2.5 million Euros6 should be spent on mine
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Conclusion
Signing the Ottawa Convention would
be a step towards getting Libya’s landmines
cleared quicker with the help of other signatories. In addition to Libya’s mine-action
efforts, there is hope for the country. Libya
has made efforts to improve relations with
members of the international community.
And although Libya remains a socialist republic, at the time of this writing, the United
States was expected to remove the country
from its list of designated state sponsors of
terrorism by the end of June 2006. Libyan
leader Moammar Gadhafi has even recently
opened Libya’s industry to Western investment. Hopefully, these recent events have set
Libya on a course to regaining acceptance in
the international community and will lead to
further aid in its mine-action efforts.
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/libya/libya.htm/#endnotes.
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ETHIOPIA, continued from page 35
this is likely to continue until the border is
demarcated, land is demined and security
is ensured.
In addition, at the time of writing,
Ethiopia and Eritrea are still in disagreement over demarcation of their border.
In recent months, the UNMEE MACC’s
demining efforts have slowed in the
TSZ, particularly on the Eritrean side,
as UNMEE deminers and workers have
been banned from flying helicopters since
October 2005  (thus blocking demining
safety requirements). Western workers were
then ejected from the country in December
2005 (though MRE in Eritrea continues).
On the Ethiopian side of the TSZ, demining continues but border tensions are
rising, and at least two anti-vehicle mines
were found recently as well as newly emplaced anti-personnel landmines, with
ongoing UXO casualties being reported.9
Additionally, there have been reports
of troop movement on both sides of the
TSZ. Coupled with this insecurity at the
Ethiopian-Eritrean border, in the south
and southeast of the country a drought and
food crisis have resulted in rising malnutrition. This humanitarian crisis is impacting
most of the Horn of Africa and may inadvertently result in a diversion of attention
and funding from demining for now.
Gebriel Lager Ezekiel, Head of
Operations at EMAO, confirms that in

Somalia

Ethiopia, mines and UXO are directly
contributing to poverty by denying access
to already limited resources in communities
and hindering development. EMAO is a new
organization and faces challenges such as
Ethiopia’s climatic conditions of mountains,
hard-baked rocky ground, forests and high
winds that make demining difficult, as well
as establishing effective organizational capacity and receiving needed funds. However,
he optimistically points out that Ethiopia’s
mine-action strategy is future-oriented, with
strategic plans for 25 mine dogs by the end
of 2006 (through Norwegian People’s Aid),
a training center for demining, and a multipurpose group for technical survey and rapid
response teams.10
Conclusion
Encouragingly, in April 2005, the European Commission announced it was giving Ethiopia US$9.6 million to support a
large-scale three-year continuation of mineclearance efforts in the remote Afar, Tigray
and Somali regions through EMAO and the
UNDP. Negotiation talks for border demarcation in the TSZ continue and so far,
conflict has not erupted. For now, demining
efforts still progress both in the TSZ and
across the country, even in the face of challenging circumstances.
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/ethiopia/ethiopia.htm/#endnotes.

by Megan Wertz
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

S

omalia’s landmine and unexploded ordnance contamination stems from several wars, beginning with the 1964 and
1977 Ogaden Wars. In the 1970s and 1980s, strategic facilities, camps and towns were mined during the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front insurgency in northeast Somalia. Somalia is in a
unique situation in which the northwestern and northeastern areas
of the country have declared themselves to be separate from the rest
of the country. The Republic of Somaliland is in the northwest (see
Somaliland country profile, page 38) and Puntland is in the northeast. The war of secession leading to the Somaliland separation occurred from 1988 to 1991 and led to more mines being emplaced;
the official division occurred in May 1991 and resulted in interclan fighting in which mines were widely used. Somaliland seeks
complete independence from Somalia, while Puntland, which established itself as an autonomous region in August 1998, wants to
become a federal division within a united Somalia.
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Somalia is not known to have produced or exported anti-personnel
landmines in the past; however, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines are plentiful and can easily be bought from weapons markets.
This easy access allows fighting clans to use landmines to defend
themselves, exacerbating the existing landmine problem.
Somalia is unable to accede to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban
Convention1 due to a lack of central government since the fall of the
government of Siyad Barre in January 1991. In August 2004, the
Transitional Federal Government was formed.
Humanitarian Implications
The landmine problem in Somalia has a socioeconomic impact
seen in numerous aspects of Somali society. It causes a reduction in
the amount of land available for livestock and agricultural production. Transportation costs have increased due to severe road conditions. Victims suffer through poor rehabilitation and development
efforts resulting in loss of life and disabilities.
The total number of Somali mine casualties is unknown. In 2004,
91 new casualties were recorded in 20 landmine incidents.2 This number was an increase over 2003; however, since landmine casualties are
not systematically recorded, this number is most likely underestimated.
The majority of incidents appear to be caused by anti-vehicle mines.
Continued on page 39, SOMALIA
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Somaliland
by Megan Wertz
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andmine and unexploded ordnance
contamination in  Somaliland is the
result of the 1964 and 1977–78 border wars with Ethiopia and the 1988–91
civil war between the Siyad Barre regime
and the Somali National Movement. The
Barre regime troops laid most of the landmines, using mines to threaten the civilian
population and protect military installations and civilian infrastructure against
SNM attacks.
The Republic of Somaliland declared
independence from Somalia in May 1991;
however, since the international community
does not recognize it as an independent state,
it is unable to accede to the Anti-personnel
Mine Ban Convention.1 Somaliland officials have expressed their commitment
to the Convention, but no legal measures
have been taken to prohibit use, production, trade or stockpiling of anti-personnel
mines. Somaliland has also not formally acceded to the Geneva Call-promoted Deed
of Commitment 2 that has been signed by 17
faction leaders elsewhere in Somalia.

The Landmine Problem
A Landmine Impact Survey of four
regions, completed in March 2003, found
357 mine-impacted communities and 276
casualties between 2001 and 2003. For
2005, the Somaliland Mine Action Center
recorded 38  new mine/UXO casualties
through August. Landmines and UXO
block roads and access to pastureland; the
most serious blockages are of drinking water
sources and irrigated cropland.
No formal marking or fencing of mined
areas is being implemented, due to theft
of the materials and the difficulties of accurately marking mined areas that are often already at least partially used by local
populations. According to Nick Bateman, a
representative for Danish Demining Group,
the biggest blockages due to landmines are
old roads that were mined during the civil
wars, but communities quickly set up detours once mines are discovered so there is
little constraint in terms of mobility.3
Mine Action Program
National efforts. The National Demining Agency and the Somaliland Mine

Action Center are responsible for mine-action
activities in Somaliland. SMAC, established
in 1999 with United Nations Development
Programme support, carries out mineaction coordination, planning and quality
management with a staff of 32 professionally
trained employees. With UNDP support,
SMAC approved a National Policy on
Mine Action, which is being reviewed in
the Somaliland House of Representatives.
The NDA is responsible for building local
capacities for clearance, survey and minerisk education. The main goals for SMAC
are to clear access to water sources and
grazing areas, clear high-impact areas by
2006 and reduce the number of incidents
from mines and UXO.
Danish Demining Group. DDG began
its mine-clearance operations in Somaliland
in 1997. The operation includes 135  local
staff, one 65-man demining team and four
mobile explosive ordnance disposal teams.
From 1999 to 2005, DDG cleared 30 minefield areas and 90 battle-area clearance/
EOD tasks totaling 1,380,887 square meters (341 acres). DDG’s original focus was
to establish a mine-clearance capacity that
the Somaliland government would take
over. According to Bateman, DDG stopped
focusing on this goal because it is currently
not a workable solution, and a mine-action
capacity within the government is unlikely
to be developed or effectively sustained.
For the past year, DDG has instead focused
on developing a final two-year phase of the
Village by Village EOD Clearance Program,
with help from UNICEF and Handicap
International, attracting donors, and creating a workable plan to hand over responsibilities for community-based EOD work
to police EOD teams when DDG leaves
Somaliland in March 2008.
DDG’s vision for Somaliland’s mine
clearance is to reduce the effects of UXO/
mine contamination to a level that is no worse
than other socioeconomic problems such as
poor health or educational services, and does
not hinder economic development. DDG
believes that with additional well-targeted
assistance from international NGOs, most
communities will be able to effectively
manage the problem. This vision has nearly
been reached; ERW in Somaliland is now a
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“minor blip on the humanitarian screen.”3
DDG workers are enthusiastic about the
country’s outlook.
Mine-risk Education
MRE in Somaliland has been unplanned and limited and no national standards have been developed. UNICEF and
HI are highly active in MRE, collaborating
with SMAC. The Village by Village EOD
Clearance Program delivers targeted MRE,
focused primarily on children because children often know where residual ERW is
located, and because they have been one
of the biggest at-risk groups through herding activities. Bateman says MRE is done
on a limited scale because communities are
managing the ERW contamination well so
there is no need for large-scale MRE. The
MRE message is kept simple: “Don’t touch.
Report.” The Village by Village program
has completed some 2,650 community visits
and 16,000 items of ERW have been disposed of through the program.
An End in Sight
Bateman says it best: “The light is at the
end of the tunnel for Somaliland and mine
clearance.”3 The hard work and dedication
of agencies like DDG and HI, working with
SMAC and the local communities will create a mine-safe Somaliland soon.
To view endnotes and references for
this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/
journal/10.1/profiles/somaliland/somaliland.
htm/#endnotes.
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SOMALIA, continued from page 37
Mine Action
Somalia’s mine action is slow due to
internal conflict impeding efforts like
planned surveys, clearance and mine-risk
education activities. There is no functioning
mine-action center for the whole of Somalia
nor is there a mine-action strategy. The
United Nations Development Programme
has been in Somalia since 2003, focusing on
mine-action capacity building and technical
assistance. The UNDP “mine action work
plan for Somalia includes supporting
activities to establish sustainable EOD
[explosive ordnance disposal] and mine
clearance teams based on existing local
police and army capacity, and the creation
of mine action centers in affected regions to
coordinate activities.”2 The UNDP focuses
on local and national capacity building.
In southern and central Somalia, an
unstable security situation blocked coordinated mine-action planning throughout
2004. The UNDP is planning coordination with regional authorities and has begun
discussions with the Transitional Federal
Government. Until a central mine-action
authority is created, the UNDP and nongovernmental organizations will carry out
mine-action coordination in these areas.
It is hoped that between 2006 and 2008 a
mine-action center will be established in
each of three different regions.
In Puntland, the Puntland Mine
Action Centre is the coordinating body
for mine action. The PMAC was estab-

lished in 2003 by the UNDP with funding from the European Commission. A
Phase I 3 and II4 Landmine Impact Survey
was completed in May 2005 in the Bari,
Nugaal and Mudug regions. The LIS
showed 35  affected communities; nine
high impact, nine medium impact and 17
low impact. Seventy-seven percent of the
mine-affected areas are in the Galkayo
and Galdogob districts in the Mudug
region. By mid-2005, police EOD teams
started addressing spot clearance tasks
identified in the LIS. The goal for 2006 is
to establish a national clearance capacity
in Puntland to address the longer-term
problem while having an international
nongovernmental organization start immediate activities to clear all the highimpact areas.
A Mine-safe Somalia
If mine-action centers are established in
southern and central Somalia, it is plausible
that, working with the centers in Somaliland
and Puntland, they could develop a national
mine-action strategy. Establishing a united
mine-action effort will be the biggest step
toward creating a mine-safe Somalia. The
United Nations believes “the mine and
UXO threat in Somalia is a finite problem,”2
one that can be solved in seven to 10 years
if given the appropriate amount of attention
and resources.
To view endnotes and references for this article, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
profiles/somalia/somalia.htm/#endnotes.
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she is obtaining a Master of Arts in
public policy. She hopes to pursue a
career in environmental policy.
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Canadian Group Holds National Yard Sale for Peacekeepers
The Canadian Landmine Foundation recently held a special event to mark the 50th
anniversary of Canadian peacekeeping efforts. Between May 19 and August 9, CLMF
encouraged Canadians to register their yard sales online and receive a tax benefit for
any proceeds that were then donated to the group.
The entire project is designed to increase Canadian awareness of the country’s tradition
of peacekeeping and current mine-action projects. Learn more at www.clmf.org.
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A Rose by Any Other Name:
The Interrelationship of Landmines and Other
Explosive Remnants of War

The author explores the vast diversification in landmine etymology,

buried at a shallow depth in the glacis of a
fortress and actuated by someone stepping
on it or touching a low strung wire.”
The same basic low-cost, low-technology
method is being used quite effectively today. In quantity, anti-personnel landmines
can be procured for less than US$3 each.
They can be rapidly deployed by minimally
trained personnel and provide a significant
anti-intrusion capability even for the most
advanced military opponents. Generally,

condemning efforts that sought to provide more information but only
complicated an already difficult process. Dugger continues with a historical
perspective on the progression of language and processes used to address
problems posed by landmines and other explosive remnants of war.

W

hen I first became involved with unexploded ordnance
and landmines in 1983, the terminology was more
straightforward and perhaps a bit more descriptive than
the tortured phrases we use today. We named our company “UXB”
after seeing the long-running show on Masterpiece Theatre entitled
“Danger UXB.” (UXB is a British acronym for “unexploded bomb”
and the show that depicted the trials and successes of the elite
British UXB teams was a phenomenal success.)
Most everything back in the early 1980s could be described as
a mine, a rocket or a bomb. The more clever members of our group
would at first enhance the descriptions with additional information
such as a “little” mine or a “big” bomb. Whatever the “name du jour,”
all of these things were potentially deadly and sometimes bore more
of an impact upon the geopolitical landscape than their presence otherwise indicated.
While politicians may believe they are the facilitators of change,
in most cases they are not. How refreshing it would be for politicians
in some of the conflicted countries to decide to settle their disputes
with a duel, as opposed to sending their military in harm’s way and
exposing their populations to the threats of landmines and other explosive remnants of war. Since that sort of “gentlemanly” behavior
is long gone, politicians almost universally come to rely upon their
military as the primary facilitators of change.
Without question, the world’s military organizations are the primary catalysts for change, but they are followed in rapid succession
by a host of others including, but not limited to, religious groups,
activists, environmentalists, paramilitary organizations, militias,
family groups and terrorists. There are immense variations in personnel, technology and application methodology resident within these
groups, but we know each will use whatever technology and methodology available in an attempt to achieve its goals—taking what
they have and making the very best use of it. It is at this point that
the threads of the relationship between landmines and other ERW
become enmeshed.
There is also no doubt that there are considerable degrees of
capabilities in the military organizations of the world. We can weave
threads to show a conclusive linkage between the low cost/low

40 | feature | journal of mine action | 2006 | august | 10.1

Typical older UXO, 90-mm items.
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by Dr. Richmond H. Dugger, III
[ UXB International, Inc. & subsidiaries ]

Typical older anti-personnel landmines.

technology of landmines and the high cost/high technology usually
found in other ERW, and how these current or legacy threats impact
the world’s population and effect change.
Even the suspected presence of the “dangerous duo”—landmines
and other ERW—can have a significant impact on how populations
function. The effectiveness of any weapon depends upon two factors:
its ability to damage or destroy men and materiel and the morale effect1 of its use, or threat thereof, upon the enemy. In most cases, the
threats posed by landmines and other remnants of war are not wholly
independent of each other. Since this audience is knowledgeable on
the specifics of both landmines and other ERW, I want to dwell more
on the conceptual framework that seeks to categorize the sources of
these two types of threats and how, even from differing sources, these
threats have been commingled, coexist and cause problems in many
countries throughout the world.
The earliest description of a pressure-operated landmine comes
from the German military historian H. Frieherr von Flemming, who
described a fladdermine (a flying mine) in his 1726 book. He wrote,
“It consisted of a ceramic container with glass and metal fragments
embedded in the clay containing 0.90 kilos [2 lb] of gunpowder,

they are manufactured by a group of SecondWorld countries and are deployed by many
Third-World countries that are pressed to
make do with what they can afford.
Of course, few of these facilitators recognize the total lifecycle cost of deploying a
single landmine, especially when accounting
for the tremendous human cost. Locating
and destroying a single hidden or buried
landmine can cost upwards of US$1,000,2
but even that cost pales when you consider
the unnecessary and dreadful cost of injuring a child or other unwary civilian.
Ordnance and other ERW are quite
different from landmines. Ordnance predates landmines by over 400 years and is
principally fired, but can be air-dropped or
launched in more current periods; this term
is used as opposed to “other remnants of
war” for discussion simplicity.
Ordnance evolution may be divided into
three segments. The earliest segment includes that period during which stone shot
was employed; guns during the period 1313
to 1520 were mostly wrought-iron with a
few early examples of more expensive cast
bronze guns that have been documented.
The second segment was that extending
from 1520 to 1854, during which cast-iron
round shot was routinely employed. In this
segment, both bronze and cast-iron ordnance
was actually used, but technology advanced
little from the first period. The increase in
power of the ordnance systems during this
period was due primarily to the use of corn
and an additive to serpentine powder, with
some small technological increase due to
better technical design of the guns toward

the end of this period. The third or current
segment started in 1854  with the innovation of elongated projectiles and rifled gun
barrels. Rapid progress has been made since
then. Ordnance items are manufactured by
most countries today, and they are deployed
by virtually every country.
Ordnance is generally more powerful
than landmines and the damage to men and
materiel can be significantly more devastating. The morale effect of gunfire would
be considered more or less constant today,
as people all over the world are aware of
artillery, bombs and the noise and destruction they can cause. However, the ordnance
threat produces a morale effect quite different from landmines, mainly because of the
detonations and visible destruction, but also
because of the ever-present fear that one’s final moment will arrive without giving any
advance notice.
“A rose by any other name would smell
as sweet,” and while the “sweetness” of landmines and ERW may be somewhat evident
to facilitators who employ their use, the

Typical 5” Illumination rounds on Kaho’olawe, Hawaii.

thorns of the “rose” are all too real for the
unwary who venture into their path.
In examining how these threats have
become commingled and coexist, we need
further investigation in each of the affected
areas. There is no single answer. The reasons
are varied, but time is often the enabling issue. If we take Afghanistan as an example,
long before American troops ventured into
Afghanistan, a host of other military and
paramilitary operations had come and
gone. The Russian occupation lasted a decade and their technology was on par with
the American technology at the time. Local
militant groups also injected their own creativity and we ended up with a cauldron of
legacy issues commingled and coexisting in
one location. That story has been repeated
numerous times and in many countries,

so time is the enabling mechanism for the
interrelationship between landmines and
other remnants of war.
Knowing that the threats are commingled and coexist is but the start of the solution. We must now delve into how we are
going to find the proper solution set for each
affected area.
To mitigate population impact, many
of the humanitarian-oriented world organizations have implemented various
assessment programs with the goals to determine the following with some degree of
scientific accuracy:
• The areas impacted by landmines and
other ERW
• The physical properties of the
contamination
• The concentration of contamination
• The impact on population masses
exposed to the threat
These assessment programs have various
names and sponsors, but they are primarily
information- and data-gathering programs.
One of the most daunting challenges assessment programs face is compiling the
actual data supporting whether or not an
actual threat from landmines and ERW exists. There are many reasons for this difficulty, but one need only remember that these
threats are not always going to be obvious
since most of them will be buried or otherwise concealed. The techniques generally
employed for these assessments involve gathering data and information from all readily
available sources including military, civilians, government personnel, United Nations
agencies, nongovernmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations and others
conducting similar assessments.
The voluminous data and information is often difficult to analyze, and it is
equally difficult to assign proper weighting and confidence levels upon its accuracy. As a consequence, various ingenious
methods are employed by these assessment
personnel that then enable them to triage
the various community threats and arrive
at solution sets based upon the most thorough and documented data and information
available. Despite the difficulty, once these
organizations gather, compile and analyze
the information and data, they are then
able to target funding and begin the next
phase of assistance. Regrettably, there can
be a considerable time lag between assessors
recognizing threats and the later activities
(clearance) needed to mitigate the threat.
A major variation (and improvement)
on the assessment program approach has
been implemented by the U.S. Department
of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and
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Tied Campaigns:
Cluster Munitions,
Explosive Remnants of War
and Anti-personnel Landmines
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The roof of a building after a BLU-97 strike in Iraq. Deminers are clearing
unexploded munitions so the building can be used as a shopping centre.

The cluster munitions campaign, following
the precedent of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, is beginning to make
an impact on state views of banning or
restricting cluster munitions. This article

Targeting Landmines Focuses on Latin America

examines the history behind the fight to ban

Targeting Landmines is a project created by Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá of MediaQuatro
designed to begin a global discussion on and generate governmental support for mine awareness,
mine clearance and victim assistance initiatives. The group presented its first exhibit for the
Targeting Landmines project in January 2006 in Caracas, Venezuela. The exhibition took place
as part of the World Social Forum.

or restrict cluster munitions and its ties to the

The body of work uses photos, articles and documentary materials to disseminate information
and spark interest for the Latin American landmine problem. Partial funding for the project
has been provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, but more support will be
necessary soon for the project to fulfill its goals. Through extensive work with several humanitarian organizations operating in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, MediaQuatro will continue to
document the breadth of the landmine issue in Latin America.
To learn more about Targeting Landmines, view some of the riveting images, and contact the
artists, visit: http://mediaquatro.sites.uol.com.br/minas-eng.html.
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have not yet rallied in similar numbers to the cluster-munitions effort.
The Cluster Munition Coalition, formed in late 2003, has approximately 170 members. Many of the CMC’s members and leadership,
however, are seasoned campaigners. Familiar to ICBL-watchers are
Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action
(UK), Mines Action Canada and Pax Christi, who are among those
sitting on CMC’s 10-member steering committee.
The CCW
The ICBL and its dynamic partnership with like-minded APM
ban states (the Ottawa Process) was an innovative and collaborative
way of quickly moving the ban agenda forward. Disappointment
with the existing Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons2
consensus rule (where a single recalcitrant state can dilute or block
Convention provisions supported by the majority) led to the new parallel process.
The parties to the Ottawa Process focused on the idea that humanitarian impact can trump military utility.3 This idea was not new
because international humanitarian law and an array of treaties from
the mid-1800s onwards already referred to obligations towards civilians during conflict, containing such ideas as proportionality, distinction, discrimination, military necessity and humane treatment.
The CMC effort has followed the precedent of the ICBL, struggling through the slow CCW process and challenging the stragglers.
If cluster-munition campaigners were unprepared for the inadequacy
of the prevention measures of the Convention’s Protocol V 4 that were
agreed to by governments, they have sober expectations about their
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host-country buy-in to the solution. The
Department of State has done an admirable
job in constructing a highly efficient, responsive, accretive and timely program for
weapons removal and abatement.
In conclusion, there is an irrefutable relationship between landmines and other remnants of war. Their origins are completely
independent; their technology and cost
components are quite different; their general
manufacturing and deployment sources are
different; but both excel as weapons since
the effectiveness of any weapon depends
upon two factors:
1. Its ability to damage or destroy men
and materiel
2. The morale effect of its use, or threat
thereof, upon the enemy
Both of these threats have many names,
and I am certain someone somewhere is
thinking up a new name for landmines and
other explosive remnants of war. Regardless
of the new tortured phrases we will be forced
to endure, let us not forget that “A rose by
any other name would smell as sweet,” but
these threats are the thorns of the rose.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Abatement, which utilizes country assessments. As an enhancement to the standard
assessment process, the WRA program seeks
to develop concurrent plans, in coordination with the various country hosts, to assist
using a fast-track approach so that serious
threats can be addressed much more expeditiously than with other methods. Under
this methodology, as country assessments
reveal threats, the information is shared
with the host country and discussions include possible solutions to the threats. As
the assessments continue, the solution sets
are fine-tuned, and it quickly becomes obvious which option is best to mitigate the
specific threats. Once the solution is mutually agreed upon by the Department of State
and the host country, the same teams that
are conducting the assessments can be expanded to handle the implementation.
The benefits of this improved approach
are numerous but include faster response
to identified threats, a more cost-effective
mitigation of threats, a fast-tracked timeline (the same teams expand to handle the
solution; there is a minimal learning curve
for personnel) for response, and ongoing

ICBL. The author also discusses the most
recent developments in the process to ban
or restrict cluster bombs.
by Robin Collins [ World Federalist Movement–Canada ]

T

he end of the Cold War has a lot to do with the greater attention the world now gives to humanitarian grievances.
Unexploded ordnance impact data has been accumulating,
but without the precedent of the anti-personnel mine campaign and
the Ottawa Convention,1 the Belgians would probably never have
considered banning cluster munitions in 2006.
Most of the ICBL’s 1,400 members have limited themselves to
APM eradication, victim assistance and other Convention goals, but

Red spray paint warns villagers of a cluster bomb along a path in Ton Neua Village,
Laos, 1994.
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Explosive Remnants of War
Even before the Ottawa Convention was
signed, deminers and mine-clearance and
other organisations recognized as self-evident
a danger from weapons with similar characteristics to anti-personnel mines. There
came a proposal from the International
Committee of the Red Cross that campaigners and governments should look at all explosive remnants of war, a grouping that initially
included unexploded cluster munitions, antitank/anti-vehicle mines and APMs, antihandling devices, artillery shells, bombs,
grenades, booby traps and even missiles.8
Explosive remnants of war captured the
boundaries of the contagion, but not all
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for most of the casualties in some postconflict environments.”12
By a process of elimination, then, the
effort to address ERW has quickly come to
focus primarily on one subgroup (aside from
APMs) with the most serious humanitarian
impact: cluster munitions.
Failure Rates
Cluster casualties were sometimes
the consequence of munitions that erred
from their target or that were dropped
close to noncombatants—but it is their
high failure-to-detonate rate that makes
them potential ERW. Official failure
rates of cluster munitions often varied
from the numbers recorded in the real

Unexploded cluster munitions litter grazing land in Xieng Khouang province, Laos, 1994.

the military utility of cluster weapons as
an area-effect weapon, readily admitted
current models were problematic. (They
did not, however, commit to their immediate withdrawal.10)
A significant strike against cluster munitions is their rivalry with APMs for highest
number of unintended victims. In parts of
the world (Laos, for instance), the sheer number of failed cluster munitions poses a hazard as great as or greater than anti-personnel
mines.11 A 2002 survey by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining found the “data available on the
casualties of ERW and percentage of UXO
cleared again shows a greater bias toward
the two main groups—anti-personnel mines
and cluster bomblets (submunitions). It is
probably the case that they are responsible

world. Rae McGrath reported in his resource book, Landmines and Unexploded
Ordnance,13 that the 1966 tests of BLU-26
submunitions at Nellis Air Force Base in
ideal circumstances revealed a 26-percent
failure-to-explode rate after deployment.
Colin King, an international landmine
and explosive ordnance disposal consultant,
pointed out, “Gulf War I clearly demonstrated a major discrepancy between performance during military ‘acceptance tests’ and
operational use. …[N]early 2,000 electronic mines remained unexploded in the U.S.
clearance sector alone, despite achieving
near-perfect results during testing.”14
Similarly, demining consultant Andy
Smith notes, “Formal tests take place on
hardpan and with the pilot able to deploy
the CBU [cluster bomb unit] in the manner

required by the manufacturer. Typically
he will be flying at the correct speed, orientation and altitude to ensure optimum
performance. In a combat situation, that
same pilot may be operating at night and
under enemy fire. The target area may include buildings or woodlands and the
ground surface may vary from concrete to
swamp. Submunitions may be dispersed at a
height that does not allow them to complete
the arming process before landing; they may
strike trees or buildings that prevent them
landing in the intended orientation. They
may also land on a surface that swallows
them up.”15
Emergence of a Cluster Munitions
Campaign
At the Lugano, Switzerland, conference
of experts organised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in 1976, 13
states16 concentrated on the lethal footprint
of cluster munitions and the horrific consequences for civilians nearby. However, core
cluster-bomb user-states did not sign onto
the Lugano statement and there was no reference to detonation failure rates. The critical experience in Laos and Vietnam was that
cluster bombs had been targeted at or near
noncombatants.17 Many of the deaths from
UXO were yet to come. While the Lugano
conference did not establish a cluster-bomb
campaign, it (and the Lucerne conference)
did lead, ultimately, to the creation of the
CCW in 1980. Except through advocacy by
the Mennonite Central Committee (with
clearance work by Mines Advisory Group in
Laos) and Human Rights Watch, the problem of cluster munitions might have fallen
entirely out of sight. The campaign spark
came somewhat later.
Ottawa Convention Impact
Thirty million submunitions were
dropped in the 1991 Gulf War, resulting
in thousands of untargeted victims—and
yet there was no sustained public outcry.
Cluster munitions casualties in Kosovo
(1999) and Afghanistan (2001), however,
did receive attention, as did munition
failure rates (normally an esoteric subject
area).18 The news media were quick to
highlight the similarity in appearance of
cluster munitions and yellow food packages dropped into Afghanistan (a confusion
that actually had rare, if any, consequences).19 In Canada, where I live, members
of Parliament had to respond to inquiries
about cluster bombs in question period.20
Government ministers were forced to make
contradictory statements. The European
Parliament, for its part, took a stand in

favour of a moratorium. So what had
changed since the Gulf War?
The link between renewed interest in
cluster munitions and the international success of the APM ban campaign is unmistakable. The ICBL and Ottawa Convention had
highlighted the unacceptability of weapons
detonated by innocent victims either directly (death and injury) or indirectly (socioeconomically). All weapon use after the Ottawa
Convention bears a new level of scrutiny.21
For many campaigners, this was the best
possible result.
The Pace Picks Up
At an International Committee of the
Red Cross experts’ meeting in Nyon,
Switzerland, in September 2000, explosive remnants of war were officially

campaigning for a moratorium on cluster
munitions (sometimes by themselves) for a
couple of years, most other member groups
were quiet.25 There was some concern that
formally linking a cluster-munitions initiative to the landmine campaign would threaten partner governments that had signed the
AP Mine Ban Convention. Would linkage jeopardize universalising the Ottawa
Convention? Some governments had to
wonder if the campaign was now spilling
over into non-APM weapons. Where would
it stop?
The contrary argument, which was
the one that eventually led to the ICBL’s
December 2001 statement,26 was that the
credibility of a campaign in pursuit of a
norm against victim-activated weapons
would be put in jeopardy without formally
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unexploded ordnance posed an equal risk.
Some were more visible and more prevalent and others were less likely to explode
inadvertently. Some had greater military
utility, which made their prohibition more
difficult. The ERW nomenclature has been
a useful and creative approach to underlining similar humanitarian effects caused by
a broad range of munitions. It resulted in a
new CCW Protocol (Protocol V), but one
with few obligations on member states.
Governments eschewed specific preventive
measures for fear that more of their arsenal
would subsequently be scrutinised, restricted or prohibited. The United Kingdom, in
its March 2005  presentation9 to the ERW
experts’ working group, while defending

PHOTO COURTESY OF TITUS PEACHEY

prospects now at the CCW. At a minimum,
preventing UXO meant establishing acceptable failure rates, banning certain fusing configurations and destroying aging
stockpiles. But no mandatory measures to
prevent UXO (including cluster munitions)
appeared in the final text. Instead, it stated,
“Each High Contracting Party is encouraged to take generic preventive measures
aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war” and “Each High
Contracting Party may, on a voluntary basis, exchange information related to efforts
to promote and establish best practices”
(emphasis added).4
Protocol V is far off the mark, but campaigners continue to press governments
to sign on as a first step to recognising a
problem. Some nongovernmental organisations now mull over the idea of an “Ottawa
Process” to deal with cluster munitions.
While not discounting any future process
outside the CCW, Human Rights Watch
has called for a new protocol focussed on
cluster munitions: “The mandate and the
protocol should be broad, and should deal
with both the technical reliability issues and
the targeting and use issues. … [A] new protocol should prohibit the use of unreliable
and inaccurate submunitions and require
their destruction. The billions of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions already
in the arsenals of more than 70 nations
are the primary humanitarian concern.
They must never be used in order to avoid
a humanitarian and socioeconomic disaster
exceeding that created by millions of landmines globally.”5
Human Rights Watch, one of a handful
of early adopters,6 was willing to call for a
moratorium on cluster munitions in 1999,
and in 2003 it named a specific list of problematic cluster weapons that should not be
used in Iraq because of their known hazardous failure rates.7

A BLU-26 cluster bomb peeks out of a rice paddy dike in Nanou Village, Laos, 2000.

put on the agenda. Colin King’s breakthrough report, Explosive Remnants of
War: A Study of Submunitions and Other
Unexploded Ordnance,22 was circulated.
Nongovernmental organisations and governments met informally, and there was “widespread recognition”23 of the ERW problem
and a need to address it.
In December 2001 at the final plenary
review conference of the CCW, the ICBL
issued its first clear statement in support
of those calling for “a moratorium on the
use, production and trade of cluster munitions.”24 This was a delicate moment for the
ICBL, where many felt that their priority
was completing work in progress on APMs.
While the Mennonite Central Committee
and Human Rights Watch had been publicly

recognizing and condemning the clustermunitions problem. The ICBL decided to
encourage its “members and supporters to
work to alleviate the humanitarian impact
of cluster munitions and other explosive
remnants of war.”26
Recent Developments
Virgil Wiebe, a consultant to the
Mennonite Central Committee and law
professor at the University of St. Thomas,
described a key presentation by the U.S. representative at the CCW in November 2005 
as “a jaw-dropping moment.” The official
borrowed heavily from a recent task force report that had found no identifiable “comprehensive approach—empirical observation or
otherwise—to determine and document
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Near Erbil, Iraq: the CBU was released at too low an altitude and these BLU-97 submunitions hit the ground
without arming. Their damaged state makes them unpredictable and very dangerous.

operational combat failure rates of U.S. munitions.”27 This is a remarkable admission
because it has broader implications than just
concerning cluster munitions. But consistent
with nongovernmental organisation and
field-based evidence, it also confirms actual
CBU failure rates might have little relationship with official “test” claims.28
In March 2006, Timothy McCormack, a
professor of international humanitarian law
at the University of Melbourne Law School,
led a review of the responses to a survey by
CCW States Parties regarding their views of
the relevance of IHL principles to explosive
remnants of war. McCormack concluded
that the CCW’s Protocol V should be sufficient to address the problem of ERW—but
if not, and the problem “only increases in
severity,” the call for a ban on cluster bombs
should not be unexpected. Significantly,
the report also argued that whatever the
outcome, “the onus is on user states to
demonstrate that such weapons can be used
consistently with the binding obligations of
IHL” (emphasis added).29
The announcement that the Belgian
government had adopted a comprehensive
ban on cluster munitions sent a ripple of
optimism through the Cluster Munition
Coalition, and thanks to good Belgian timing, it arrived just in advance of the CCW
meeting of States Parties in March 2006. In
one swoop, the Belgians have changed the
complexion of the cluster munitions campaign. While they have set the bar high,30
they have also reinforced the belief that an
international ban on something, not just
clean-up measures, is now possible. The final
ban text has been adopted by both houses of
parliament in Belgium as of this writing.
While the most comprehensive ban is
in Belgium (Austria is entering a parliamentary debate on a clusters moratorium),
several other states have made their reserva-
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tions known: “Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,31 Poland,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States have plans to withdraw from
service or have destroyed certain types of
cluster munitions.”32 Germany and Belgium
are considering a strategy of narrowing the
definition of cluster munitions so that a ban
excludes advanced models that are not expected to be problematic.33 The United States
is not Belgium, but even the U.S. military,
having distributed its own task-force report
in advance of the CCW, seems to be willing to consider major changes in its arsenal.
For the first time in a long time, a significant
international restriction on certain cluster
munitions appears to be within reach.
Continuing Debates
From the start, many ICBL campaigners had difficulty condoning technical
measures to address high cluster-munition
failure rates. They campaigned against
self-destruction, self-deactivation and selfneutralisation solutions for APMs and worry
that supporting technical fixes now may
compromise an absolutist principle defended
earlier. However, what if major players refuse
to join an all-out ban on cluster munitions,
even if they support a comprehensive ban on
anti-personnel mines?
Controversy also surrounds the debate
over what an “acceptable” failure rate might
look like. Less than 1-percent failure is a
typical cut-off point, but is also arbitrary. A
very small percentage of a very large number can still be a humanitarian disaster,
albeit a much-reduced danger compared
with that produced by a 10- to 30-percent
failure rate.
Yet, there may be a harm-reduction imperative to prioritising destruction of certain
more problematic “worst culprit” munitions,

whatever the future holds for a complete
ban. There is consensus within the CMC
for a moratorium on use, production and
trade of cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have been resolved—
but not everyone has been in favour of
prioritising.34 Does highlighting the bulk of
the problem legitimate what remains? Some
worry that humanitarian law will be ignored
and they have suggested that cluster munitions might be used more indiscriminately
if their failure rates are “fixed.” Will militaries switch to other bombs, causing more
casualties, if cluster munitions are banned entirely?35
An interesting reverse-onus framework
outlined by Landmine Action (UK) and
consistent with one of the conclusions of
the McCormack report is that governments
should recognise all cluster munitions are
assumed prohibited unless users can “opt in”
with a guarantee that a particular munition
can be used safely.36 Might that approach fit
nicely with the destruction of legacy munitions with the highest failure rates?
A final point: If the failure rates of cluster
munitions were reduced to nil or next to nil,
would there remain a humanitarian problem
on a scale sufficient to sustain a campaign
for a comprehensive international ban?
See Endnotes,” page 110

Mines and ERW
Due to the history and nature of conflicts in
the Ethiopia/Eritrea area, cleanup presents
specific considerations and hazards. The
lessons learned by the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Mine Action
Coordination

Centre

in

mine/explosive

rem-nants of war cleanup are presented,
as well as recommendations on clearance
operations for situations with mixed mine/
ERW like that in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
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ines and explosive remnants of war continue to affect
many parts of the world. One such area is the Horn of
Africa, where wars have continued for the better part of
the 20th century. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1320 formally
established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
in November 2000. At the same time, the U.N. Security Council
formally established a Mine Action Coordination Centre within
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The resolution
requires the MACC to coordinate and provide technical assistance for
humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ1 [temporary security
zone] and area adjacent to it.
History of the Mine and ERW Problem
The mine and ERW problems of Eritrea and Ethiopia stem from
three historical periods. Eritrea was colonised by the Italians in the
19th century. During the Second World War, Italian and British
forces fought a number of battles across Eritrea, culminating in a
major siege on the town of Keren in 1941, which lasted nearly three
months. These battles were fought in a conventional manner, consisting of aerial bombardments, artillery, small-arms fire and mine
emplacement. Certain areas around Keren are considered hazardous
today due to suspected contamination by mines and unexploded ordnance, particularly in the hills surrounding the township. Keren was
the scene of a major battle again during the independence war years
between 1961 and 1991.
After the Second World War, Eritrea was governed by Great
Britain until the early 1950s, when it was handed over to Ethiopia
to be part of the federation system; annexed by Ethiopia, Eritrea became its northernmost province. There was a resurgence of Eritrean
nationalism in the early 1960s when the Eritrean population began

an insurgent campaign for independence against Ethiopian forces.
This rebellion gradually developed into a more conventional war as
the Eritreans gained support for their cause, won key battles and held
ground. This struggle for independence lasted 30 years and affected
the entire country. The Eritrean struggle for independence is possibly
one of the most successful examples of a liberation war. Eritreans are
justifiably proud of the establishment of their country, as it was won
at great cost to the population and without “outside” help or support
from other nations.
After the state of Eritrea was established in 1993, following a
U.N.-monitored referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly for independence, the relationship between Eritrea and
Ethiopia was cordial. This relationship continued until several issues
soured it, including the introduction of a new currency, the nakfa,
which replaced the Ethiopian birr. The situation eventually deteriorated into a war lasting from 1998 to 2000 over non-demarcated borders. Then in 2000, Algiers brokered a peace accord.
This border war was an intense conflict, with both sides employing conventional war strategies that developed into a carefully
planned and executed military operation reminiscent of World War I.
The war was fought at terrible cost with an estimated 70,000 people
killed and thousands more displaced. As a result of this conflict, the
entire border area between the two countries from the Sudan in the
west to the Djiboutian border in the east remains contaminated with
mines and ERW today.
Interrelationship between Mines and ERW
As a result of these conflicts, most of Eritrea and the northern
areas of Ethiopia remain contaminated with mines and conventional
ERW. In a recent incident, a truck driver collecting stones for a building site was killed when his vehicle drove over a landmine on a vacant
site just off a main road near the capital, Asmara. This mine was a
remnant of the independence war years, quite possibly overlooked
when the area was vacated.
In examining the history of the conflicts that have engulfed the
region, mines and ERW are interwoven menaces rather than separate
entities. It is not safe to just walk out to unexploded ordnance or
an abandoned tank and attempt to remove or destroy items without
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first establishing the history of the area and
what military actions occurred there. This
problem presents challenges to demining
and explosive-ordnance-disposal teams operating within the UNMEE area. Deminers
conducting clearance operations sometimes
encounter UXO and other ERW, including
abandoned military vehicles with live ammunition still on board. For example, during
battle-area clearance, a number of vehicles
with live ammunition scattered around them
were found. The vehicles had been set on fire
by retreating forces and the contents exploded, scattering the ammunition around the
burning vehicles. In such cases, a path has to
be cleared up to and around the vehicles to
enable teams to work safely.
Demining operations within a postconflict situation involving all aspects of
conventional war scenarios will generally
encounter a mixed threat of both mines
and ERW in areas where battles have taken
place and ground was contested. As battle
conditions develop, the area will become
littered with ERW of every imaginable description, in particular when the attacking
force seeks to dislodge the defenders. It is
inevitable that a percentage of the munitions directed at either side would fail to
function, either through accident or by design. Disabled or destroyed tanks and other
vehicles with supplies of ammunition present further challenges.
Problems Confronting the
Clearance Operation
A scenario of this type presents additional problems to the clearing agency. What is
perceived as the greater danger—the mined
ground or the littered ERW? In many cases,
local shepherds herding their animals have
encountered UXO lying on the ground and
resorted to throwing stones at it, through either idle curiosity or sheer boredom. Stones
landing on nearby mines have caused the
items to explode.
Locals scavenging among ERW for items
that can be recovered for sale, such as copper
and brass, enter mined areas in their quest
for such items out of economic necessity.2 In
many cases these people are killed or injured.
Emergency rescue measures, usually undertaken by demining organisations working in
the area, need to be conducted immediately
to recover the victim, or other locals will attempt an impromptu rescue operation, often
with equally tragic results. Being involved
in the recovery operation can be a traumatic
experience for many personnel.3
In some cases, clearance operations can
be disrupted when demining teams lack
suitably cross-trained, qualified personnel

48 | feature | journal of mine action | 2006 | august | 10.1

to remove or disarm UXO and ERW in conjunction with any mines encountered within
the clearance area.
ERW Encountered within UNMEE
Most conventional ERW items encountered within the UNMEE’s operations consist
of small-arms ammunition, mortars, artillery
shells to 155 mm and Boevaya Mashina/rocketpropelled grenade-type rockets. These items
have caused a number of casualties among
the local population living within the TSZ
and adjacent areas. Often the casualties are
children, who are curious by nature and play
with the items they encounter. These items,
although usually small, can inflict quite
horrific injuries to the child. A number of
submunitions and aerial bombs have also
been encountered during field operations.
Submunitions have streamers and are an attractive shape and colour that readily attract
a child’s curiosity.
Table 1 gives an overview of ERW items
encountered within the UNMEE.

Clearance Operations
Recommendations
As a result of identifying and mitigating the ERW problems in Eritrea, UNMEE
MACC has several recommendations for
developing a good clearance operation. A
thorough investigation is critical. A great deal
of the information can be gleaned from discussions with various parties, including local
inhabitants, militia, police and military personnel. Past operational reports from the area
will also be of assistance. If the region was the
subject of an Impact Survey and/or Technical
Survey, it is also extremely important to
consult the data presented in these reports.
The clearance operation should examine
the following:
• What is the history of the area?
• What forces and equipment were
involved? This will give an indication of the types of ERW likely to
be encountered. For example, tanks
and artillery will mean larger ERW;
submunitions can be delivered by

ERW Item

Recorded in Incident* and
Quantity Found Following
Incidents

F1 hand grenade

Yes—2

Chinese wooden HG (type unknown4)

Yes—1

M 75 Yugoslav HG frag

Yes—1

F1 HG fuse

Yes—3

Russian HG RGK3

Yes—1

RPG rocket

Yes—2

A fuse from an RPG rocket

Yes—1

Anti-aircraft bullet

Yes—1

POMZ

Yes—1

PMN

Yes—2

TM-46

Yes—5 

TM-57

Yes—1

Belgian plastic PRBM3

Yes—13

Czechoslovakian PT-MI-BA III

Yes—1

Unidentified HG

Yes—3

Unidentified UXO

Yes—4 

Unidentified AT mine

Yes—24

Unidentified explosive

Yes—1

TOTAL

67

Table 1: ERW Encountered in the UNMEE.
*Source: UNMEE MACC Preliminary Investigation Reports 2001–2005

•

•

•

•

artillery. Aerial bombardments would
suggest the need to be conscious of
larger ordnance and the possibility
of submunitions.
What was the intensity and duration
of the campaign? A lengthy campaign
means the likelihood of a greater
number of ERW being present.
Did the contested land change hands?
It is the experience of UNMEE
MACC that contested areas that
changed hands resulted in many of
the mines laid by one side being recovered and re-laid in other areas by
the new owners.
What are the items of ERW encountered in operations to date? This will
determine the level of expertise required by the clearance organisation
to deal with likely finds as the clearance operation encounters the items.5
Depending on the number found
and their frequency, these specialised
personnel may need to remain on-site
or be within close proximity to the
operation while it is in progress. The
items of ERW will also determine the
type of equipment used to dispose of
these items.6
The area itself will need to be reviewed. If it is inhabited, the proximity of any discoveries of larger
ordnance, in particular, will present
additional considerations to the clearance operation. Should the item(s) be

destroyed in situ or removed? If the
item(s) cannot be moved due to lack
of specialised equipment, what measures need to be adopted to mitigate
the effects of destroying the item(s)? 7
• Abandoned military vehicles need
to be checked for ammunition and
other explosive devices. Approaches
to the vehicles need to be physically
cleared to eliminate the possibility
of mines. The presence of any potentially hazardous substances needs to
be considered also.
Conclusion
The experience of the UNMEE MACC
is that mines and conventional ERW are
an interwoven part of many clearance operations. However, it is essential to factor a
worst-case scenario into any plan. The types
of ERW encountered will determine the level of expertise required to complete the task
and deal with any finds in the course of it.
It is important that any clearance operation
have adequately trained personnel to deal
with ERW likely to be encountered during
the course of any task.
Staff members of the UNMEE MACC provided valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
For additional references and further
reading for this article, please visit http://
maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/feature/kudyba/
kudyba.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 111
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30,000 Square Meters Demined in Angola
Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (The National Institute for Demining) in Angola recently
announced it has demined more than 30,000 square meters (7.41 acres) of mine-affected land
in the country. INAD reported 12 anti-personnel mines, one anti-tank mine, 206 mortar
shells and various other explosive devices were destroyed as part of the clearance.
Fields demined by INAD were given to local populations for farming and other agricultural
pursuits. The organization has begun reconnaissance work to locate and identify more
mined areas in need of clearance.
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This primer reviews the legal and functional understandings regarding explosive remnants of
war, particularly after the adoption of Protocol V in the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons.1 It examines the tensions between the legal definition of ERW and the reality on
the ground, and recommends clarifying the terms that bind post-conflict clearance efforts
to ensure the greatest effectiveness of those campaigns.

Working Toward a Definition of ERW
Prior to November 2003, there was no formal legal definition for
ERW. It was often treated as a synonym for unexploded ordnance,
which the International Mine Action Standards have defined as “explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise
prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched
or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or
design or for any other reason.”2 The IMAS define explosive ordnance as “all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological and chemical agents.”3
The IMAS definition of explosive ordnance presents a more extensive scope of munitions 4 than most groups involved with mine/
ERW clearance would use, as it encompasses nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons. A more pragmatic explanation of ERW is exemplified in an International Review of the Red Cross article, which included in its definition of unexploded munitions “anti-personnel
mines, which are widely prohibited, as well as anti-vehicle mines,
submunitions from airborne cluster bombs or land-based systems
and other unexploded ordnance.”5 In general, the term ERW was
open for interpretation regarding what munitions or ordnance
might be included, and entailed anything from APMs to submunitions or “other UXO.”
Pressure for legal regulation of ERW under humanitarian law has
been spearheaded primarily by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Landmine Action U.K. and the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining. In particular, cluster-bomb
submunitions 6 have been of increasing concern. In a 2000 study on
Kosovo, the ICRC reported that cluster bomblets had an estimated
overall failure rate of between 10 and 15 percent.7 Landmine Action
U.K. reported that in Kosovo between 1999 and 2001, while landmines
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Submunition.
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hile using weapons during a conflict is a military decision,
modern combat operations have introduced a dilemma:
what to do with explosive remnants of war that remain
after a conflict ends. Such weapons not only threaten the post-conflict
safety of civilians and military personnel but can also be a major impediment to economic development. This primer on ERW provides
an overview of the changing definition of ERW, reports what is currently included in the term ERW and argues that the way ahead for
post-conflict stabilization and development will require a clarification
and agreement on those terms if the challenge is answered effectively.
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by Daniele Ressler [ Mine Action Information Center ]

caused about 13 percent of civilian deaths,
unexploded cluster-bomb submunitions
proved a larger threat, contributing to almost 32 percent of deaths.8 Some observed
that the likelihood of munitions malfunction was increasing through “the rapidly
expanding use of mass-produced cluster
munitions, the increased reliance on highly
sensitive micro-electronics in munitions and
fuses, and quality-control problems in the
defense industry.”9
Proponents for international regulation
of ERW advocated the addition of a protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons to address humanitarian concerns. After over a year of discussion and preparation, CCW Protocol V
was adopted Nov. 28, 2003. Protocol V
requires states to clear future ERW and to
work together to “clear existing unexploded ordnance or abandoned ammunition,
which can already be found in more than

Anti-personnel blast mine.

80 countries.”10,11 This includes taking all
feasible precautions to protect civilians from
ERW dangers as well as recording and sharing post-conflict ERW location information
for clearance.
While not yet in force, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein recently deposited instruments of ratification on May 12, 2006
to reach the necessary 20 States Parties
consenting to be bound to Protocol V. As
a result, Protocol V will now enter into
force as a legally binding accord by the
end of this year, on Nov. 12, 2006. Since
then, countries have continued to ratify
this Protocol.12

Submunition.

A Legal Definition of ERW
Protocol V presents a legal precedent
for defining explosive remnants of war. It

defines ERW as “unexploded ordnance and
abandoned explosive ordnance.”13 Protocol
V defines UXO using the IMAS’ standard
definition as previously cited; thus the first
part of this new legal definition of ERW
differs little from older understandings
of ERW-as-UXO. However, Protocol V’s
definition of ERW provides two important
modifications to popular understanding
of ERW-as-UXO.
The first noteworthy aspect is the second
part of the legal ERW definition, as “abandoned explosive ordnance.” Protocol V defines AXO as “explosive ordnance that has
not been used during an armed conflict,
that has been left behind or dumped by a
party to an armed conflict, and which is no
longer under control of the party that left it
behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive
ordnance may or may not have been primed,
fused, armed or otherwise prepared for
use.”13 This means that not only can ERW

of mines, booby traps and other devices as
defined in Protocol II of this Convention
as amended on 3 May 1996.”13 This
means that mines, including APMs15 and
AVMs,16,17 booby traps and manually emplaced munitions/other devices18  including
improvised explosive devices19 are excluded
from Protocol V on ERW and legally are
not defined as ERW. APMs also legally
fall under the jurisdiction of the widely ratified Ottawa Convention’s regulations.15
Practical Application of ERW
as Legally Defined
International humanitarian law has now
codified a definition of ERW, obliging States
Parties that have ratified Protocol V to act on
the resultant legal requirements of clearance.
Meanwhile, what does ERW functionally
mean? When organizations and clearance
teams are working to “remove ERW,” what
are they actually clearing on the ground?
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A Primer on Explosive Remnants of War

Anti-personnel blast mine, commonly known as a “butterfly mine.”

be understood traditionally as resulting
from the failure of weapons (UXO), but it
can also be understood as weapons that were
not used at all. AXO may range from “a few
rounds of ammunition or a grenade left with
the body of a dead soldier to entire ammunition dumps abandoned (frequently in a great
hurry) by a retreating force.”14
The second important caveat is that
even as CCW Protocol V legally defines
what ERW is, it also specifically states what
ERW is not, due to separate obligation under CCW Amended Protocol II. When defining the jurisdiction under which the term
ERW can now be applied in international
humanitarian law, Protocol V defines explosive ordnance (the common characteristic of all ERW) as “conventional munitions
containing explosives, with the exception

There is not a prevailing depiction of what
actual physical ordnance is considered to be
“explosive remnants of war” or how ERW
clearance should be managed. Herein resides a potentially problematic gap between
an understanding of ERW with regard to
legal obligations for clearance and an understanding of effective clearance operations.
In attempting to understand a practical
definition of ERW more acutely, this article
examines an analytical model published
by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining in 2001 and 2002.
Rather than focusing on a legal or technical
definition of ERW, the GICHD examined
ERW in practical terms of what might present an “explosive threat in post-conflict environments”20 and explicitly argued that ERW
was a broader term than simply UXO. The
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Aircraft bombs

“Cruise” missiles

Minelets

Anti-tank
ammunition

Depth charges

Mortar ammunition

Artillery shells

Electro-explosive
devices

Mortar rounds

Ballistic missiles

Field artillery
ammunition

Mortar shells

Free-flight rockets

Propellant-actuated
devices

Bombs

Gravity bombs

Pyrotechnics

Cannon
ammunition

Grenades

Rocket ammunition

Cluster-bomb units

Guided missiles

Rocket motors and
fuel

Bomblets

Table 1. Examples of UXO that can be considered ERW under
Protocol V.
This highlights a core tension between the functional and legal understanding of ERW because, although ERW does not legally
include mines, they are still highly explosive munitions, a danger
to civilians and military personnel, and functionally an explosive
remnant of war. Additionally, Protocol V does not include chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and ordnance; however, many of
the possible types of UXO listed in Table 1 such as warheads and
grenades might very well have such properties, again presenting existence of a practical interrelatedness of weapons both included and
not included in Protocol V.
Abandoned armored fighting vehicles. The GICHD describes
explosive ordnance disposal of abandoned AFVs23 in a defensive
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Anti-tank mine.

position as “one of the most technically complex and demanding operations conducted by an EOD technician” due to threat components
of surrounding mines/UXO, depleted uranium fragments, explosive
reactive armor, unstable stocks of internally stowed ammunition and
access denial devices.21 With these explosive threats present, abandoned AFVs are functionally considered ERW. The international
legal definition of ERW would also apSmall-arms
pear to identify AFVs as ERW, though
ammunition
again with the exception of mines
surrounding the AFV or any booby
Submunitions
traps or improvised explosive devices, as they are all codified in CCW
Surface-to-air
Amended Protocol II. Additionally,
missiles
AFVs are only legally considered ERW
once they are abandoned by the user
Tank ammunition
party as AXO and only if they have
explosive properties.
Torpedoes
Small arms and light weapons.
SALW and their ammunition can be
Unmanned aerial
vehicles
functionally understood as ERW due
to their potential instability through
Warheads
aging and improper/unregulated maintenance, leading to explosions. The
GICHD defines SALW as “all lethal
conventional munitions that can be
carried by an individual combatant or
a light vehicle, and that also do not require a substantial logistical and
maintenance capability.”21,24 Danger lies in leaking explosive content
and degradation of fuse safety systems and propellant stabilizer.20 The
international legal definition of ERW would allow inclusion of SALW
with the exception again of any mines, booby traps or improvised
explosive devices that might be carried and so long as the SALW are
not being carried by state actors for official use.
Stockpiles of ammunition and explosives. Stockpiles and
caches25 of ammunition or explosives present a practical ERW threat
through the danger of explosion, which can be devastating if poor
storage conditions lead to leaks or sudden movements resulting in
spontaneous combustion. In one example, a January 2002 explosion
at a government ammunition depot in Lagos, Nigeria, resulted in
over 1,000 deaths.26 Legally, if stockpiles are understood to be under

Tension between Legal and
Functional Definitions
The existence of a tension between legal and functional definitions of ERW
quickly becomes clear when examining
the “exceptions”—mines, booby traps and
IEDs/other devices—to ERW as it is legally
defined. The pattern found when comparing ERW as explosive threat with ERW by
legal definition reflects a paradoxical reality: while mines, booby traps and IEDs
cannot be legally included in Protocol V
as ERW, practically they are all highly explosive. The philosophical argument that
mines are “different” from UXO and AXO
because when exploded they have fulfilled
their function (as opposed to failing to explode [UXO] or never being used [AXO])
does not carry over with any importance
into functional clearance in a post-conflict
setting. For example, mines can be found
on the ground amidst other UXO, may be
emplaced around AFVs, and can be stored
within stockpiles. Because mines are highly
explosive, they must be treated with the
same concern, precision and technical skill
as any legally defined ERW.
An additional tension relates to the
function of weapons and the timing of
their use. For example, if booby traps and
IEDs remain after a conflict and are rigged
to detonate explosive ordnance, can they
be considered abandoned ordnance and, by
definition, ERW? If a civilian is injured by
an abandoned explosive booby trap or IED
left by retreating forces, are they a victim of
the ongoing conflict or rather of an explosive
remnant of that conflict? Ultimately, even if
they aren’t “legally” defined as ERW under
Protocol V, booby traps and IEDs present
the same risk of explosion and the same need
for effective and successful clearance.
These tensions are of interest not for
semantic reasons but out of practical concern. What becomes clear is that the physical explosive threat of mines, UXO, AXO,
booby traps and IEDs/other devices cannot
be separated from each other on the ground,
despite a separation within legal jurisdiction
of international humanitarian law. Provision
of assistance in clearance and clean-up is required by both CCW Protocol V and the
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national control, they would not be defined
as ERW as they are not abandoned; caches,
if understood to be ordnance stored by nonstate actors and then abandoned, could be
considered ERW and might include any explosive ordnance except mines, booby traps
and IEDs. The key is that they are explosive
and not under the control of the party that
left them behind or dumped them.
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GICHD divided the explosive threat of ERW into four major areas
that are useful as a framework to understand better what ordnance
might realistically be included in ERW risk:
1. Mine and UXO contamination of the ground
2. Abandoned armored fighting vehicles
3. Small arms and light weapons, including limited ammunition
and explosives in the possession of civilians and non-state
actors
4. Abandoned and/or damaged/disrupted stockpiles of
ammunition and explosives21
The GICHD’s model lists what it considers to be the ERW of
primary concern based on potential on-the-ground explosive hazards.
How does a definition of ERW as it is functionally understood compare to the new legal definition of ERW in international humanitarian law? The relationship between practical and legal understandings of explosive remnants of war will be compared by looking at
the GICHD’s four specific types of ERW understood to be potential
explosive threat.
Mines and unexploded weapons ground contamination. One
aspect of on-the-ground ERW contamination is UXO (as defined by
the IMAS). However, at the time of publication, both AP and AV
mines were also included in the GICHD’s identification of ERW,
due to the highly explosive nature of these weapons. Table 1 lists an
array of potential UXO that might be found on the ground after a
conflict.22 However, under Protocol V, APMs and AVMs are no longer legally defined as ERW as they are codified separately and exclusively in CCW Amended Protocol II or the Ottawa Convention;
thus, mines are not included in Table 1.

A small, aerial-dispensed, impact-fired, anti-personnel fragmentation bomb.

Ottawa Convention, and there is the need
for greatest efficiency in order to best protect
and serve human lives at risk. This requires
coordination, sharing of information and
collaborative expertise.
One potential pitfall will be if the clearance efforts of mines, booby traps, IEDs
and ERW aren’t coordinated because
their jurisdiction under humanitarian law
doesn’t technically require carry-over of
specific duties anywhere outside that specific legal mandate. For example, clearance of landmines is required through the
Ottawa Convention while clearance of
ERW is required through CCW Protocol
V. Humanitarian law provides the regulation of clearance within each convention
or protocol, but there is no guarantee that
effective clearance efforts will be wellcoordinated between signatory parties of
these separate legal agreements.

Future Action Toward ERW
Eradication
Many groups still deal pragmatically with
mines and other UXO together. For example,
the U.S. government includes in its definition
of ERW “landmines, UXO and abandoned
ammunition caches,” and in its humanitarian mine-action program it “strives to reduce
the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines, unexploded ordnance and
small arms ammunition.”27  Within the United
Nations, mine action is coordinated primarily
under the U.N. Mine Action Service and includes “all activities geared towards addressing
the problems faced by populations as a result of
landmine contamination”; however, despite its
name, it is understood that U.N. mine action
“also addresses all forms of UXO.”28
Even so, the reality is that despite some
inclusion of UXO and AXO in mine-action
clearance activities, they have not yet had
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and the need for global clearance in the same
way that the Ottawa Convention did for
landmines. However, if ERW is to join the
ranks of priority with landmines, the need to
combine and coordinate education, identification, information management, research,
and clearance efforts between landmines
and ERW should become imperative.

Daniele Ressler works as a
Researcher, Writer and Editorial
Assistant for the Journal of Mine
Action. She holds a Master of Science
in violence, conflict and development studies from the University
of London’s School of Oriental and
African Studies. She has also studied
in Switzerland, earning a Certificate
for Applied Studies in peacemaking.
Daniele has lived in Washington, D.C.,
Seattle and Nairobi, Kenya.
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A new set of playing cards are raising awareness and
recognition of common landmines and explosives encountered
globally. The cards help adults and children in mine-affected
regions learn more about mines and how to identify them.
Each card carries the image of a frequently encountered
mine, its country of origin, type and basic munitions
details. The back of the cards carries a “DANGER: MINES”
sign. Attention has been paid to consistency and correlation
between suits: Clubs are anti-tank mines, diamonds are
anti-personnel mines with the lowest metal content, hearts
are AP mines with enough metal to make them detectable,
and spades are fragmentation mines capable of injuring at
great distances.
In many cases, the card number relates directly to mine
designation. Jokers are two of the most common and sensitive
submunitions, BLU-97 and M42-type. In addition to being used
in normal card play, the cards also are predisposed to “top
trumps,” a game in which a mine category is used to determine
supremacy. For example, players will designate a
category, such as diameter, to specify highest
and lowest value in winning. In doing
so, players, especially children,
absorb technical details easily.
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Conclusion
This article serves to clarify definitions
of ERW by examining legal and functional
understandings. At the same time, how the
international community, governments,
organizations and individuals choose to
respond to ERW is of keen interest. As the
legal definition of ERW becomes more limited, excluding mines, booby traps and IEDs
from its mandate, it challenges us to increase
the functional coordination among various
explosive elements remaining after conflict
in both research and cleanup efforts. Our
challenge will be to understand and apply legal requirements that enforce commitment
to cleanup of all explosive ordnance, from
ERW as legally defined (including UXO,
AFVs, SALW and caches) to mines, booby
traps, IEDs and other devices. Ultimately,
defining ERW should not create regression
or obfuscation in clearance projects, but
rather provide stronger clarity, which allows
us to consider all pertinent aspects of postconflict munitions threats.
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://maic.jmu.edu /feature /
ressler/ressler.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 111

Mine-Recognition Cards Teach Adults, Children

A deck of cards is £7.05, inclusive of VAT where applicable
(approximately US$9.05); shipping rates are determined based
on destination. The company also
offers a database of more than
10,000 mine and ordnance images and can tailor card decks to
specific needs.
For more information on the
cards or to place an order, visit
www.ckingassociates.co.uk.
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A pile of abandoned munitions.
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efforts need to be effective. This will require coordination between mine and ERW
policy and practice, development of a deeper
understanding of the relationship between
mines and ERW and a greater commitment
to understanding ERW (as it is now legally
defined) in its own right. Practical questions
arise in terms of best practice. For example,
is it more effective to have one EOD team
working to clear both mines and ERW, or
should they be cleared separately to work
within their legally separate mandates (or
separate funding)? If mines and other functional ERW are cleared by separate groups,
should it be at the same time? How can governments, organizations and workers share
decision-making and coordination roles?
Will relevant information be quickly and correctly shared and recorded between groups?
As the legal scope and responsibility for
ERW clearance become more exclusively
defined under CCW Protocol V, there is
increased need for policy and coordination
to improve overall clearance efforts between
the legal jurisdictions of mines, booby traps/
IEDs and ERW. There is also the hope that
as ERW clearance becomes its own legal jurisdiction of concern, it will receive a boost
in global awareness and priority.
Because Protocol V regarding ERW will
not be put into force until Nov. 12, 2006,
yet it is not clear how agencies and governments will address the problem and clearance of ERW. States Parties must first decide
to ratify the Protocol, and then follow its
dictates. Protocol V may succeed in increasing awareness of the deadly threats of ERW
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the popular attention that APMs have garnered, nor have they been understood and
researched as extensively as APMs have
been. This is due largely to the strength and
success of the Ottawa Convention, which
has provided far more financial support,
research and political pressure toward ridding countries of the scourge of landmines
than toward ERW. If the goal is to eradicate ERW with the same inspiring success as
landmines, stronger policy is needed to ensure ERW receive the same level of concern
and action as landmines, and that clearance
of various explosive threats, including ERW,
mines, booby traps and IEDs, is coordinated and focused on with equal priority.
It was only in 2004, for example, that the
U.S. Department of Defense obtained a
change of its legislative authority to broaden
its humanitarian mine-action efforts to include ERW, 29 showing that for many, the
prioritization of ERW clearance is still in
early stages.
Presently, there is no agreement on what
specific ordnance is included in the framework of UXO and AXO. The GICHD
notes that since there is no common standard for reporting post-conflict casualties
and the type of explosive ordnance cleared,
there is not even an “accurate and objective
assessment of the impact of specific types
of UXO.”21 In particular, injuries can be
misreported, resulting in a skewed picture
of the source of casualties from functional
ERW. For example, a leg injury may have
occurred through a submunition, but was
recorded as an anti-personnel injury due to
the popular focus on landmines or lack of
concrete data and knowledge of UXO and
AXO in contrast to familiarity with landmines. An important first step, then, is additional research about and standardized
identification of weapons and munitions
remaining after a conflict to provide accurate reporting, measuring and understanding of ERW incidence.
Additionally, the GICHD argues in particular for a “system to allow a global overview of casualties caused by specific types
of ERW” with reports including not only
generic type but also condition (blind/dud,
field storage, rigged as IED or booby trap).21
Such an understanding of ERW functionally includes mines, booby traps and IEDs
along with the aforementioned UXO and
AXO, because in order to comprehensively
assess the incidence and scope of deadly munitions, the analysis must include all explosive munitions.
The understanding of threats and incidence of post-conflict casualties needs to be
improved, and clearance and risk-education

10.1 | august | 2006 | journal of mine action | feature |  55  

Response to Explosive
Remnants of War in
Post-conflict Environments

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF RONCO CONSULTING CORPORATION

RONCO’s

RONCO’s technical experts are dedicated to
eliminating threats created by landmines and
explosive remnants of war. Part of RONCO’s
disposal process is creating local demining
capacities in their host countries. As part of
a quick response, RONCO has most recently
added mine-action programs in Iraq and
Afghanistan, creating a specialized explosiveordnance-disposal capacity in Afghanistan
and establishing a bomb-disposal training
school in Iraq.
by Stacy L. Smith [ RONCO Consulting Corporation ]

T

heir eyes widen and a smile appears at the first sight of a precariously stacked pile of munitions, newly uncovered bunker
of mines or slyly matched pair of explosive devices. They pose
for pictures beside rockets in Iraq and caches in Afghanistan. Back
at RONCO headquarters in Washington, D.C., it’s pretty obvious
that these guys—our highly trained technical experts in explosive
ordnance disposal—can hardly wait to blow something up.
On second glance, though, something more is apparent: It’s not
just about loading the pit, unraveling the detonation cord, placing
the charges and watching the big explosion. It is about the pride and
satisfaction that RONCO’s EOD Advisors take in eliminating the
threats created by mines and other explosive remnants of war and in
transferring their skills to host-nation personnel so future disposal
operations can continue unabated once they’ve departed. Through
formal classroom instruction, on-the-job training and mentoring in
the disposal of varied and numerous munitions, RONCO has ensured a swift and safe response to the ERW threat, most recently as
an added component to its humanitarian mine-action programs in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
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Abandoned ammunition supply points are prevalent across Afghanistan.

Background
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, RONCO was on the ground within
weeks of the cessation of the initial conflict. In 2001, RONCO sent
14  Technical Advisors to Afghanistan to aid the U.N. Mine Action
Programme for Afghanistan in upgrading its clearance efforts, and in
2003, the U.S. Department of State’s Quick Reaction Demining Force
was deployed to Baghdad to respond to emergency clearance tasks. This
led to follow-on requests to develop a national mine-action capacity in
Iraq. In both of these situations, RONCO was asked to deploy quickly, foster a national capacity for humanitarian demining and create a
capacity for independent EOD operations, with all activities initially
funded under the U.S. DOS’s Integrated Mine Action Support contract. Historically, RONCO has always disposed of ERW encountered
during humanitarian-demining operations. In recent years, however,
the importance of developing a local capacity to conduct this work has
become more critical as RONCO has increasingly undertaken projects
in hostile and fragile post-conflict environments.
RONCO’s approach always involves the training of a local national capacity to perform this work, not only because of its extensive

knowledge of the location and type of ordnance found, but because of
its desire, like that of RONCO’s own field staff, to benefit the communities in which it works. The following accounts of RONCO’s approach to building highly specialized disposal teams in Afghanistan
and Iraq illustrate the company’s success in integrating these capacities
into mine-action programs while operating in unstable environments.
Creating a Specialized EOD Capacity in Afghanistan
In 2001, Coalition bombing throughout Afghanistan left former
Taliban and Afghan Army bases destroyed. Left unguarded, these
bases and ammunition supply points attracted insurgents gathering munitions for improvised explosive devices and locals collecting
scrap metal.
With an increasing number of attacks on Coalition Forces and
accidents at the ASPs, their clearance quickly became a priority for
local authorities. Following discussions with the U.N. Mine Action
Centre for Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of State agreed to
form specialized EOD teams operating outside of the normal U.N.
structure to address the problem. Under the Department of State’s
Integrated Mine Action Support contract, RONCO trained five 12man, specialized EOD teams comprised of local Afghans to operate
in Kandahar, Herat, Khost and Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as other sensitive regions of Afghanistan. In addition, RONCO trained four other
EOD teams operating under the Demining Agency for Afghanistan,
an indigenous nongovernmental organization whose creation in the
early 1990s RONCO supported, to focus on clearance of villages in
the heavily fought-over southern region of Afghanistan.
RONCO coordinated with local governors and other government
officials to identify munitions stockpiles creating threats to the population and also to determine land-use requirements and national priorities. The teams then assessed the type of ordnance, level and type
of damage, and security threat posed by the ordnance. RONCO also
liaised with Provisional Rehabilitation Teams and Coalition units in
the area, who often requested assistance in destroying caches of munitions, deeply buried bombs and other unexploded ordnance, and
other weapons hindering their operations.
RONCO’s EOD teams first conducted initial surface clearance to
recover and destroy ordnance around the perimeter of the bunkers or
caches. The teams then breached the damaged bunkers manually or
with the aid of mechanical equipment, clearing collapsed walls and debris so the contents of the bunker could be inspected and sorted. Items
identified by Coalition Forces as a threat or classified too dangerous to
transport were immediately destroyed. After the RONCO EOD teams

emptied each bunker, mechanical equipment was again used to sift
through any rubble to locate and remove any remaining UXO.
Due to the security situation in Afghanistan, RONCO trained
and employed static guards1 at its work sites to safeguard personnel
and equipment. On duty around the clock, the guards prevented
insurgent groups or scrap-metal collectors from stealing munitions.
These security elements protected the local population by reducing
the threat of improvised explosive devices in their communities and
decreasing ordnance-related incidents among scrap collectors, many
of whom are children, gathering and selling the metal.
The creation of this specialized EOD capacity in Afghanistan
produced impressive results in three years of operations. During
the first few weeks of operations in 2003, the teams destroyed over
45,000 107-mm rockets in Kandahar at the request of commanders
at Kandahar Air Base, which was under weekly attack. After removing these weapons, the number of attacks on the base was reduced
to just six in the entire following year. In total, the EOD teams destroyed over two million items of explosive ordnance, including  in
part 22,000 mines, 84,000 rockets, 915,000 projectiles, 100 missiles
and, of particular interest, 30 man-portable air-defense systems posing a significant threat if obtained by terrorists. This total does not
include the disposal of hundreds of tons of small-arms ammunition
also found in bunkers or caches.
Additionally, Demining Agency for Afghanistan teams advised and mentored by RONCO cleared Soviet-era munitions from
over 400 villages in southern Afghanistan during this time period.
These teams, which previously did not know how to dispose of large
bombs, were trained by RONCO, developing a national capacity, so
land could be rendered safe for local populations.
Establishing a Bomb-Disposal Training School in Iraq
In March 2005, RONCO was tasked by the Multi-National
Security Transition Command–Iraq, through the Department of
State’s IMAS contract, to provide explosive-ordnance-disposal training and support services to develop up to four Iraqi National Guard
EOD companies. For this project, RONCO tapped its instructional
cadre from the Iraqi Mine/UXO Clearance Organization, which was
created and trained by RONCO between 2003 and 2004.
After the initial mobilization of RONCO and IMCO personnel, along with the renovation of living and classroom facilities at
a compound in southern Iraq, planning and coordination for the
first course commenced. The RONCO/IMCO staff developed
and implemented training programs, programs of instruction,

Afghanistan’s landscape is littered with stacks of abandoned and unsecured ordnance.
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other explosive threats persisting in Iraq;
another 650 EOD Level II Operators and
30 advanced medical personnel will also be
trained. Additionally, RONCO will train
and mentor a 40-person Iraqi instructor
cadre in EOD and IEDD to establish a viable host-nation training capability.

Stacy L. Smith
Communications and Proposal
Manager
RONCO Consulting Corporation
2301 M Street, NW Suite 400
Washington, DC 20037 / USA
Tel: +1 202 785 2791
E-mail: ssmith@roncowash.com
Web site:
www.roncoconsulting.com

Patent Sought for Explosive-eating Fungus
Robert Riggs of Texas has filed a patent for pellets of dormant fungal spores that could
be mixed with explosives before being loaded into an explosive package. The dry spores
remain dormant until moisture in the air travels down the wick of an unexploded package
and germinates the spores.
The fungus, a white-rot variety of Phlebia radiate, then devours the explosive material inside
the bomb, rendering it harmless. Should the explosive detonate, the fungus disintegrates
with the material.
By allowing manufacturers to control the content of the explosive-pellet mixture, they will
be able to determine how long an unexploded package will be left dangerous.
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The Expanding Role of
Mine Action
RONCO’s guys are never hesitant or illequipped for a mission, whether it’s a task
to destroy mines, empty a bunker filled to
the brim with rockets or respond to an IED
threat. In their careers, they have defused,
disarmed and destroyed it all and effectively transferred these skills to host-nation
personnel. Oftentimes, RONCO Advisors
work alongside these people to mentor them
every step of the way, assisting in stacking
ordnance for on-site detonation or hoisting
munitions onto a truck for transport to a
central disposal site.
As evidenced in the company’s recent
post-conflict experiences in Afghanistan and
Iraq, RONCO has created specialized EOD
capacities to address specifically the ERW
threat as an extension of mine action. The extremely dangerous nature of working in these
fragile environments has required the deployment and use of security in mine action, an
added component to safeguard RONCO’s
people while fulfilling its commitment to the
host nation and a testament to its commitment to this expanding mine-action role.
See Endnotes, page 112

Unsung Hero:

Silvija
Bogdany
by Jennette Townsend
[ Mine Action Information Center ]

I

n the fall of 2001, Silvija Bogdany answered a Norwegian People’s Aid
advertisement for mine-clearance personnel of both sexes. After six weeks
of intense training, Bogdany became the youngest deminer in Croatia
and began working in the field alongside highly experienced male deminers.
In the spring of 2003, she was promoted to Team Leader. Though she only has
about four years of experience, her former Project Manager, Damir Jakši, places
her in the category of “highly experienced deminers.” Bogdany is now both the
Technical Advisor to and Supervisor of the DCA Mine Action Program Sudan,
where she trains demining staff. Capacity building is one objective of the team,
and the main goal is to help Sudanese deminers become less reliant on international supervision.  
Nevertheless, Bogdany likes to think of herself as “an ordinary girl.” She likes
to ride her motorcycle in her spare time; her favorite movie is Forrest Gump; and
her dream is to have two dogs, two horses and a large fish aquarium.
The Deminer
Poisonous snakes are some of the less ominous dangers Bogdany encounters
in the field. Below the surface of the ground lies a more deadly threat: landmines. “There were situations when I was a deminer that I can thank
only God for being alive and in one piece,” she says. Such an incident occurred while she was working in Slavonia. “I was in a fight
with my boyfriend, very unbalanced and stupid. I know that now. I
thought that my personal problems wouldn’t interfere with my work.
I was wrong.”
At the end of the work period, Bogdany’s Team Leader told her that
she had to finish her section before they went home. Frustrated with her
boyfriend and angry with her Team Leader, she finished clearing her section of the minefield. “The next day I went over the area I cleared with
a metal detector and found my footprint in the dirt that covered an AP
[anti-personnel] mine.”
“That day changed my life,” says Bogdany. “I have thought about that
event many times and every time the same conclusion comes to my mind:
‘Yes, I believe that God watches over me.’”
Not many deminers who have had a similar experience have gone
back to work the next day. Bogdany returned to work. “I don’t know
where I got the strength to do that!” she exclaims.
She returned to work as if nothing happened, but Bogdany broke
up with her boyfriend. “I couldn’t allow myself to make the same mistake again.” Her relationship with her Team Leader changed. “I used
to admire him, but now I realized that he didn’t care for his team. He
cared for how many square meters we cleared.” Bogdany says that
as a result of the experience, she promised herself that if she ever
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lesson plans, multimedia presentations,
and training aids to provide practical and
technical training to up to 200 students at
any one time in leadership, basic trauma
life support, and EOD Levels I, II and III
training.2 As was the case in Afghanistan,
RONCO trained and employed a security
force at its training facility in Iraq to protect personnel and equipment.
In 2005, the program graduated over
350 students, including 55 Iraqi officers and
staff noncommissioned officers in leadership positions and 301 Iraqi soldiers trained
in bomb disposal with basic trauma life support. Of the 301 Iraqi soldiers trained, 242
were trained to EOD Level III and 59 were
trained to EOD Levels I and II. RONCO
also developed a database of the students’
qualifications for use in maintaining records of student development and to assist
in identifying students for subsequent, more
advanced training requirements.
RONCO augmented its existing training
facilities and staff in December 2005 following winning a new contract to provide EOD,
improvised-explosive-device disposal and instructor training to the Iraqi Army and Police
to further respond to threats posed by bombs
and IEDs throughout Iraq.
With technical advice from RONCO
personnel, the IMCO instructor cadre continues to conduct these training courses.
In 2006, RONCO expects to train approximately 185  IED Disposal Specialists
to locate, identify, dispose of and report on
UXO and IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs and
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No Wizards,
Just Patient
by Bart Weetjens [ APOPO ] and
Jina Kim [ Mine Action Information Center]

tal organization that trains rats to be at new
mine-detection tool. The authors describe
the basic idea behind this unique concept.

T

he presence of landmines all over the world is an issue the
United Nations, governments and other world organizations are trying to address. But the difficult question
lies in how to find metal-ba sed landmines using metal detectors
because the iron-containing, laterite soils in sub-Saharan Africa
trigger the detectors indiscriminately. Since every signal has to
be checked, this method is not very useful in certain soils. One
organization, APOPO, utilizes a unique approach to finding
landmines. In Tanzania and Mozambique, mine-detection rats
are now being used.
Rats show much promise in furthering mine detection.
Like mine-detecting dogs, they have a highly developed sense
of smell. APOPO trains its rats to detect mines in the field using vapor-detection technology. Since landmines emit a vapor
from the explosives within them, the rats are able to use their

WEETJENS

APOPO is a Belgian-African nongovernmenSY OF BART

Silvija
Bogdany

Silvija Bog
dany
Technica
l Advisor/S
uper visor
DCA Mine
Action Pro
gram Sud
A marat S
an
treet 9, B
lock 10
Khartoum
/ Sudan
Tel: +882
165 420 30
64
E-mail: sb
ogdany@
gmail.com
Damir Ja
kšić
NPA Mine
Action Pro
gram Cro
Plemena
atia
Lapčana bb
23420 Ben
kovac / C
roatia
Tel: +385
23 684 02
4
Fa x: +385
23 682 20
1
E-mail: da
mirjaksic@
npaid.hr

ALL PHOT
OS COURTE

e presence of landmines all over t he worl d is an issue t he Uni t ed N at ions and ot her worl d organizat ions are t rying t o ad dress. But t he difficul t quest ion lies in how t o find landmines t hat are undet ect able using met al det ect ors becaus
t aining, lat eri t e soils in Sub-Saharan Africa t rigger met al det ect ors indiscriminat ely. Since every signal has t o be checked, met al det ect ors are not very useful in cert ain soils. One organizat ion, APOPO, ut ilizes a unique met hod. Mineof t en use t he aid of mine-det ect ing dogs, but in Tanzania and Mozambique mine-det ect ion rat s are now being used t o det ect mines.

The Team Leader
As a Team Leader, a day’s work for Bogdany might involve guiding two demining machines and an eight-person demining team at
the same time. She says this is not too difficult if both the team and the machines are located in the same place or near one another.
However, deminers must be at least 200 meters (656 feet) away from each of the machines. “My team is often on one side of the field
and the machines, naturally, are all the way on the other side of the field,” she explains. “In short, I did a lot of walking around like
some lost fly, and I am dressed in full equipment.”
The work not only mentally and physically challenges Bogdany, but it also affects her emotionally. After two Croatian
deminers were killed and one was badly injured, she says, “My friends try to convince me that this comes with [the] work and I
know that, but somehow I am not satisfied with that answer. I think that Team Leaders and Supervisors are mainly responsible for
most accidents.”
She thinks a Team Leader’s most important job is taking care of his or her team and safety on the site. “It is a really big responsibility and a person must recognize the situation
and not push it. You must know every person, his
way of thinking and limits. It is hard to work with
people, but the reward is big,” Bogdany says.
“It is difficult to continue with work after every
A n Intervie
landmine incident. I think that discussing it with
w with
the team is better than not talking about it at all.
What we all can and have to do is learn someW here do yo
thing from those incidents and try not to bring
u see mine
fit into that
action in th
our colleagues and ourselves into a similar situe next 10 to
vision ?
20 years, an
One thing is
ation,” she explains. “I’ve noticed that most acd where do
ce
rt
ai
you
n
—
th
w
er
or
e
ld
w
ill always be
cidents happen at the end of the working period.
because ther
e
m
w
in
il
efi
l
al
elds and min
ways be war
demining w
I think that concentration falls and everybody is
e action in th
somewhere
ill continue
on the ea rth
e
for many ye
I th in k that
. Even if war
nervous and not thinking right.”
ar
s.
in 10 to 20
stops,
on
ye
ly I wou ld li
ars, deminin
On Bogdany’s one-year anniversary of being
ke to see mor
g w il l st il l b
e soph istica
in their wor
a Team Leader she said, “My biggest reward is
ted equ ipmen e demining as it is now
k.
,
t, wh ich w il
Since I pref
that I can go to sleep every evening knowing
l help demin
er fieldwork
er
s
W
to
orld countr y
of fice work,
that my team is okay.”
work ing for
I see myself
an NGO [n
visor, perhap
somewhere
ongovernmen
s as a demin
in a Thirdin
ta
g
l
in
or
in
ga nization]
m
st
ru
in
ctor. I also se
e-risk educa
Thinking about the Future
as a supertion.
e myself bec
If money an
oming more
“My involvement in mine action has
d ot her obst
involved
ing w it h the
acles were n
developed much quicker and deeper than
o object, how
world ’s min
e problem ?
wou ld you go
If money wer
I thought it would,” says Bogdany. “I beabout dea le no object,
w
h
yp
it
h
ot
la
h
ndmines bec
etically spea
came a Team Leader in just 15 months. I’ve
k ing, we wou
ause war wou
begins becau
ldn’t have a
ld be an en
met and become friends with many people
se of money
problem
igma to peo
an
m
d
oney wasn’t
pl
m
e.
at
er
A lmost ever
who are also involved in mine action. I
ia
l
p
ossessions. O
involved—th
y war
nly one war
e Troja n War
W hat do yo
have gained more confidence in myself.”
started wher
.
u feel are ar
e
eas in the d
I would inve
Looking to the future, she says, “If God
emining wor
st more mon
ld
th
make demin
at ca n be im
ey in resear
gives me health and luck, I will be involved
ing ea sier w
ch and in n
proved ?
ith less risk
ew innovatio
work qualit y.
fo
in demining until my pension. I just hope
ns that wou
r
d
eminers, bu
I would inve
ld
t at the sa m
st money in
qualit y train
that everything will turn out right.”
e time impr
new, more so
ing and edu
ove
phisticated
cation for dem
Q
u
al
eq
it y assura nce
Bogdany remembers a long talk she
uipment and
iners.
in
and qualit y
With more
control are
had with her sister, Emilija, who retired
personnel qu
of
bi
al
g
ifi
im
b
ed
ef
p
or
ore and duri
to conduct m
ta nce to dem
from demining when she got married.
ng the clea ra
onitoring of
ining.
nce process
la nd prior to
demining or
“She told me one thing and I think
and to condu
ga nizations
its formal re
ct
lease, it wou
final inspecti
are conduct
about it every now and then. She told
ld be ensure
ed in accord
on of clea red
d that all cl
ance with In
dard operat
ea ra nce proc
te
rn
me that it was when she quit demining procedu
ational Min
esses
res. This way
e Action Stan
properly and
dards and st
it would be
ing that she realized for the first time
that it was n
anen
sured that th
ot just a mon
companies.
e job was don
how dangerous the job is. She is more
ey chase. Per
I have seen
fe
w
e
h
ct
er
examples ar
tending to fi
e clea ra nce
concerned for me now than she was
e commerci
was not don
nish one proj
al
e
ec
pr
t
an
op
as
d move on to
erly because
quick ly as p
for herself when she was a deminer.
they were
ossible so th
another proj
at they ca n
that in the m
ect, and af te
collect mon
Maybe it is better for us not to think
r that one, to
oney race, d
ey
emining qu
another and
the work are
alit y diminis
about that.”
so on. I thin
under unnec
h
es
k
.
es
P
lu
sa
s, people wh
ry pressure.
A ll in all it
o are doing
comes down
increa se prod
to
good manag
uctivit y but
ement and
not lowering
orga nization
the sa fety st
, tr ying to
andards.

Jennet te
Townsen
d
Journal of
Mine Act
ion
Mine Actio
n Informat
ion Cente
E-mail: m
r
aic@jmu.
edu

Alfredo Adam

o and his ba

by rat.

Teachers

nce of landmines all over t he worl d is an issue t he Uni t ed N at ions and ot her worl d organizat ions are t rying t o ad dress. But t he difficul t quest ion lies in how t o find landmines t hat are undet ect able using met al det ect ors because t he iron-cong, lat eri t e soils in Sub-Saharan Africa t rigger met al det ect ors indiscriminat ely. Since every signal has t o be checked, met al det ect ors are not very useful in cert ain soils. One organizat ion, APOPO, ut ilizes a unique met hod. Mine-act ion cent ers
use t he aid of mine-det ect ing dogs, but in Tanzania and Mozambique mine-det ect ion rat s are now being used t o det ect mines.

became a Team Leader, people and their safety would come first and not the daily result. “Naturally, daily achievements count, and
that is how I see a good Team Leader—managing to have high productivity but not jeopardizing safety.”
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Challenges in
by Adam Kushner, M.D., M.P.H. [ Médecins du Monde

]

Sudan

Working with Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spen
t 12 weeks with a
mission in Malakal, Sudan. This article, written as a journ
al, is his account
of the first six weeks. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has
helped many
and witnessed the impressive ability of doctors in Malakal

to work in

stressful and sub-par conditions. He also came face to
face

with

the cholera crisis and worked to get support and supp
lies for
a second Cholera Treatment Center site.
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t is the end of my first day in Malak al, Sudan, but all that
matters are
the orange streaks accentuating the indigo hues of the clouds
, darkness
slowly descending after the sunset, and the almost palpab
le silence.
Across the river, a flat plain extends for miles. Little grows
and there are
no houses or signs of activit y; it looks like a no-ma n’s-lan
d. On our side,
the eastern bank, a beehive of activit y is slowly continuing.
Long, metal,
canoe-like boats discha rge their passengers or bound-up,
brown, taupe
and khaki bundles of bamboo, balsa and thatch—the buildin
g materials throughout the region. The piles are stacked and
stretch in
random patterns along the shore. Traders and passengers
amble
slowly by; some climb into smaller boats and head furthe
r up or
down the river to neighboring villages. Malak al, the city
where
I will stay for the next two to three months, is
considered the gateway to southern Sudan. It is
the capital of the Upper Nile state and home to
more than 150,000 people. With a peace agreement reached in 2005  between the north and
south, a civil war that raged for more than two
decades ended. Daily, more and more former refugees return to the south seeking jobs and a way
to rebuild their lives. They also return to untold
numbers of landmines.
But at this time of day the Nile is quiet. Masses
of green and brown reeds and other debris— small
floating islands, some only a few inches in diameter, some many yards across—float rapidly northward, downstream. Flocks of heron or other
such birds fly in V-formations. Occasionally a
New
home
constr
goat saunters by uttering a strident beeehhh,
ucted
in the
minefi
interrupting the silence. A few teenagers apeld in
Malak
al.
proach and practice their limited English skills.
They smile and are eager to hear a response. “How are
you?” they cry with heavy accents. One shows off his
knowledge with a hearty “Good morning, teacher!”
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t h Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed t he impressive
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. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed t he impressive abili t y of doct ors in Malakal
er st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er si t e.
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to settle. Now that it is the dry season, the ground is quite hard and
many of the mines are literally trapped in the ground.  
In speaking with the head of the United Nations Mine Action
Service here in Malakal, I find he feels that once the rains begin
and the ground softens, there will be a significant increase in the
number of landmine injuries. In the past two months, there have
been seven victims brought to the Malakal Hospital. I have operated on two: the soldier I wrote about above (whose thumbs I was
able to save), and a six-year-old girl who required an above-knee
amputation. A third child is also on the ward recovering from injuries she suffered after playing with a piece of unexploded ordnance.
I was told the other victims were very severely injured and died
soon after admission.
To understand the landmine situation more clearly, I have also
spoken with the UNMAS folks about making sure the victim data
is incorporated into the Information Management System for Mine
Action database. For those of you who don’t know, IMSMA is a
global standardized database to collect information on landmines
and minefields; it also has a victim component. In addition, I am
hoping to get a better hospital surveillance program on victim data
established and have also written a proposal to get a stockpile of surgical consumables in place for if and when we begin to receive large
numbers of landmine victims. Data shows landmine victims utilize
vast amounts of hospital resources, and we need to be prepared for
such a disaster.
As for me, being here has the usual fun/torture of operating in
suboptimal conditions. While here, I am not focusing on landmine
casualties. I do general surgery. A few cases had to be cancelled due
to lack of enough sterile drapes and gowns. We seldom have cautery,
sufficient clamps, or forceps with teeth. However, I am told that a
batch of new surgical instruments is being sent from Paris in a week
or so—the supplies will certainly be welcomed. In addition, work on
the new operating rooms is proceeding nicely and they will hopefully be completed soon. This lack of supplies or a new operating
room has, of course, not really limited our operating; we managed
to do numerous appendectomies and hernias, a few cholecystectomies, thyroidectomies, a burn contracture release and skin graft, a
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Working in Malakal
The mission in Malakal is to improve the surgical services at the Upper Nile State Teaching Hospital, a 100-bed,
government-run facility originally built by the British in
the early 1900s. It is the only government hospital providing surgical services to the inhabitants of three states:
Upper Nile, Jonguli and Unity. Funding for the current project is provided by the French Embassy in
Khartoum. The scope of the project includes building new operating rooms, providing new surgical
equipment and supplies, and developing a training
program to help improve the knowledge of the local
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surgeons, anesthetists, gynecologists and nurses.
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t h Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed t he impressive
oct ors in Malakal t o work under st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er si t e. Working wi t h Médecins du
. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed t he impressive abili t y of doct ors in Malakal
er st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er si t e.

On the way to the guest house, other staff members and
I pass the back of the hospital and the office of Médecins du
Monde (for those of you like moi, who are rather françaischallenged: Doctors of the World). MDM is a humanitarian
assistance organization, founded in 1980 by former Médecins
Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) folk. I am currently working for MDM.

te Nile
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Another Landmine Incident
Saturday night while walking to our favorite grilled goat
O
restaurant, I was informed about another landmine/UX
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probably from his shirt catching on fire. The last boy had
penetrating wound to his left flank.  
Now the prospect of getting an operating-room team tol in
gether at 7 p.m. on a Saturday night in a district hospita
my
southern Sudan didn’t initially seem like an option, but to

surprise and delight, Dr. Mamoun was able to
rally the troops and by 10 p.m. we were exploring the abdomen of the child with the flank
injury. We did the entire operation under
3
ketamine anesthesia. The only injury was a
hole in the descending colon; we recovered
a one-inch piece of shrapnel. We mobilized
the splenic flexure,4 exteriorized the wound,
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and created a temporary colostomy, which
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Other than that, we have done a few
more thyroids, a common bile-duct exploration for stones, a number of hernia s,
and of course a whole bunch of appendectomies. Also, cholera has arrived. At
6
first, it was only by barge. A number of
people left Juba with symptoms, and
the boat was stopped by the local authorities. One case of cholera was confirmed and that person was isolated
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Getting Through CTC
The language barrier prevents
me from effectively communicating with many of the nurses, the
patients and the careta kers of the
children. Sure, I am learning some
phrases, and although they were helpful in
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e presence of landmines all over t he worl d is an issue t he Uni t ed N at ions and ot her worl d organizat ions are t rying t o ad dress. But t he difficul t quest ion lies in how t o find landmines t hat are undet ect able using met al det ect ors
because t he iron-cont aining, lat eri t e soils in Sub-Saharan Africa t rigger met al det ect ors indiscriminat ely. Since every signal has t o be checked, met al det ect ors are not very useful in cert ain soils. One organizat ion, APOPO, ut ilizes a
unique met hod. Mine-act ion cent ers of t en use t he aid of mine-det ect ing dogs, but in Tanzania and Mozambique mine-det ect ion rat s are now being used t o det ect mines.
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The Bad News
Cholera is here, big time. The cases started arrivi
ng a week-and-a-half ago, and so far over 500 patien
ts
have been treated at the MSF Cholera Treatment
Center. After we were notified about the arriva l of
numerous cholera patients, we stopped by early Thursday
morning to see if MSF needed any help. They stated
that they were desperate for more medical person
nel. So, being part of “medical personnel” myself,
I offered my services (with the approval of MDM).
For four days, or actua lly three days and one night,
I
worked in the MSF CTC. Let me tell you, it was
certainly eye-opening.
The CTC is set up in the local soccer stadiu m,
a large expanse of dusty and dry, cracked
ground. The entire area is enclosed by a corrugated
metal fence, which is helpfu l in keeping
people away from the infected patients; however,
there are four entrances to the stadiu m and
people and goats continue to enter despite the armed
police stationed at the entrance. In the
stadiu m there is a groomed-ea rth playing field
and to the south of that is a mass of tents
and plastic fencing. The CTC is divided into four
zones —one each for obser vation, for
recovery, for hospitalization, and for the staff and
supplies. Sprayers are posted at the
entrance and a centra l point in order to spray everyo
ne’s hands and feet with a dilute
chlorine solution in order to limit conta minat ion.
In theory, the medical care for a cholera patient is
fairly easy and basic. Patients
are admitted with severe diarrhea, vomiting and
evidence of dehydration. The
way to treat them is with fluid, lots of fluid, and then
more fluid, and then when
you think they have had enough and are beginning
to drink, you make sure
they are getting more fluid. Now when I say fluid
what I mean is Ringers
solution, an electrolyte mixture given intravenous
ly. Most guidelines say
about 6 to 10 liters (6 to 11 quarts) per patient.
So, it all sounds fine and dandy, and not too difficu
lt. There are
local nurses to assist with the majority of the work
and the doctor
merely super vises. Well, the problem is we are
in Sudan, which
for those of you who forgot, is in Africa, where thing
s never really go as planned. An additional problem for me
is
that I don’t speak Arabic or the local languages
of Shilluk, Dinka or Nuer. This lack of communication adds to the frustration
of working in over 100 degrees
Fahrenheit in the middle of a
hot, dusty stadium in tents filled
beyond capacity with patients with
non-stop vomiting and diarrhea.
Sure there are beds with large holes
in the center and buckets placed under them, but often they do not collect all the fluid. Patients, especially
little children, vomit on the beds, on the
floor, and occasionally on the staff.
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oct ors in Malakal t o work under st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er si t e. Working wi t h Médecins du
. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed t he impressive abili t y of doct ors in Malakal
er st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er si t e.

and treated. Today, however, 21 more cases were
reported with one death. Hopefully things will remai
n under control.
UNM AS has agreed to fund our proposal (to the
tune of US$13,000) to stockpile enough surgical
supplies to treat 100
landmine victims. Due to the change in funding
sources for the local Ministry of Health from Khart
oum to Juba, no one is
certain that the current hospital stocks will be replac
ed. I was excited to hear the project was approved as
a quick-impact project,
and it was quick—approved within two weeks of writin
g the proposal. The supplies should be delivered within
10 days.
We have found that people are building homes closer
and closer to the minefield. Last week there were
two more landmine victims. Two young girls were slightly injure
d when a goat detonated a landmine close to where
they were squatting.
Their wounds were dressed at the hospital and they
did not require an admission.

Working wi t h Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed
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supposedly straightfor ward and simple medical
job, the stress
of the nearly dying children, heat, inability to
communicate,
interference of the nurses, and apathy of the
careta kers was
almost too much to bear. I must admit, it was
by far one of
the most horrible days of my life. But as all
days eventually
do, it finally ended.
Overwhelming Cholera Crisis
I did not return to the CTC until the follow
ing evening
for the night shift. By that time we were all
aware that the
cholera crisis was beginning to overwhelm
the MSF site.
Rozenn (our field coordinator) had been in conta
ct with the
MDM headquarters in Paris and a decision was
made to send
an emergency team to Maka lal and set up a
second MDM
CTC . Monday was spent going around town
trying to get
support and material for the second site. As the
surgery project is so small, our available resources and perso
nnel are severely limited. In fact, we only have one vehic
le. And yes, it is
white with the MDM logo on the side as all nong
overnmental
organization vehicles should be.
Luck ily, offers of assistance readily came to
us. The
International Committee of the Red Cross gave
us a 10,000liter (2,642-gallon) water bladder; UNICEF
promised buckets, cups, chlorine and plastic sheeting; the Unite
d Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees gave us blank
ets and plastic sheeting; the United Nations Office for the
Coordination
of Humanita rian Affairs and the United Natio
ns Mission in
Sudan lent us a vehicle; and the India n Army helpe
d to dig latrines. We received the names of local staff from
the Ministry
of Health and hired nurses, medical assistants,
cleaners, cooks
and sprayers— all the staff that was needed to
run a CTC .
A site was located and we began to set up as
a team of
logisticians and nurses arrived from Paris. The
only things
missing now are some logistical supplies that
were held up in
customs in Duba i and medical supplies, includ
ing plent y of
Ringers, which have been held up in Khartoum
. We are hoping to be operationa l within the next day or two.
Luck ily for
all, the number of cases has decreased a bit and
the current
situation is manageable.
While all this has been happening, I have not
been operating. Dr. Mamoun is quite capable of functionin
g on his own,
although both he and I are eager to continue with
the trauma
lectures and get back into the O.R., especially
since the reconstruction is finished and the new O.R. is fully
functional. I
also received a copy of an ICRC landmine traini
ng video and
plan to show that some time next week.
The only case I operated on in the past week
was when
some local employees of an international NGO
were shot
while traveling in the evening on the west bank
of the Nile.
The story is that they were attacked by Shillu
k Roya l Police
who were drunk. Two of the seven passengers
in the car were
injured and one required a debridement of his
wounds. But
basica lly they were both very lucky and should
do okay.
Best to all, and just for the record, even thoug
h we are
work ing hard, I am still having a great time.
See Endnotes, page 112

Working wi t h Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and wi t nessed
t he impressive abili t y of doct ors in Malakal t o work under st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment Cent er
si t e. Working wi t h Médecins du Monde, Dr. Kushner spent 12 weeks working for a mission in Malakal, Sudan. This art icle is his account of t he first six weeks, wri t t en as a journal. Through his work, Dr. Kushner has helped many and
wi t nessed t he impressive abili t y of doct ors in Malakal t o work under st ressful and sub-par condi t ions. Dr. Kushner also came face t o face wi t h t he cholera crisis and worked on get t ing support and supplies for a second Cholera Treat ment
Cent er si t e.

the tents, I will probably never use them again
. Let’s face it,
outside of a CTC , when am I ever going to need
to say “Kam
isshal ?” (“How many times have you had diarrh
ea?”) ? It is
probably an even less useful phrase than my
second Spanish
dialog in high school, which taught me to say,
“Vamos a las
carreras de perros” (“Let’s go to the dog races” ).
Aside from the difficulties in communication,
the job
entails only some minor doctoring and nursi
ng skills ; however, there also is some medical coordination,
administration
and heavy lifting. When I started, we had about
20 patients
in one eight-bed tent, and another 20-bed tent
that was partially full. The second tent filled rapid ly and
luckily a third
tent were erected. On my second day the numb
er of patients
continued to increa se, so a fourth and then a
fifth tent were
erected. Today there are approximately 100 beds,
when the
census is over 100, patients are kept on the floor.
To date, the
maximum number of patients admitted in one
day was 71.
In the hospital portion of the CTC, the large tents
work well
with only 20 beds and a wide central aisle, but
unfortunately
this rarely happens. Beds are placed along the cente
r, making it
difficult to walk, clean and properly assess the patien
ts.
The shifts at the CTC are from 8  a.m. to 8 
p.m. The
first day was long and stressful; the second day
was long and
stressful; the third day was almost unbearable.
That third day
I was assigned to the third big tent, which only
had two patients when I arrived. More and more patients
were brought
in during the course of the morning, and I had
to make and
carry in the cholera beds and set up the tent mysel
f. We had
few supplies and those too I collected. Initia lly,
children pre7
sented with IVs and the nurses were able to start
IVs on most
of the other patients. I assessed the new patien
ts and filled
out the one-page charts for each new admission.
As the day
wore on, it got increa singly difficult. The numb
er of patients
began to increa se; we were flooded with new
admissions,
some barely conscious, some barely alive. I tried
to continually reassess the patients’ status. There were
no nurses who
spoke English. They did not understand my reque
sts and they
did not understand how to care for the patien
ts. I was on a
treadmill that was getting faster and faster. I
was constantly
moving from bed to bed, reassessing the hydra
tion status of
the patients, trying to remain calm with the
futilit y in trying to convince the careta kers to give the child
ren electrolyte
solutions to drink.
As my stress increa sed I realized that not only
were the
nurses not continuing IVs, but when a bag
finished they
would discontinue the entire drip. Patients who
needed more
than five liters of fluids were receiving only one.
I kept running to the boxes of Ringers and hanging the
bags myself.
This continued throughout the shift, but thing
s went from
bad to worse as multiple severely dehydrated
children were
brought to us without IVs. We struggled to get
access. Other
local doctors and nurses were recruited to the
effort and I
was continually running between the single
large tent and
the two smaller tents that had just been set up.
I started an
interosseous IV8 on one child. Another Dutc
h doctor came
to assist us, and I took a much-welcomed break
. For such a
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“Colombia without Mines” Concert Held
Juanes, a South American singer-turned-activist, recently held a Colombia sin Minas
(Colombia without Mines) concert. The event raised money to support Colombian children
harmed by anti-personnel landmines. A native of the country, Juanes, performed May 24,
2006, at the Gibson Amphitheatre in Los Angeles, Calif.
Also appearing were Alejandro Sanz, Ana Gabriel, Carlos Vives and others. The concert
denounced the use of landmines, raised awareness of the landmine danger to children
and provided assistance to children in need of prostheses.
Juanes is a long-standing supporter of mine action, and the concert was organized by
his Mi Sangre (My Blood) Foundation. Other groups also pledged support for Colombia
sin Minas. The Wheelchair Foundation agreed to donate wheelchairs totaling double
the value of money raised through ticket sales. Sponsors for the concert included
Univision Television, the Colombia Coffee Federation, American Airlines and Red Bull
energy drink.
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The Tajikistan Mine Action Centre is
responsible for all mine-action-related
programs in the country. The author
details Tajikistan’s landmine problems
and provides a report on TMAC’s

n o t e s

f r o m

progress in various aspects of mine
action as well as its goals for future
mine-related operations.
by Jonmahmad Rajabov
[ Tajikistan Mine Action Centre ]

B

oth sides in Tajikistan’s five-year civil war in the
1990s used anti-personnel mines and many of these
weapons remain in place in the country’s central area.
Uzbek forces laid APMs along their border with Tajikistan
and some remain in disputed territory. Minefields also exist
along the border with Afghanistan in land recently handed
over to Tajik sovereignty by Russian forces. Nearly 10 years
after the end of the civil war, landmines continue to create obstacles for accessing grazing and agricultural land in
Tajikistan and cause economic hardship for its people. The
problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war contributes to human suffering and livestock loss.
The landmine issue continues to be a source of concern
for the government of Tajikistan and demining remains
vitally important to national development plans. Foreignmanufactured landmines kill, maim and threaten rural
Tajiks who are living in the poorest areas of their own country. Landmines were placed by the Soviet Union, Russian
forces (following Tajik independence), the Tajiks themselves, and Uzbek forces along Uzbek-Tajik borders. Areas
on the Afghan and Uzbek borders and former battlefields in
the central region continue to present a hazard to the rural
poor who have to live with the threat of explosive remnants
of war as part of their daily lives.
The Tajikistan national government has adopted a
long-term strategic plan, one that is linked to mine-action
goals and national development plans. The government’s
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Establishing international cooperation during the meetings of the
Standing Committees of the Ottawa Convention.

commitment to mine-action initiatives is visible and increasing. Tajikistan has been a State Party of the Ottawa
Convention1 since 1 April 2000, and the government is also
a signatory of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons.2
Humanitarian Impact of AP Mines and UXO
Landmines and items of unexploded ordnance appeared in the central part of Tajikistan during the civil war
years when both sides of the conflict used anti-personnel
mines and other munitions along the Tajik-Uzbek and
Tajik-Afghan borders. The central region incorporates the
Tavildara region and the Rasht Valley, as well as parts of the
Gorno-Badakhshan region. Landmines, UXO and other
remnants of war continue to be a hazard for the people in
this region.
Along some parts of the Tajik border with Afghanistan,
Russian forces and border troops laid and maintained mines
to counter cross-border infiltration and for self-protection.
In 2005, Russian forces completed the hand-over process to
Tajik colleagues. Mine records were also provided.
Uzbek forces laid APMs along the border with Tajikistan,
and the first deaths and injuries involving civilians in this border area were reported in August 1999. Seventy-two deaths
and 85 injuries have occurred in these communities, and in
excess of 2,000 head of livestock have been lost. Since 1992,
239 people have been injured and 238  killed as the result

Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
On 20 June 2003, the Tajik government
signed an agreement with the United Nations
Development Programme called “Support
to the Tajikistan National Mine Action
Programme,” and the Tajikistan Mine Action
Centre was established. The Centre is a governmental structure and is responsible for
all mine-action-related issues in Tajikistan.
It is also the executive authority of the national Commission on Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law.
Planning, Monitoring and
Coordinating
TMAC develops mine-action plans
(strategic and annual), national standards
and other strategic documents related
to mine action and submits them to the
Commission on the Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law for approval. Implementation of the Tajik Mine
Action Programme is in accordance with
the Mine Action Strategic Five-year Plan
for 2004–08  and the Annual Plan, which
CIIHL approved on 13 April 2004.
TMAC is responsible for coordinating
and monitoring all mine-action activities in
Tajikistan. Within this framework, TMAC
updates the national mine-action plan and
undertakes the development, priority selection, planning and coordination of operations. It also prioritizes new tasks, confirms
completion of tasks and gives certificates
of cleared sites to local authorities. TMAC
provides its partners with information on
mined areas and operations obtained from
the Information Management System for
Mine Action, as well as on mine incidents
and mine survivors.
TMAC quality-assurance officers confirm that demining management methods
and procedures are in accordance with national and international standards.
TMAC’s major partners are the
UNDP, the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe, the European
Union, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, UNICEF, the Tajikistan
Red Crescent, representatives of the donor
countries in Tajikistan, Fondation Suisse de
Déminage, the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining, Ministries of
Security, Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Education, Labour and Social Protection,
Defence, Health, and Emergency Situations,
the State Committee for Protection of the
State Border and local executive authorities.
Mine Clearance
In accordance with Article 5  of the
Ottawa Convention, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction
of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but
not later than 10 years after the entry into
force of this, for Tajikistan this deadline is
1 April 2010.
As a signatory to the Convention,
Tajikistan completed destruction of its
stockpiles (3,029 AP mines) on 31 March
2004. The Ministry of Defence, supported
by Fondation Suisse de Déminage, undertook
the destruction.
On 20 June 2003, the government
signed an agreement with FSD. Funding is
channelled through the UNDP and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, and FSD is now the national
survey and mine-clearance partner in
Tajikistan, with four survey and four
mine-clearance teams. More than 100
mined areas have been identified so far as a
result of survey operations.
In 2004, three mined areas were cleared
and handed over to local authorities for future use. Since the Technical Survey and
mine clearance started in July 2004, more
than 180,000 square metres (44 acres) and
more than 2,000 mines and items of UXO
have been cleared.
To speed the process of mine clearance, TMAC plans to establish four minedetecting dog teams. TMAC thinks this
issue is very important for the programme,
and the Centre is looking for donors to
fund the project.
Mine-risk Education
The Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan,
supported by the ICRC and UNDP, is undertaking MRE in 14 districts of the country
(border areas of the Sugd region, the Rasht
valley and Vanj, and the Darvoz districts of the
Gorno Badakhshan region). In August 2005,
UNICEF initiated a small, joint pilot project
together with the Ministry of Education of
Tajikistan. RCST and UNICEF volunteers

conduct complementary activities to educate
the local population about mine hazards and
how to live with landmines.
More than 3,200 large mine-hazard
warning signs have been manufactured and
more than 2,200 were placed in border areas
in the Sugd region. The remainder will be
erected in the southern part of the country.
In addition, to provide more information on
MRE activities, the U.N. booklet Guideline
to Mine & UXO Safety was translated and
6,000 copies in Tajik and 3,000 copies in
Uzbek languages were distributed. More
than 22,000 leaflets were issued with appropriate guidelines for distribution by the
programme’s volunteers, military personnel,
local authorities, teachers and active advocates of the programme.
Assistance to Survivors
A project called Assistance to Landmine
Survivors, implemented within the framework of cooperation among the Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection of the
Population of the Republic of Tajikistan,
ICRC, UNDP and RCST, assists disabled
persons, including landmine survivors, by
providing prostheses and medical assistance in
the national Orthopaedic Centre, Dushanbe.
An income-generation project implemented
by RCST in 2005  delivered breeding pairs
of goats or sheep to 72 landmine survivors
in three mine-affected districts of the Sugd
region and three mine-affected districts of
Rasht valley. These individuals can now establish small-scale livestock enterprises, each
returning one offspring to the RCST to redistribute and expand the project. There is a
need to extend this project in the future to
provide for all mine survivors.
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of mine accidents in Tajikistan. Children account for 20 percent of these casualties.  
The problem of mine contamination seriously affects the civil population who are
engaged in farming, wood gathering, grazing and activities related to normal rural
life. Landmines also adversely affect agricultural development, the environment and
the economy of the country. Almost all the
inhabitants within at-risk communities have
received mine-risk education and awareness
training. Still, economic imperatives drive
local populations to continue visiting hazardous areas, which often results in death
and injury.

A deminer works at mine clearance.
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Jonmahmad Rajabov graduated from
the High Political School of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Russia in St.
Petersburg in 1987. He then worked
at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and
Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Before taking this position he worked
for seven years at the Presidential Office
at the Department of Defence, Legal
Issues, Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law.
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Advocacy
A regional conference, “Progress towards the Ottawa Convention’s Aims in
Central Asia,” was held 15–16 April 2004, in
Dushanbe. The conference was organized by
the UNDP with the support of the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining. Official representatives of central Asian countries and Afghanistan, the
UNDP, the OCSE, the GICHD, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the ICRC,
representatives of diplomatic corps and international organizations registered in Tajikistan,
governmental authorities and NGO representatives took part in the conference. Participants
discussed the implementation process of the
Ottawa Convention in the region on the eve
of the First Review Conference in Nairobi,
Kenya. The conference adopted a statement
that stressed the necessity of support for the
process of the Ottawa Convention and the
need for the central Asian countries to accede to the Convention. It pleased officials
that Her Majesty Queen Noor of Jordan
took part in the conference.

The official delegation of the Republic
of Tajikistan took part in the First Review
Conference in Nairobi and made a presentation about the process of implementing the
Ottawa Convention. TMAC and other governmental representatives continue to take an
active role in international conferences and
meetings on the banning of anti-personnel
mines. TMAC conducts ongoing training, meetings, liaison and other activities as
part of the process of implementation of the
Tajikistan Mine Action Programme.
Reporting
In accordance with Article 7 of the
Ottawa Convention, the Republic of
Tajikistan submits its annual reports to the
U.N. Secretary-General on the country’s minecontamination status and on the completion
process to comply with the Convention.  
Conclusion
The Civil War of the 1990s created a
mine/UXO problem for Tajikistan that is
still threatening the daily lives of its citizens a decade later. The Tajikistan Mine
Action Centre is remedying the devastating
effects this problem has had on the country. TMAC, with international support,
has started and will continue to make huge
strides in mine/UXO clearance, mine-risk
education and victim assistance.
See Endnotes, page 112

Armed Non-state Actors: The Main Users of the

“Poor Man’s Weapon”
This report, which builds on the 2004 Geneva
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TMAC, in cooperation with the
MLSPP, ICRC, UNDP, and RCS, organized a summer camp for 32 mine survivors
in Romit valley of the Vahdat district in
July 2005. The camp provided the survivors an opportunity for psychological rehabilitation and social integration.

Call initial analysis,1 provides a comprehensive
mapping of the use, acquisition, production,
transfer and stockpiling of landmines by armed
non-state actors through a presentation of
individual group profiles and a global analysis.
The report records global occurrences of antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mine planting by
NSAs during 2003–2005, whether activated
by victims, vehicles or at a distance using
Sudan People’s Liberation Army combatant in South Sudan.

by Anki Sjöberg [ Geneva Call ]

N

Rigged Mine Blast Kills 64, Injures More
A powerful landmine blast ripped through a passenger bus loaded with commuters and schoolchildren in
northern Sri Lanka in early June. The attack, attributed to the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (popularly known as the Tamil Tigers), killed more than 64 people and injured dozens more.
Officials said many of the injured were bystanders not on the bus.
The explosion tore through the packed bus in a crowded part of Kabithigollewa, a town about 200
kilometers (125 miles) north of the capital, Colombo. Military officials said the blast came from two
landmines hanging from a tree and rigged to detonate when signaled from a remote position. Rigging mines
above ground on trees and other structures is a common Tiger tactic to reduce blast shielding provided
by the ground. The Tigers strongly denied responsibility for the attack after government officials
assigned blame to the group. The bus bombing was the most violent act since a tentative ceasefire in
2002 and brings the divided country even closer to total war.
The Sri Lankan Air Force responded later by bombing several rebel-held areas in other parts of the
country. The Tigers are a separatist terrorist group seeking independence of certain areas from Sri
Lanka and have been classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.
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command detonation.

on-state actors often have more limited military resources
than the states against which they fight and, therefore, use
landmines, “the poor man’s weapon,” more frequently. As
a consequence, the number of NSAs using landmines significantly
exceeds the number of states deploying this weapon.
Around 60 NSAs have emplaced landmines in 24 countries across
five geographic regions: sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America and the Middle East/North Africa.2 In addition to these
NSAs, armed groups, which are difficult to identify as belonging to
a certain category of ideology or organizational form, have also made
frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Two-thirds of
these groups have deployed some type of victim-activated devices.
These devices were both factory-made and handmade, indicating
NSA involvement in both the transfer and the production of mines.
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume I: A Global Report
Profiling NSAs and their Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer and
Stockpiling of Landmines2 confirmed earlier findings of important regional disparities, not the least of which was the comparatively higher
concentration of mine use by NSAs in Asia, especially of improvised
explosive devices (aka handmade mines).3 The second most affected
region is Africa.
A greater proportion of NSA mine use occurs in Ottawa
Convention4 non-signatory countries: 60 percent of the NSAs identified as mine users operate in these countries.2 Given that 151 of the
world’s approximately 200 states have adhered to this international
agreement, it appears that non-signatories are more exposed to NSA
mine use than are States Parties. This is not to say, however, that

being a party to the Ottawa Convention protects a country from NSA
mine deployment. Indeed, two very frequent mine users, the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional, operate in Colombia, a State Party.
Frequency of Mine Use
Keeping in mind the differences in mine use among NSAs is
crucial in choosing the most appropriate strategy for engaging them
in a mine ban. It is clear there are significant disparities between
NSAs, not only in terms of the reasons that motivate their mine use
and the types of mines they choose to employ, but also in respect
to the frequency of use.5 For some NSAs, landmines constitute one
of their weapons of choice. Examples of such groups include FARC
and ELN in Colombia, several Burmese and Kashmiri groups, and
the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist. Other groups deploy mines
when they have access to, or a particular “need” for, mines. Instances
of this are the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Philippines and the Rahanwein Resistance Army in
Somalia. Some groups, such as the Party for the Liberation of the
Hutu People–National Liberation Forces in Burundi and the Sendero
Luminoso in Peru, are sporadic users.
Logic Behind NSA Mine Use
Although deemed by many as lacking decisive military utility
and despite their disastrous humanitarian consequences, landmines
clearly serve different purposes for each NSA that employs them.1
Knowing why and how NSAs use these weapons could contribute to
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developing a successful strategy for engaging these groups in the landmine ban. Four
reasons for mine use were identified as the
purpose of the report:
1. Offensive
2. Defensive
3. Economic gain
4. So-called “nuisance mining”
Many NSAs use landmines in an offensive manner; for example, the CPN-M
in Nepal, the Kurdistan People’s Congress/
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel/
PKK) in Turkey, the Communist Party of
India–Maoist in India, and the Taliban
in Afghanistan. However, offensive use is
probably significantly over-reported since it
is more visible.
NSAs often confirm not only offensive
but also defensive mine uses. Indeed, according to a majority of NSAs, landmines
are mainly utilized for defensive purposes. The Burmese Rohingya Solidarity
Organization has admitted to using mines
to defend its camps and bases as well as to
protect its members from robbery or from
the Bangladeshi Army. The Chin National
Front (Burma/Myanmar) has also admitted
to using mines for self-defense, apparently
to protect its camps.
Landmine use for economic purposes
is not frequently reported, although this is
probably due to underreporting rather than
the insignificance of this kind of use. For
example, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia allegedly utilizes landmines for
the protection of coca plantations, whereas
the Movement of the Democratic Forces of
Casamance in Senegal is thought to plant
landmines to hinder the local population
from benefiting from economically profitable land.
As for nuisance mining, the most cited example is probably that of the Lord’s
Resistance Army. Nuisance mining is the
use of mines that serve no direct military
or economic purpose. This includes using
mines to interfere with strategic infrastructure, such as communications and railways,
or to affect civilians. Other examples are
groups in Colombia and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. FARC allegedly
placed mines at the entrances of a town and
in houses and vehicles before the army took
over the area.3
Command-detonation
NSAs frequently use landmines offensively, targeting state security forces or other
individuals linked to the state. In many cases, NSAs are present at the time and place
of the landmine attacks. This suggests that
for these NSAs, command-detonated land-

mines may be an alternative, and hence, a
total ban on AP mines may be possible.  
There is currently a trend in many
conflicts towards increased use of commanddetonated mines. However, although
command-detonation is clearly preferable
from a humanitarian point of view to victim and vehicle activation, this does not
constitute a guarantee that civilians and
humanitarian actors will not be victimized,
as became evident in the tragic incident in
Nepal’s Chitwan district in June 2005.6
Widespread Production and Use
of IEDs
Around 40 groups globally produced
and used improvised explosive devices between 2003 and 2005.2 This indicates that a
strategy that solely targets access to factorymade landmines and explosives is not sufficient. Easy access to materials necessary to
manufacture IEDs, as well as knowledge and
technology transfers among NSAs, has un-

state sponsors are thought to supply NSAs
with factory-made mines.
Large areas of the world are not under the
effective control of any state, a fact facilitating
the trafficking of arms and IED-making material among NSAs. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that in some post-conflict situations
there is no need for NSAs or individuals to
look for sources of mines since weapons, including mines, are plentiful and easily available, as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.
Different NSAs have allegedly transferred
to each other not only arms and explosives
but also the knowledge and technology on
how to manufacture landmines, as in Burma/
Myanmar, India and the Philippines. There
are also allegations that some transfers are of
a more permanent character and include the
joint running of camps. Indeed, it has been
asserted on more than one occasion that
there have been intense contacts between the
Nepalese CPN-M and some Indian Maoists
(CPI–M), including joint training.7

“There is currently a trend
in many conflicts towards
increased use of commanddetonated mines.”

doubtedly contributed to spreading the landmine problem. Nevertheless, IEDs do not
always constitute indiscriminate weapons as
this depends on how they are put to use.
Sources of Factory-made Mines
Factory-made landmines are accessible to
NSAs through at least three sources:
1. Minefields or stocks
2. Certain state sponsors
3. Other NSAs or the black market
One of the main sources of factory-made
landmines for NSAs is the very state against
which they are fighting. Incidents of NSAs
managing to loot or capture landmines from
the state are reported regularly. Such has repeatedly been the case in the Philippines and
Burma/Myanmar. NSAs have also reported
that soldiers from state armies have offered
to sell them landmines. Furthermore, foreign
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Impact of NSA Mine Use
The impact of NSA mine use is in many
respects similar to the impact of state mine
use. However, it appears that NSA mines
are more widely dispersed than state mines
and non-state actors are usually less prone to
mark or map their mines.
The humanitarian impact of NSA mine
use is difficult to measure, since it takes
place in a conflict situation, in areas where
little or no mine action is taking place and
where civilians may fear reporting mine
incidents. In addition, the humanitarian
impact of NSA mine use is difficult to
distinguish from that of the conflict itself
until the conflict has ended and information becomes available through mine-action efforts. The impact of former mine use
by NSAs (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle)

“The humanitarian impact of NSA
mine use is difficult to measure, since
it takes place in a conflict situation, in
areas where little or no mine action
is taking place and where civilians
may fear reporting mine incidents.”

can be seen in Angola, South Sudan and
Sri Lanka.
NSAs all over the world are victimized by
their own mines, as well as those deployed
by governments, paramilitaries and other
NSAs. The fact that their own combatants
are also victimized could be used in negotiations for a mine ban with NSAs. Access to
victim assistance for combatants who have
suffered mine incidents could also be used
as a carrot in negotiations.
Effects of AV Mine Use
Some 30 NSAs used AV mines between
2003 and 2005.2 As is shown in numerous
studies, AV mines triggered by vehicles are
also indiscriminate weapons. However,
since NSAs in many conflicts largely depend on these weapons, it appears unlikely
that many of them would agree to a total
ban on AV mines. Nevertheless, some NSAs
have expressed an interest in also banning
these weapons.
Need for Prioritization
When engaging NSAs, priorities must be
set as to when and where to allocate scarce
resources: If humanitarian actors target a
group that is a frequent user and manage
to involve it in the mine ban, the benefits
for the population are greater; yet a sporadic
user or non-user may be more open to renouncing the use of mines since mines are
not a crucial part of its military strategy.
The Global Report, by explaining specific
characteristics of the NSAs and their mine
use, intends to provide a background tool
for humanitarian actors to strategize regarding which non-state actors to target and
what the appropriate approaches might be.
For instance, one way of conducting advocacy is through direct contact with a group’s
leadership. Another way is by disseminating

mine-ban information within civil society in
order to create a bottom-up pressure on the
group. In addition, understanding regional
patterns is essential, since these may have
important consequences for the engagement
and implementation of strategies for a mine
ban. This may be particularly true in cases
where regional dynamics appear to fuel the
landmine problem or provide possibilities
for its solution.
NSA Involvement in Mine Action
Considering the disastrous effects of
landmine use, there is a requirement for
national and international agencies to undertake mine action in areas where NSAs
operate and/or are in control, as encouraged
in Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan.8
Given the benefits of mine action to affected
populations, it is indefensible for the concerned governments to allow such actions.
Indeed, NSAs are contributing to mine
action in different areas around the world,
notably in Sudan, Sri Lanka and Iraqi
Kurdistan. In order to map the benefits
and challenges related to the involvement
of non-state actors in humanitarian demining and to encourage other NSAs to ban
anti-personnel mines and get involved in
mine action, there is a need to further investigate current mine-action efforts undertaken by these actors in conflict and
post-conflict situations. Geneva Call is
currently working on such a report about
NSA mine action. In fact, the Global Report
is part of a bigger project that studies the
negative and positive implications of NSAs
in the landmine problem. This project grew
out of the realization that only by understanding NSA- and region-specific dynamics is it possible to address the current
and future landmine problem as it relates
to NSAs.

Conclusion
The Global Report clearly demonstrates a
need to discuss the mine issue with non-state
actors. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the
long-term perspective of the consequences of
mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the
international community to find channels of
communication with NSAs on the AP mine
issue. Parties to conflict often use accusations
of AP mine use to discredit the other party because of the stigmatization of such arms following the Ottawa process, but also because
of the natural “perception of landmines as an
illegitimate type of weapon.”9 NSAs, as well
as states, are thus reluctant to admit they are
using a victim-activated weapon. This suggests an inclusive approach—involving advocacy based on accurate information—could
be the key to success for spreading a mine
ban among NSAs.
This article is drawn from a report produced by Geneva Call, Armed Non-State
Actors and Landmines, Volume I: A
Global Report Profiling NSAs and their
Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer
and Stockpiling of Landmines,2 which was
published in November 2005. The report
can be downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web
site at http://www.genevacall.org. Hard copies
can be obtained by writing to info@genevacall.org.
See Endnotes, page 112
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Demining in

Sri Lanka

This paper presents a project the author has been working on since January 2005 in the
context of her doctoral research and offers some of the first results. The topic concerns
the participatory design and development of a distributed system for humanitarian-demining
operations in Sri Lanka. The completed research is expected to encompass the relationship
among landmines, humanitarian technologies and development. This article looks at the
adaptation of power tillers for demining applications in Sri Lanka using a participatory design
methodology called the Snail System.
by Emanuela Elisa Cepolina [ University of Genova, Italy ]

T

here is a common understanding that research into humanitarian demining technology has not yet provided the positive
results initially expected. In the last 10–15 years, hundreds
of millions of U.S. dollars1 have been spent on research, and promising technologies have been developed and tested. However, there
has been very limited introduction and integration of new mechanical technologies into common demining practices in the field.
This observation is supported by results from a field study conducted last year in collaboration with the European project, European
Union in Humanitarian Demining 2 (EUDEM2), of which I was
a part.  Our research focused on collecting information about machines and technologies created for use in the field of humanitarian demining, as well as the efficiency of these tools and end-users’
feedback about them. We found 16 demining machines in use by
nine organizations working in the four countries we visited, while the
total number of sensor technologies in use by the same organizations
was 1,081.2
Such a discrepancy in the number of machines and sensors employed by demining organizations is surprising. In fact, while sensors
are considered part of equipment assigned to personnel and therefore
each deminer has one, the number of machines employed by each
organization was generally very low, usually between zero and two
items. One exception was a single organisation that was using nine
different machines.
While gathering various data, we asked nongovernmental organization logisticians about the maintenance costs of technologies
in terms of the operating cost, salary of operators, downtime due to
mechanical failures, time between failures and cost to repair failed
machines. Generally, we found a huge difference between the maintenance costs of a machine and that of a sensor. Taking as an example
our data gathered in Mozambique, the maintenance cost per month
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of a machine in use at an organization was US$530 while the cost
for maintaining a sensor was $194. These calculations do not even
take into consideration the cost of training, which lasts 25 days for
a machine and less than one day for a sensor.2
Thus, we believe high maintenance costs are one of the key
factors behind the low adoption rate of machines by demining organizations. In our calculations, the high maintenance expenses
were primarily due to the excessive cost to repair machines, multiplied by the high frequency of machine failures. We concluded
demining machines are complex systems that have not been conceived by the deminers who use them; nor have most machines
been developed specifically for the environment in which they are
being used.
Establishing a Participatory Approach to Demining
Machine Design
These findings support the argument that there is a need to
change the approach of designing new machines to one that is participatory and specially tailored to specific demining environments.
Allowing deminers to build the machines they like with richer countries providing the missing but necessary tools can improve demining efficiency as well as help the development process.
In fact, technology plays a pivotal role in the development
process of a country. Jeffrey Sachs, Special Adviser to the U.N.
Secretary-General, writes, “I believe the single most important reason why prosperity spread, and why it continues to spread, is the
transmission of technologies and the ideas behind them.”3 Indeed,
rapid economic development requires technical capacities to suffuse the entire society from the bottom up. In developing countries,
homegrown technologies are needed to adapt the global technological development process to a wide range of local needs including

energy production and use, construction, natural hazard mitigation,
disease control and agricultural production. Moreover, homegrown
technologies for humanitarian demining applications are required as
landmines influence both economic and human development of affected countries.
With these exploratory findings in mind, I would like to present
a project I have been a part of in the context of my doctoral research
since January 2005. The methodology proposal is applied to the design of HD technology based on agricultural technology (the power
tiller); later on it could be applied to the improvement of old agricultural technologies to new agricultural tasks. This approach suggests
a participatory way to design technology that makes use of and improves local knowledge. Generally, this methodology can be used for
designing new agricultural technologies or adapting and improving
old ones.
The methodology presented will be tested for designing and developing a distributed system for area-reduction operations in Sri
Lanka. Given that every mine problem is unique and strictly linked
to the area where it occurs, the research focuses on one particular
region of Sri Lanka: the northeastern area of Vanni.
Designing a technology for operation in a specific region helps
concentrate efforts on a well-defined problem; moreover, it allows local deminers to be involved in a project from which they will benefit
and to exploit the knowledge they have acquired over many years
working in the field. We have chosen Sri Lanka for several reasons.
People are generally well educated (having typically attended 10
years of school), enthusiastic, and willing to work and learn new
skills. Additionally, the country is facing an immediate post-conflict
situation in which people are strongly involved in rebuilding the
country. Furthermore, although the tsunami disaster of late 2004 
did not greatly modify the landmine situation since the coastal areas
were previously cleared, it heavily impacted the local economy, making even more urgent the need to provide cleared land to farmers.
A one-month trip to northeast Sri Lanka was organized in
January–February 2005. The trip was aimed at establishing contacts,
deepening knowledge of the local environment and improving communication skills to make the participatory contribution more effective. I interviewed groups of deminers to start the research in the right
direction, better understand local needs and establish a reciprocal
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Power Tillers and Snails for

Figure 1: Snail representing the workflow of the first work package:
preliminary work.
trust between local people and expatriates coordinating humanitarian operations there.
From Agricultural Machines to Demining Machines
After my solo trip to Sri Lanka, the research team, which included several staff from the Laboratory of Design and Measurement
for Automation and Robotics(PMARlab), spent time formalizing
the input received from those working in the field, from defining
the environment of the northeastern region of Sri Lanka to organizing the ideas that came up during interviews with local deminers.
Most notably, in the field, I gathered information by working on
the functional requirements for a system of small, light and cheap
demining machines to be used for working close to the deminers.
The need of such a system of machines arose from a study I conducted last year in collaboration with EUDEM2 at the University
of Genova PMARlab under the supervision of the EUDEM2 team,
which co-funded the study. I conducted part of the study in the
field, collecting information from end–users. In that study, when
deminers were asked about their preferences for new machine technology, they expressed a strong desire for new machines that were
small, light and cheap.2
Based on these findings, we suggested adapting power tillers to
demining applications. Power tillers are widely used and commercially available in Sri Lanka, and they are available secondhand.4
They are easy to transport as they are small and light, and available

Figure 2: Workflow for achieving the final design methodology.
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with different types of engines. The most
powerful one (approximately 14  kW) is
sturdy enough for our task.
As this project progresses, machines
will be adapted to perform ground preparation and vegetation cutting. A special endeffector5 will be designed to process the soil
and bring mines up to the soil surface. Each
machine can be remotely controlled to help a
single deminer in his work by preparing the
ground in front of him, and all the machines
can be controlled automatically to perform
area-reduction operations. Deminers will always assist machines: once a mine is found
and lifted up on the soil surface by the special end-effector, a deminer can remove the
mine manually. Manual mine removal has
been introduced in order to lower the complexity and cost of the machines, as well as
to allow a quicker integration of machines in
operational procedures.
A Participatory Methodology
For Machine Creation:
The Snail System
This project focuses both on practical
and philosophical aspects of machine design. Not only does the input for improved
machine design need to be participatory,
but the practical work of developing a new
participatory methodology for mine clearance technologies is also at the core of our
research. The premise is that design methodology must be participatory throughout
the process, involving local workers’ input.
I have elaborated just such a provisional design methodology called the Snail
System, a primary system to design technology in a participatory way, and represented
by a snail. The Snail System was used on the
first visit, trying to involve deminers in the
design of the new technology from the very
beginning. The Snail System will also be
used later to involve end-users in the next
steps of the design process.
The Snail System allows a progressive involvement of end-users in the design process.
Snails are lines connecting subsequent steps
of the design process that develop along
a straight line indicating work progress.
Meetings with end-users happen along the
straight work progress line. Every decision
is made with end-users; only studies prior
to these decisions, such as the preparation
of possible choices, simulations and calculations, are carried out by researchers and later
presented to end-users.
Each Snail represents a work module
necessary to carry out the main package of
the total work for the project. The workflow of machine design is represented by
Snail lines, as often it is iterative; the design

process is repeated until a satisfactory result
is reached. The Snail representing the first
work package of the preliminary research for
the demining machine design is represented
in Figure 1. Other future work packages,
each with its own snail, will involve endeffector design of the ground-processing
tool and vegetation tool; integration of tools,
prototype and testing; control design; and
final prototype and testing.
Each Snail requires different work and
responsibilities before meetings with endusers, but holding meetings of end-users for
various Snails at the same time can be done
to reduce travel expenses. Graphically, two
Snails can overlap.
The overall task of defining a new participatory design methodology is complex and
unresolved. The final methodology is being
designed through an iterative process—the

smaller than the previous one, needing less
work and therefore shorter lines to be carried
out. We believe end-users and researchers
will acquire efficiency and practical expertise with more practice and learn better
skills along the process in both participation
and technological design.
Of the two antennae for each Snail, one
goes into the next snail, indicating that the
design methodology used in the next work
package comes from the one evolved in the
last work package, and the other antenna goes
into the dissemination of ideas and experiences achieved in the previous work package.

crease demining machine
use in order to eradicate
more effectively landmines
safely and efficiently.”
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Erik Tollefsen of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining; Professor
Richard Bocco of IUED; Andy Smith of AVS
Mine Action Consultants; Luke Atkinson
and Richard Schmidt of Norwegian People’s
Aid; Professor Rinaldo Michelini di San
Martino and Paolo Silingardi of University
of Genova; and Alcherio Martinoli of Ecole
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.
The work presented here has been conceived
and structured in an attempt to receive funding
from different institutes. Even though the team
has not received specific funding for the project,
they will continue working.
See Endnotes, page 112

Conclusion
By employing power tillers and adapting
them to demining applications, we intend
to leverage mature off-the-shelf technology already in use and exploit end-users’

“The ultimate goal is to in-

first step of the methodology, the scheme,
represented with the Snail, will be used,
tested, evaluated and changed many times.
Each iteration will produce a new version of
the technical design of the machine, as well
as an improved design methodology. Once
the technical design of the demining tool
under research in a given work package is
satisfactory, the participatory methodology
design will be reviewed again for application
in the next work package.
The workflow for achieving the final
machine design methodology, therefore, can
be represented graphically on a line depicting the work progress as a family of Snails,
walking one behind the other, as shown
in Figure 2. Each Snail represents how the
methodology evolves, together with the necessary work that will be carried out to finish
the overall project of designing demining
machines from power tillers. Each Snail is

knowledge and resources, and will empower
local participants. The ultimate goal is to
increase demining machine use in order to
more effectively eradicate landmines safely
and efficiently. This project attempts to both
practically apply local resources and participation into machine design, and formalize a
successful theory of methodology that applies
participation in machine design.
The research project the author has undertaken in the context of her doctoral studies
has been presented to inform the community
and to seek comments. The work proposed has
been discussed with many valuable people,
whom she would like to thank for their time:

knowledge of agricultural practices. Skills
acquired in the modification of agricultural
technology already in use in order to achieve
a new particular task, such as demining
technology, could be used later to improve
agricultural production after the land has
been cleared of mines by better machinery.
Technological innovations in the field of agriculture are one of the major contributors
to development.
In parallel with the work to define the
new participatory design methodology, the
research team at the PMARlab and I will
carry out research along two other fields
of study: investigating the relationship between demining activities and development,
and defining the role of humanitarian demining technologies in development.
The premise is that participation, particularly in demining machine design, will
be more effective and efficient as it uses local

International Mine Awareness Day Marked Globally
Nane Annan, wife of United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan, served as keynote speaker for events held by the United
Nations Mine Action Service in recognition of International
Mine Awareness Day. The day was marked globally April 4.
Dozens of dignitaries, representatives and supporters of mine
action gathered in New York to hear Annan speak.
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Mine Action, a mine-action advocacy group sponsored by the United Nations, screened a film
featuring an Iraqi amputee and held a discussion panel featuring actor Danny Glover, a
Goodwill Ambassador for UNICEF.
The United Nations, which flew 82 white balloons outside its New York complex for the 82
mine-affected countries, estimates 15,000 deaths each year are the result of landmines. About
one-tenth of the world’s supply of landmines is emplaced in Angola, according to UNICEF. That
country has an amputee population of approximately 70,000 people.
Representatives from the United States were on-hand for the events. Although the United States
is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention, a representative from the U.S. Department of
State estimated that the U.S. government has provided more than US$1 billion for landmine and
weapons removal over the past decade.
The Mine Action Information Center at James Madison University observed International Mine
Awareness Day with a week of events from April 10 to 13. Landmine Awareness Week began with
an information booth on the student commons. Students were given green ribbons in recognition
of landmine survivors and could explore the global issue of landmines. The film Disarm was
screened at the campus movie theater and representatives from the U.S. Department of State
came to campus to lead a discussion on U.S. policies regarding landmines and similar weapons.
A display at JMU’s Carrier Library was also available to expose students to the landmine issue
through photos, maps and other materials. Ken Rutherford, landmine survivor and Co-founder of
Landmine Survivors Network, closed the week of events with a presentation.
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Report from the

Minefield
as a School Ground:
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GICHD

Geneva Diary:

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining provides operational assistance to

The Tzur Baher Minefield
Clearance Project

mine-action programmes and operators, creates and disseminates knowledge, works to improve
quality management and standards, and provides support to instruments of international law like

With so many factors limiting the education

the Ottawa Convention1 and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.2

process in the Middle East, it is hard to believe

by Ian Mansfield [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

O

ver the past 15 years, mine action
has evolved into an established
component of the relief and development sectors. During this period,
programmes and projects for demining,
mine-risk education, victim assistance, advocacy and stockpile destruction have been
discussed, refined and improved by operators, programmers, diplomats and activists.
As part of its ongoing role to reinforce the
effectiveness and efficiency of mine action,
the GICHD commissioned contributions

Ian Mansfield is the Operations
Director at the GICHD and is responsible for all operational, technical and
research activities of the Centre. He is
also responsible for analysing existing
and potential areas of activity for the
Centre, as well as all evaluation, assessment and consultancy activities.
Mansfield holds a Master of Business
Administration and a bachelor’s
degree in civil engineering.
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GICHD
Avenue de la Paix 7bis
CH-1211 Geneva / Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 906 1674
Fax: +41 22 906 1690
E-mail: i.mansfield@gichd.ch
Web site: http://www.gichd.ch

from development and mine-action experts
on the many lessons that have been learned
over the past 15 years and the challenges that
remain to be met. These have been brought
together in a book titled Mine Action: Lessons
and Challenges.
Following an executive summary of its
main conclusions and findings, the work
is laid out in two parts. Part I looks at the
core activities—the “pillars”—of mine action: advocacy, victim assistance, mine-risk
education, demining and stockpile destruction. Part II looks at key management
issues, specifically programme coordination and management, information management and capacity development. This
work concludes with a thought-provoking
assessment of what mine action has actually achieved. The book was published in
November 2005 and can be ordered via the
GICHD Web site.
IMAS Mine-risk Education:
‘Best Practice’ Handbooks
The seven mine-risk education components of the International Mine
Action Standards outline minimum standards for the planning,
implementing, monitoring and
evaluation of MRE programmes
and projects. The IMAS are largely prescriptive, advising national
authorities, operators and donors
on what is necessary for the development and implementation of effective
MRE programmes. However, they do not
guide stakeholders on how they might adapt
their programmes to be more compliant
with the standards.
To facilitate the implementation of the
MRE standards in the field, UNICEF requested the GICHD develop a series of
“best practice” guidebooks to provide more
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practical advice on how to implement the
MRE standards. A total of 12 guidebooks
have been developed using a variety of people, countries and contexts. The guidebooks
address a wide range of areas covered by the
MRE IMAS, including:
• How to support the coordination and
the dissemination of public information
• How to implement risk education and
training projects
• How to undertake community mineaction liaison
• What elements should be considered
to implement effective MRE projects in emergencies
Copies of the guidebooks are available by
contacting GICHD or UNICEF, or online
at www.mineactionstandards.org.
Ongoing Work at the GICHD
The GICHD is undertaking a major
study, Land Release and Risk-Management
Approaches, which aims to examine the
various processes used to release land (other
than by full clearance) and to advise on
ways in which a risk-management
approach can be applied to speed
up this process. The study will be
completed by the end of 2006.
The development of the
International Mine Action Standards has been undertaken by
the GICHD on behalf of United
Nations Mine Action Service.
There are currently 38  existing IMAS
and another 10 are in the final approval
stage of the process. The latest IMAS are
always posted on the Standards’ Web site
(www.mineactionstandards.org) and the
GICHD produces an updated CD each
year. A revised, simple Guide to IMAS was
published in early 2006.
See Endnotes, page 112

that one more could be imposed upon the
people of Tzur Baher, a village in Jerusalem.
However, the presence of a minefield in
their village severely hindered progress in
the building of a school. Maavarim Civil
Engineering Ltd. was brought in to begin work.
The planned site for the school is now mineDeminers around the world clear land to make it possible for communities to safely
build schools, as well as other structures.

free, and construction is scheduled to start in
the near future.

by Bentzi Telefus [ Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd. ]

W

hen you think about building a high school, the last word
that probably comes to mind is minefield, but that’s exactly what the people of Tzur Baher considered. Clearing
a minefield and returning it to civilian use is always important. When
the purpose is to allow youth to obtain an education, this significance
has added benefits.
Tzur Baher is a small Palestinian village on the eastern outskirts
of Jerusalem where 15,000 residents live with only one general school
for about 4,000 village children. Due to the lack of a public high
school, those who do not find schools outside of the village get at
most 10 years of basic education.  
The community decided to build a new school, but available land
was scarce. Most potential building sites in the village were in use for
private housing, and the only public land under municipal control
was the minefield in the western outskirts of the village, where the
Jordanian Army emplaced mines before the 1967 War.1
In 2000, the Israeli government and Jerusalem municipality approved a new public housing program that included building two
new high schools and a public youth center. The building program

resulted from an Israeli Supreme Court ruling that forced the authorities to build schools for the villagers.
The decision regarding who would do the clearance and who
would fund the clearance of the minefield caused a disagreement between the army and the municipality;2 each side placed the responsibility with the other. The Israeli Defense Force claimed it is responsible
for clearing minefields only when the clearance is a military necessity. Additionally, the IDF insisted that since the land is located on
a Jordanian minefield, it was not the IDF’s responsibility to clear it.
The municipality, on the other hand, argued the IDF has the professional and public responsibility to clear the field since the municipality has no expertise in mine clearance.
The government’s legal counsel made the final decision: Israel’s
Ministry of Justice decided it was the municipality’s responsibility
to do the work and ordered it to engage a civilian mine-clearance
company to complete the project. The Ministry of Justice found that
although the IDF was not responsible for emplacing the field, it was,
nevertheless, responsible for verifying the professional quality of the
clearance work. The court consequently ordered the IDF to give the
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Systematic Test & Evaluation of Metal Detectors:

Interim Report Field Trials

Mozambique

The Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission published at the end of 2005

A large mine repository.

set a new precedent involving the areas of responsibilities of each body involved in civilian and humanitarian mine clearance. The
decision to force the Jerusalem municipality to fund mine clearance and to force the
army to then be professionally responsible
for landmines it did not emplace is a model
for mine-clearance activity in Israel—a
model that hopefully will lead the way to
clearing more minefields.
This article was written with assistance
from the project manager, Mr. Ishay Telavivi
of Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd.
See Endnotes, page 112

another interim report for the STEMD
project.1 This article gives background on

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MAIC

Status of the Field
According to Ishay Telavivi, during the
pre-project survey he found that the field had
become a site for the disposal of building debris left on the boundaries of the minefield
(creating a pile of more than 50,000 cubic
meters [65,398 cubic yards]). This obstacle
made the clearance project more difficult
since the debris spilled over onto the land to
be cleared, and the pile had to be removed
before clearance could begin.
The minefield contained a combination
of M-35  Belgian anti-personnel mines3 and
some Jordanian AP mines.4 In the late 1980s
and 1990s, the IDF removed some of the
mines to minimize risk, but there was no certainty regarding the extent of the mines left.
To make things more complex, over the years

stages of the project and to address any
complaints that arose.
Maavarim’s standard operating procedures, based on the International Mine
Action Standards, led the planning and
execution of the work on the Tzur Baher
project from start to finish. The work on
this site was a combination of a few methods. Although the survey and analysis of the
field showed no evidence of anti-tank mines,
to identify and dismiss the presence of this
type of mine, Maavarim personnel marked
the boundaries of the field and conducted
manual demining using metal detectors.
Next, mechanical demining removed the
land to a depth of 0.5 meter (1.6 feet) to the
bedrock. In the last stage, Maavarim used
specially trained mine-detection dogs to verify that all mines had been removed.
The Israeli Army provided supervision
and final approval for the clearance of the

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF ICRC

final quality assurance stamp of approval, verifying that all the mines had been removed.

the project and report and some results
and recommendations of the trial. The
authors hope this article will pique interest
The EC JRC conducts trials of metal detectors through the STEMD project.

by Dieter Guelle and Adam Lewis
[ European Commission Joint Research Centre ]

T

Children gather for Mine-risk education.

the residents encroached on the minefield
boundaries to a point that some of the houses
were built bordering the field. The presence
of these houses made removing mines on-site
much more difficult and called for a gentler
and more accurate clearance process.
Clearing the Field
Demining companies in Israel must
be approved by the Ministry of Defense
and the IDF to assure compliance with
quality-control standard operating procedures. Maavarim Civil Engineering has
years of experience in contracting with
the MoD for mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal projects, and was
chosen to conduct the mine clearance and
to prepare the field for construction of the
school. Because this project was undertaken on behalf of the villagers, a special
Maavarim liaison officer was appointed
to keep the villagers informed during all

field, accepting Maavarim’s recommendation to approach this project according to
IMAS, even though the IDF does not normally work according to IMAS.
Conclusion
The work on the site started in early
September 2005  and was complete by the
end of October. Construction will be completed by May 2007. The Tzur Baher project
is an example of how mine clearance can
influence the daily life of an entire village.
From experience working with the demining industry in Israel, it is evident that government and private funds are rarely being
spent on this type of activity unless commercial interests are involved.
This project is unique because this is
the first time the Israeli Supreme Court has
stated that the government is responsible for
clearing a minefield that was not left by its
army. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice
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in the full report.

he concept of the Systematic Test & Evaluation of Metal
Detectors project is to conduct tests relevant to specific mine
and UXO problems in different regions of the world. STEMD
can be regarded as a trial making use of the experience distilled into
the Centre European Normalisation Workshop Agreement (CWA)
about testing of metal detectors and giving an overview of the stateof-the-art of the current metal-detector fleet. The project consists
of laboratory tests, field trials and training of interested parties in
testing methods. Lab tests are being carried out in the laboratories
of the JRC–Ispra. A trial in southern Africa was planned from the
outset. Mozambique was favoured because of previous experience
and because of the existence of a dedicated training site with different types of soils and the availability of local test targets. The report
describes the second field trial of the STEMD project. Some basic
information from the STEMD Interim Report Field Trial Laos is repeated so the present report may be understood independently.2
The purpose of the trials in Mozambique was to:
• Assess recent commercial off-the-shelf detectors believed to
be appropriate to Mozambique and for humanitarian demining generally
• Make the data available for the humanitarian-demining
community
Objectives of the trials were to:
• Compare performance of detectors in different types of
Mozambican soils
• Measure sensitivity of detectors to typical local targets of interest and standard targets
• Train local staff in the CWA
• Collect site information for International Test and Evaluation
Program for Humanitarian Demining

The report gives an overview about the preparation and describes
in detail the methodology and procedures used to achieve comparable results. The technical details of the detectors described in the
report are divided into two categories: technical information that is
relevant to users and that which is relevant to technical personnel.
A full chapter explains the main factor influencing metal-detector
performance—the ground. A simple method to measure and gain
knowledge about the magnetic soil properties is explained.
In this trial, we were able to take advantage of seven prepared
lanes used for training purposes by the Accelerated Demining
Program. Lane 1 contained builders’ sand from a sandpit. Lanes 2–
6 contained five different soil types from the zone around Moamba.
Lane 7 contained soil from Namaacha, adjacent to the Swaziland
border. With those seven lanes and increasing detection difficulties
from one lane to the other, the results reflected the influence of soil
on the detection abilities of the current metal-detector fleet. The
detectors being tested included the 12 latest models from the following manufacturers:
• CEIA S.p.A.
• Ebinger GmbH
• Guartel Ltd.
• Institute Dr. Foerster GmbH and Co. KG
• Minelab Pty. Ltd.
• Schiebel Elektronische Geräte GmbH
• Shanghai Research Institute of Microwave Technology
• Vallon GmbH.
The results of the trial are laid out in two chapters of the report.
One describes the direct comparison of all detectors versus the 13 targets and the seven soil types, and the other is an individual assessment
of each detector. For sensitivity comparison in air, the detectors were
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set up in Lane 1 to maximum sensitivity, and
in the other lanes the ground compensation3
was carried out (where available) and then
the max sensitivity test in air carried out.
For establishing the influence of the ground,
the targets were buried in the lanes and the
achieved maximum depth was registered.
The following targets were included:
• PMN-2 4 and PMN mines with
neutralised fuzes
• Type 72 and Gyata AP simulants,
locally used and produced
• R2M2 fuze mounted in 60-mm5
diameter clear plastic holders6
• ITOP fuze inserts Mo, Ko, Io
• 100Cr6 chrome steel balls, 5-, 7-, 10-,
12- and 15-mm diameter, placed in
wooden containers.
Conclusions and recommendations of
the report include:

• The sensitivity loss from L1 to L7 for
the detectors without ground compensation was so large that some
targets that could be comfortably
detected to the required depth of 130
mm in L1 could not be detected even
much nearer to the surface in the
higher numbered lanes.
• For detectors7 with very substantial
sensitivity loss from L1 to L7, it is important that the users are aware of the
ground conditions and check the reliability of the detector’s ability to sense
the expected mines in the working area.
• In general, in air maximum detection
heights, measured with the detectors
set up for a particular type of ground,
are not equal to the in-soil maximum
detection depth in the same ground.
• Minimum-metal mines are still the

main detection problem. Even the detectors with good soil compensation
could not always detect the smaller targets to the required depth in all lanes.
• Ground magnetic properties (magnetic susceptibility, ground reference
height) should be measured and recorded as a survey task because they
have to be known for planning and
proper use of the detector fleet.
For the execution of the trial, we received
excellent support from the Mozambican
National Demining Institute the Accelerated
Demining Program and other national organisations. Note: There are a very limited number
of hard copies of the report available for people
that have limited access to the Internet. If you
do not have access to the Internet, please contact Adam Lewis to obtain a printed copy.
See Endnotes, page 112
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With the highest number of landmine-related deaths
and injuries in recent years, Colombia has a vested
interest in seeking cost-effective demining methods.
Consequently, the government recently trained six
rats to locate explosive devices, which are often
emplaced by rebel forces and drug dealers.
Recent interest in training rats arose not simply
because the animal has an uncanny aptitude for the
task, but also because training mine-detecting dogs
is more costly and time-consuming. Dog handlers
are often injured if their canines set off an
explosive device nearby. Unlike their heavier
canine counterparts, rats are usually too light to
detonate landmines.
Mines in Colombia are the result of decades of
conflict between government forces and guerrillas
protecting lucrative coca fields, which provide
much of the world’s cocaine supply. The irregularly
emplaced minefields are designed to keep Colombian
and international forces from eradicating or
disrupting the production of coca.
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Mine Action Support Group Update
The following article highlights the recent activities of the Mine Action Support Group from the
first quarterly U.N. newsletter of 2006, including updates on the United Nations Mine Action
Service, the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF.1
excerpted by Stacy Davis [ U.S. Department of State ]

T

he MASG is an informal forum of 26 members that meets
quarterly to exchange information between donors and the
U.N. Secretariat on mine-action activities and research.
Representatives from mine-affected countries, nongovernmental organizations and experts are invited to report on the status of mine
action in their countries. The MASG also works to achieve greater
donor coordination and facilitate funding. The United States was
unanimously elected to chair the committee in December 2005 and
will continue to do so until 2007.
UNMAS
On 20 April 2006, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on
Mine Action adopted the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Mine Action
Strategy 2006–2010. The Strategy complements the inter-agency
policy on mine action and effective coordination that IACG–MA
principals adopted in June 2005. It also reflects lessons learned over
the course of the implementation of the United Nations’ Mine Action
Strategy 2001–2005. Above all, the new strategy is results-based—its
strategic goal and four strategic objectives focus on the impact, or
the anticipated outcome, of  U.N. mine action by 2010. The previous
Strategy listed some 48 activities as “strategic objectives.” These were
appropriate for departmental and agency work plans but did not
assist in the organization of priorities and measurement of results.
The content of the new Strategy is a significant improvement.
The text provides a situational analysis describing the assumptions,
risks and challenges defining the context within which the United
Nations believes its strategic goal and objectives can be achieved by
2010. The United Nations will work in partnership with others but, in
light of its own mandates, advantages and resources, it is mindful of the
responsibilities borne by other key actors in the mine-action sector.
The new Strategy reaffirms the United Nations’ express commitment to supporting adherence to and compliance with the normative
framework for mine action and refers expressly to the United Nations’
commitment to continuous, transparent monitoring of progress and
periodic reporting on implementation to the General Assembly.
U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
During the first quarter of 2006, the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation and the Mines Advisory Group resumed their Emergency
Impact Survey activities, starting with the area of Gbadolite in the
Equateur province. Following its survey in 2005  of the northern
Katanga district, DanChurchAid is now conducting mine/explosive
remnants of war clearance operations within the priority areas identified by the survey. Part of these activities are funded through the end
of the year, but more remains to be done and additional resources are
required for increasing the capacities, particularly for surveys.

Eritrea. Demining operations as part of the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea have gone through extensive changes
in the first part of 2006. Due to governmental limitations on the
use of helicopters for medical evacuations in Eritrean areas, most of
the demining operations have moved closer to the Ethiopian border.
Clearance operations are still ongoing in the Temporary Security
Zone, including road clearance and UXO clearance. The UNMEE
Mine Action Coordination Center is now focusing on planning mineaction support to the demarcation of the Eritrean/Ethiopian border.
This support will use mechanical, manual and mine-dog capacities to
ensure effective clearance of the border.
UNDP
Chad. Although funding for demining is low in Chad, several mineaction groups in the country are active. Key achievements include:
• Mines Advisory Group resumed operations from mid-January
until the end of February 2006.
• Following a visit, the U.S. Department of State decided
on a one-year extension of the MAG project (March 2006–
February 2007), increasing the explosive ordnance disposal teams from one to three and allocating a budget of
US$2.2 million.
• The government of Switzerland is providing a Technical
Advisor to the Information Management System for Mine
Action database for six months beginning 1 May 2006.
• The National Demining Office participated in a meeting
with a representative of the World Bank in order to study the
possibility for the Bank to finance the national mine-action
program with oil revenues.
Key challenges included:
• On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High
Committee for National Demining compound, the HCND
staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated.4
All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND
have suffered from this situation.
Key objectives were:
• In 2006, a technical assistance project that was about to be
terminated due to lack of funds received US$100,000 from
the Chadian government and an additional US$100,000
from UNDP Chad. This amount of money is not sufficient
to resume mine-clearance activities, which stopped in midDecember 2005. At least US$1 million is needed to cover
the cost of operations for six months. Engaging the government and other external donors for the implementation of the
National Mine Action Plan for 2006 remains the first key
objective for the short term.
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• The same effort should be used for the mine-risk education program, which stopped in December 2005 due to lack of funding.
• With the placement of a new Technical Advisor, updating the
database, the HCND Web site and preparing the team for
version 4  of the Information Management System for Mine
Action will be possible.
• The need to contract an operator to resume operations as soon
as possible has been recognized.
Funding shortfalls:
• The implementation of the Humanitarian National Mine
Action Program is not funded for 2006.
• The explosive ordnance disposal team and deminers have been
unemployed since mid-December 2005.
Sudan. Although under-funded, Sudan is making progress
towards its mine-action goals. Key achievements in Sudan included:
• The National Mine Action Authority, with technical and advisory support from the UNDP, was officially launched in a
ceremony in Khartoum held on 7 March 2006.
• With support from UNDP Sudan, the NMAA developed organizational structures for the National Mine Action Center–
Khartoum and the Regional Mine Action Center in Southern
Sudan–Juba and has started to recruit additional national staff.
• UNDP Sudan contributed to the on-time preparation and
submission of the updated Article 7 report for 2005, a requirement for Sudan under the Ottawa Convention.2
• UNDP Sudan finalized the recruitment process of a Technical
Advisor based in Juba and two National Programme Officers,
one each in Khartoum and Juba. The new staff members are
scheduled to join the UNDP by the end of May 2006.
The following were key objectives for Sudan:
• Continue to recruit additional staff for the Mine Action
Centers in Khartoum and Juba by providing technical advice
and support.
• Provide additional equipment (furniture, computers, vehicles,
supplies) for the establishment and expansion of the Mine
Action Centers in Khartoum and Juba.
• Conduct a training-needs assessment for the national staff
working in both mine-action centers.
• Provide technical support and advice to the NMAA to streamline mine action into national recovery and development plans
and to develop a resource-mobilization campaign/strategy.
• Support the National Mine Action Center to build national
clearance operations capacities as a joint project of the authorities in the north and south.
Sudan also experienced funding shortfalls during this period. The
UNDP is in urgent need of US$4.7 million to support the establishment of National and Regional Mine Action Centers in Khartoum
and Juba and for the training, equipment and operations cost of
the national mine/UXO clearance teams (140 national personnel)
as part of the national operations capacity building with deminers
provided by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan
Armed Forces. This initiative supports the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.3
Uganda. Some of the key achievements in Uganda were as follows:
• The National Mine Action Steering Committee chaired by the
Permanent Secretary to the Office of the Prime Minister was
established and commenced work.
• The National Mine Action Legislation and Mine Action Policy
were drafted.
• The newest version of the Information Management System
for Mine Action (4.0) was installed, user training conducted
and field tests started.
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• Needs assessments started in the affected districts of Lira and
Soroti and Technical Survey/clearance/explosive ordnance
disposal operations started in Kaberamaido, facilitating the
return of internally displaced persons.
• The Ugandan Mine Action Center was officially opened by
the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Disaster
Preparedness and Refugees.
• A Victim-assistance Technical Advisor has commenced work.
Key objectives included:
• Complete Technical Survey/clearance/EOD operations in
identified IDP areas in Kabaramaido and Katakwi.
• Perform targeted needs assessments in two more landmineand ERW-affected areas in northern Uganda.
• Develop a national disaster-management database utilizing
IMSMA version 4.0.
• Develop a surveillance network in the Ministry of Health.
The funding situation in Uganda is as follows:
• Currently available for 2006: US$1.4 million for capacity development, Technical Survey/clearance/EOD, targeted needs
assessments, technical assistance, and monitoring and evaluation from the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Norway,
the International Mine Action Training Centre–Nairobi and
the UNDP.
• Unconfirmed pledges and expressed interest: US$1.3 million for
Technical Survey/clearance/EOD, quality assurance and victim
assistance from Austria, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Switzerland and the United Nations Mine Action Service.
• Targeted needs assessments in six northern districts amounting to US$343,000.
• To continue needs assessments in two districts, US$115,000 is
urgently required in May 2006.
• An additional six months for technical assistance, specifically
a Victim-assistance Advisor, is needed and US$124,000 is
required no later than June 2006.
• US$180,000 is urgently required for a national surveillance
network/database for landmine survivors and war disabled
within IDP camps.
UNICEF
Angola. UNICEF Angola continues to support the capacity development of the mine-risk education section of Comissâo Nacional
Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária and continues
as the focal point for MRE among U.N. agencies.
During the reporting period, UNICEF continued technical and
financial support to field-based MRE activities through eight local
nongovernmental organizations and one international NGO, based
in nine of the most mine-contaminated provinces: Huila, Malanje,
Moxico, Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Uige, Bíe, Huambo and Kwando
Kuvango. In addition to implementing interactive MRE instruction
utilising theatre performance, puppet shows, songs and visual materials, these NGOs have mobilized and trained community volunteers
and mine committees as sustainable agents to continue reminding
people about the dangers of mines and to inform them about making
the right contacts when mines are found. In February, each NGO
participated in exchange visits to other implementing NGOs to share
experiences on implementing MRE activities in the field and difficulties they are facing in forming and training mine committees.
UNICEF also supports the Angolan Committee of the Red
Cross (ARC) to work with CNIDAH to determine the new orientation for MRE and training needs. The needs assessment for
training was finalized, indicating the radio announcements and
police presentations were particularly effective in disseminating

MRE information. Based on the research findings, ARC designed
and is field-testing police training manuals. UNICEF will publish
them once they are approved.
MRE materials designed and produced by UNICEF were
widely disseminated not only through UNICEF-supported
NGOs but also through Handicap International–France and
the International Committee of the Red Cross to implement
MRE programs.
UNICEF, together with the UNDP, supported CNIDAH
to organize an event to celebrate the International Day for Mine
Awareness and Assistance on 4 April 2006. A joint press release was
distributed by UNICEF and the UNDP to inform media about the
global activities planned on this date and mine-action activities implemented by U.N. agencies. One of the highlights of the event was
the MRE performance provided by Palanca Negra, one of the nine
UNICEF-supported NGOs, from the province of Malange. Palanca
Negra demonstrated vividly the dangers represented by mines, engaging villagers, especially children, in interactive play and reallife situations. UNICEF displayed posters, educational materials and
campaign materials. This event was widely covered by national television stations and major national newspapers.
On 3 and 4 May 2006, UNICEF supported CNIDAH in organizing a national meeting on:
• Introduction of the newly drafted National Mine Action
Strategy (2006–2011) and new focus for MRE strategy
• Utilization of Landmine Impact Survey data for the programming cycle
• Creation of an emergency-to-development approach for MRE
programming
• Revision of the MRE data collection form for IMSMA
• Effectiveness of implementing a radio-based program for MRE
Key actors of MRE, including NGOs, Ministry of Education
teacher-trainers and provincial representatives on mine action,
were invited.
In May, an in-service teacher training for 20,000 first-grade teachers began in support of the nationwide expansion of the education
reforms for first grade. All teachers who participate in this training
received MRE as a part of a national package of life-skills education.
UNICEF prepared a package of educational materials for the teachers to take back to their schools.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. UNICEF–DRC has been
one of the major actors conducting MRE in the DRC with the support of its international and national partners. Four out of the six
targeted provinces in the current project are reached by UNICEF
projects, which were completed by the end of March 2006.
From February 2006 to March 2006:
• In South Kivu province, 19,201 persons, especially returnees
from Tanzania, were reached directly in Fizi Territory with
MRE in 14 schools and 54 villages; 32,000 other persons were
indirectly reached via local radio.
• In North Katanga, particularly in the triangle, Pweto-MobaMuliro, MRE was given to 6,000 persons from February to
March 2006, focusing on returnees from Zambia and internally displaced persons.
• In Equateur province, MRE reached 6,000 students and 16,200
others via schools and villages through 150 cartoon animators.
Also, 58,000 returnees from Brazzaville, Republic of Congo,
and 50,000 IDPs in Equateur province received MRE.
• An assessment mission continued in Ikela to determine the
total number of beneficiaries for MRE interventions planned
during April 2006.
• In Province Orientale, 275 students from nine primary schools

were trained in MRE and 2,851 students and 54  teachers
of these schools were reached via the trained students. An
additional 420 members of communities and 90 members of
community relays in six villages were trained and 2,511 inhabitants of these villages were reached directly.
Only one project is ongoing in Ikela. Due to a current funding
shortage, it is not possible to take current MRE initiatives in the
DRC to scale. Due to the size of the country, the ongoing insecurity
in some areas, inaccessibility, and communication problems, demining and destruction of mines are being implemented at a slow pace.
There is a need to continue program implementation and strengthening of MRE activities as a necessary life-saving initiative benefiting
affected and vulnerable populations.
Ethiopia. UNICEF–Ethiopia has been working with its MRE
partners to implement the recommendations of the MRE program evaluation5 that was conducted in 2005. The recommendations included
strengthening program-coordination and project-management skills
and developing a sustainable surveillance system and an emergencypreparedness plan. UNICEF facilitated a meeting with the Ethiopian
Mine Action Office, the Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs,
and the Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO) to
discuss roles and responsibilities.

“There is a need to continue
program implementation and
strengthening of MRE activities
as a necessary life-saving initiative benefiting affected and
vulnerable populations.”

UNICEF, through its implementing partner, and with the federal and regional governments’ involvement, has commenced the
pilot Village Profile Project. The objective is to discuss the community’s mine-action challenges in a development context, and to collect data on victims and assistance required for the victims and risktakers. Using a participatory approach, mine-affected communities
are invited to share with RaDO the development challenges their
villagers face on a daily basis, and from this information, program
stakeholders will identify future challenges for the MRE project in
Ethiopia. RaDO will encourage the community to take responsibility for the problems it faces and inform them of available services
to deal with their challenges in the governmental and nongovernmental sectors.
If mines/ERW are in the top five priorities of the community
challenges, RaDO will facilitate the community to develop its own
solutions to live safely in the mine-affected areas. The community
will look at who the risk-takers and victims are and discuss ways to
reduce the number of risk-takers and victims through MRE activities. If communities do not see mines or ERW as a problem and if
there have been no incidents in the previous two years, all partners
will review the need to provide direct MRE to these communities. It
is hoped this project will assist communities to have more ownership
of their problem and facilitate government partners to effectively
Continued on page 91, MASG
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Landmine
Victims
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Understanding the
Ottawa Convention’s
Obligations to

The Ottawa Convention1 is unique for a number of reasons, not the least of which being
that the Convention has linked obligations
concerning the use of a weapon with a requirement that Convention signatories assist
a victim wounded by that weapon. When
the Convention was adopted in September
1997, this aspect, while lauded by diplomats
and activists,2 was certain to be a challenge
to implement. The real work began once the
Convention entered into force and states had
to act on this responsibility. This article discusses in particular the Convention’s victimassistance obligations.
by Kerry Brinkert [ Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

A

rticle 6.3 of the Convention states that “each State Party
in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration,
of mine victims.”1 This provision gave currency to terms like mine
victims, survivors and assistance in the context of mine action and
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Many children who are victims of landmines spend time in the San Barnabé Refugee
Center, waiting for medical attention. During Halloween they can play on the streets
just like any other kids (Bogotá Colombia - 2005).

international law. However, given that these terms are not defined
specifically in the Convention and “arguably the Convention does
not impose an absolute legal obligation upon States Parties to assist
mine victims,”3 the Convention’s membership was challenged with
figuring out exactly what to do.
Understanding the Convention’s Obligations
The Convention’s First Review Conference in 2004  concluded
that “victims include those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or
omissions related to mine utilization.” 7
States Parties acknowledged that such a broad construction in
the definition of a landmine victim would help draw attention to the
entire spectrum of landmine victimization. Yet the attention continues to focus on those physically injured by mines. It was also noted
that “those individuals directly impacted by mines are a sub-group of
larger communities of persons with injuries and disabilities.” 7 This
important point helped the States Parties to understand the need
for a more comprehensive and holistic approach to what the United
Nations has defined as mine action.
The United Nations defines mine action as encompassing five
core elements, one being victim assistance. However, there are important tactical, logistical, technical and medical differences between
humanitarian demining and activities related to assisting in the care,
rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine victims.
Humanitarian demining, developed as an area of expertise dealing with locating and neutralising of ordnance, is distinct from other
humanitarian or development challenges and has developed as a
relatively new and specialised discipline. In contrast, the matter of
victim assistance does not require the development of new fields or
disciplines but calls for ensuring that existing medical systems, social
programs, and legislative and policy frameworks are adequate to meet
the needs of all citizens—including landmine victims.
The problems faced by landmine victims are often identical to
those faced by other persons with injuries or disabilities. Assistance
to landmine victims should be viewed as part of a country’s overall

public-health and social-services systems
and human-rights frameworks.
The matter of victim assistance must
also be addressed within the broader context
of development. While a political commitment is required to advance the quality of
life for mine victims, ensuring a real difference results will require addressing broader
development concerns.
While addressing development concerns
of a group (e.g., landmine survivors), we
must always remember they are diverse individuals with equally diverse needs. The
States Parties have recognized this point,
declaring that victim assistance, as well as
being a matter of collective concern, “is also
a human rights issue.” 7
Another major advance made by the
States Parties was to record an understanding of what exactly is meant by victim assistance. At the Convention’s First Review
Conference, the States Parties reached a
consensus that victim assistance is generally
understood to comprise six elements:
1. Understanding the extent of the challenges faced
2. Emergency and continuing medical
care
3. Physical rehabilitation, including
physiotherapy, prosthetics and assistive devices
4. Psychological support and social
reintegration
5. Economic reintegration
6. Establishing, enforcing and implementing relevant laws and public
policies7
Responsibility
Who ultimately has responsibility for
assisting mine victims? The States Parties
understand that “all States Parties in a position to do so have a responsibility to support
mine victims—regardless of the number of
landmine victims within a particular State
Party.” 7 However, “the ultimate responsibility for victim assistance rests with each State
Party within which there are landmine survivors and other mine victims.” The logic
for this position is grounded in the fact that
“it is the basic responsibility of each State to
ensure the well-being of its population, notwithstanding the fundamental importance
of the international donor community supporting the integration and implementation
of the policies and programs articulated by
States Parties in need.” 7
The responsibility to support mine victims is “most profound in 24 States Parties
in which these States Parties themselves have
indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands of landmine sur-

vivors.” 7 These countries are Afghanistan,
Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia,
Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro,
Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and
Yemen.
This sense of responsibility was underscored in the Nairobi Action Plan, which
noted the Convention’s victim assistance
obligations constitute “a vital promise for
hundreds of thousands of mine victims
around the world, as well as for their families and communities” and that “keeping
this promise is a crucial responsibility of all
States Parties,” with it being “especially the
case for those [24] States Parties where there
are vast numbers of victims.”8 Moreover, the
States Parties recorded 11 commitments to
this “vital promise.” These commitments include that States Parties, “particularly those
[24  nations] with the greatest numbers of
mine victims,” will do their utmost to proceed with specific action points related to all
six defined areas of victim assistance.8
The States Parties’ understandings provided a solid basis to consider that victimassistance obligations of the Convention
could be parallel to the more concrete obligations found elsewhere in the Convention.
For example, with respect to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines,
the Convention’s obligations are very clear.
What must each State Party do? It must destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines under
its jurisdiction or control. For whom is this
obligation relevant? Every State Party that
reports stockpiled anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control must apply this
portion of the Convention.
Following the development of fundamental understandings on victim assistance,
it became much clearer to see what the victim assistance obligation entails and for
whom it is most pertinent. However, while
a sound basis was provided to treat victim
assistance like other obligations, complications still existed.
Seizing the Opportunity
Presented by Understandings on
Victim Assistance
What States Parties still lacked following their First Review Conference was a
clear understanding of what milestones
could or should be achieved by a certain
time. Millions of dollars had been generated between 1997 and 2004 for matters consistent with the aim of assisting landmine
victims.9 However, activists were arguing

Marco Antonio Joaquín was a fisherman before the accident. Now, with the help of the local NGO FUNDEMOS,
he is working in a bakery - Popayan - Colombia

that not enough was being done or being
done well enough.
By not knowing what needs to be done by
key dates or events, the Convention’s States
Parties were setting themselves up for failure. Following the First Review Conference,
the Co-chairs of the Standing Committee
on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration took this as their point of departure, advancing victim assistance provisions of the Convention as if they were other
obligations.
Of course, victim assistance is generally unlike other obligations. It is not defined in the Convention, which means the
conclusions recorded at the First Review
Conference became extremely significant.
The Convention has also not precisely identified with whom the greatest responsibilities
for conducting victim assistance activities
belong. This suggests it is important for the
24 States Parties with the largest significant
number of survivors to take responsibility
for their own victims. Following the First
Review Conference, the task has been to
assign deadlines for victim-assistance obligations paralleling the Convention’s milestones for mine clearance and stockpile
destruction.
In terms of the deadlines, perhaps both
arbitrarily and logically, the Co-chairs
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Toward SMART Victim Assistance
The Co-chairs’ approach to to gauging
and ensuring progress involved the distribution of a comprehensive questionnaire
to the 24  relevant States Parties to help
frame an understanding of concrete victim assistance objectives by 2009; plans
to achieve these objectives; and means to
implement these plans. The main aim of
this questionnaire was to encourage the
24  States Parties in question to establish
so-called SMART objectives:11
• Specific objectives that should specify what these States Parties want to
achieve
• Measurable objectives that would
enable all to know whether objectives
had been met
• Achievable objectives that are truly
attainable
• Realistic objectives that could indeed
be achieved with resources at the disposal of the State Party in question or
with resources that could realistically
be acquired externally
• Time-bound objectives that would
be achieved by the time of the Second
Review Conference
Initial responses to the questionnaire were
presented at the June 2005 meeting of the
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance
and Socio-Economic Reintegration with
all responses summarized in a lengthy
annex to the Sixth Meeting of the States

Parties’ Zagreb Progress Report. It provides
the beginnings of a clearer road map regarding what needs to be done between 2005 
and the Second Review Conference and how
success pertaining to victim assistance will
be measured in 2009.
Overcoming Remaining
Challenges
While the effort undertaken in 2005 
by relevant States Parties was impressive,
the usefulness of the responses is in doubt.
Few States Parties actually responded with
SMART objectives. Some States Parties detailed at length their status. However, even

the idea that “providing adequate assistance
to landmine survivors must be seen in a
broader context of development and underdevelopment.” 7 Many States Parties have
prepared poverty-reduction strategy papers
or national development plans to overcome
broader development challenges, with such
documents containing objectives relevant to
advancing the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors. However, in
many instances, the preparation of victimassistance objectives has not been considered
in these broader national plans.
To overcome these challenges, the States
decided the best way to ensure progress is to
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called for concrete progress to be made by
the time of the Convention’s Second Review
Conference. In terms of clarifying the measures of effectiveness, the Co-chairs turned
the matter over to the 24  States Parties in
question. Clearly, what could be expected
from, or what should be achieved by, any
one of the 24 relevant States Parties would
be different from all others given diversities
in numbers and characteristics of survivors,
bureaucratic and service-delivery capacity,
geography, etc.
As the ultimate responsibility for meeting
the needs of survivors rests with each state,
it was understood they themselves must define what can and should be achieved, in
concrete and measurable terms, as well as
how those needs can be met. Others may
have the expertise and capacity to assist
in understanding problems, in developing
plans to deal with these problems and in
monitoring the efficacy and implementation of plans. Real and sustainable progress, though, cannot be made without the
affected States Parties themselves “owning”
the challenge and the authority for devising
solutions to it.

The “process support” procedure involves
country visits featuring the following:
• One-on-one meetings with officials
from relevant ministries to raise
awareness of the matter and to stimulate inter-ministerial coordination
• Outreach to relevant international
organisations and others to ensure
that their efforts in support of the
State Party in question are both incorporated into and incorporate
mine-victim-assistance efforts
• Inter-ministerial workshops to bring
together all relevant actors to discuss
and consolidate improvements on objectives and the development of plans
It should be noted workshops are not considered as stand-alone activities or ends in
themselves. Rather, workshops are part
of a State Party’s overall process of objective-setting, planning and implementing
efforts to ensure progress by 2009. The
ultimate aim is a true equalization of opportunities for landmine survivors and other
persons with disabilities vis-à-vis countries’
broader populations.
Conclusion
It would be unrealistic to think some of
the world’s poorest countries with some of
the greatest challenges regarding the care,

rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine
survivors would demonstrate perfection in
the establishment of national victim-assistance objectives. Assistance exists to help
countries at risk with these tasks; in accordance with the Ottawa Convention, those
in a position to do so are obliged to provide
it. However, outsiders cannot do it all, nor
should they.
With perfection unattainable, it should
be acknowledged that any degree of meaningful progress made by relevant at-risk
states in taking charge of these matters
will be a major advance. The Ottawa
Convention, after all, was about expanding
the traditional understanding of state responsibility, with states accepting they have
important human-security responsibilities.
Ensuring progress in victim assistance by
key milestone dates, like the 2009 Second
Review Conference, will help demonstrate
the realism of this sense of responsibility.
The work undertaken to date by States
Parties suggests they are on the right track.
However, efforts—and processes—will
have to continue with vigor in order to
make a real and sustainable difference.
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/
notes/brinkert/brinkert.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 113
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MASG, continued from page 87

Jhon Ferney lost his leg in a landmine accident running from FARC guerrilla warfare.
Three others died. (Medellin, Colombia - 2005)

MASG Establishes Online Information
Clearinghouse
In an effort to make information more readily available to

though this should have provided a sound
basis for setting objectives, very little was put
forward in terms of what the desired status
would be in 2009. Other States Parties failed
to spell out what is known or not known
about their status. In addition, some States
Parties did not engage in the effort at all.
Another challenge identified in 2005 
relates to the effort to develop victimassistance objectives in conjunction with demining officials who have little interaction
with the health and social services sectors.
In some instances, the actual provision of assistance to landmine survivors appears to be
the responsibility of mine-action structures,
not health-care or social-service structures.
A further challenge related to fostering
an understanding of victim assistance is
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work intensively, on a one-to-one national
basis, with as many of the relevant States
Parties as possible. The aim, quite simply, is
to see the following at the September 2006
Seventh Meeting of the States Parties:
• Those with good objectives will have
developed good plans
• Those with vague objectives will have
developed more concrete objectives
• Those that have not engaged or have
engaged very little in the process of developing objectives and plans in 2005 
will have become more engaged
To achieve the Co-chairs’ aim, some
level of support is being provided to all 24 
relevant States Parties in the form of advice
each may wish to consider in improving on
2005 efforts to establish SMART objectives.

the mine-action community, announcements and resources from
the Mine Action Support Group are now available online. The
Web site is an electronic clearinghouse for MASG newsletters

and efficiently plan their MRE program
through data analysis, thereby reducing
subjective approaches to program implementation. This project will also help move
the surveillance system forward. Results of
this pilot project will be available in May
2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining, facilitates data analysis and effective programming for the government
partners and RaDO.
See Endnotes, page 113

and events, as well as quarterly reports prepared for MASG
by the United Nations Mine Action Service, United Nations
Development Programme, UNICEF and other organizations.
The United States currently heads the MASG, a group of 26
major donor countries providing resources for mine action
around the globe. The U.S. Department of State has given the
task of chairing the MASG to its Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement.
To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit
www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

Mine Action Support Group
Stacy Bernard Davis
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State
SA-3, Suite 6100 WRA
2121 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20522 / USA
E-mail: davissb@state.gov
Tel: +1 202 663 0081
Fax: +1 202 663 0090
Web site: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/
wra /c17719.htm
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Test and Evaluation

of Japanese GPR-based AP Mine
Detection Systems Mounted on
Robotic Vehicles
This article introduces Japanese activities regarding a project, “Research and Development
of Sensing Technology, Access and Control
Technology to Support Humanitarian Demining
of AP Mines.” This project, which includes the
research of six teams from academia and industry, has been funded by the Japan Science
and Technology Agency (JST) under the auspices
of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEX T ). The developed systems are equipped with both ground-
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penetrating radar and a metal detector, and they
are designed to make no explicit alarm and to
leave decision-making of detection using subsurface images to the operators. To evaluate these
kinds of systems, a series of trials was conducted
in Japan from 8 February to 11 March 2005.
by Jun Ishikawa and Mitsuru Kiyota [ Japan Science and Technology
Agency ] and Katsuhisa Furuta [ Tokyo Denki University ]

A

t current clearance speed, it will take more than 100 years
to remove all the landmines that remain in the world.1
Consequently, Japan is developing more efficient and safer humanitarian demining technologies. This article introduces Japanese
robotic sensor systems that provide deminers with clear subsurface
images via ground-penetrating radar in combination with metal detectors (GPR+MD).
Experiment Overview: Background
To reconstruct clear images, highly accurate sensor-positioning
systems, as well as sensing technology itself, are indispensable be-
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cause one of the most important pieces of information for signal
processing is sensor position, where the sensor acquires a series of
data for GPR+MD.
There are many kinds of anti-personnel landmines, which can be
laid by humans or scattered by airplanes, and mined areas are not
limited to plains but also marshes, canals, steep hillsides, seashores,
deserts, mountains and forests. For such rough terrain, robotic systems must have sensor heads that can scan the ground as closely as
possible but never touch it as well-trained deminers do. Metal detectors, which are a kind of an electromagnetic induction (EMI) sensor,
have the possible detection distance of about 15 centimeters for minimum-metal landmines. For these metal detectors, it is a challenge for
sensor systems to access minefields and manipulate the sensor head in
severe environments in order to stay as close to the ground as possible.
Thus, Japanese advanced robotics and sensor engineering have been
fused to create novel detectors.
Japan started preparation for this kind of research and development in March 1997, when the Tokyo Conference on Anti-personnel
Landmines was held. At this conference, participants undertook a comprehensive discussion to strengthen international efforts toward addressing the problems of AP landmines, especially landmine clearance by the
United Nations and other organizations; development of new technology
for mine detection and removal; and assistance to victims. In December
1997, Keizo Obuchi, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, signed
the Ottawa Convention,2 and the ultimate goal of zero victims was proposed. Since August 2002, the Japanese have undertaken preparations
to start humanitarian-demining R&D.3
Japanese R&D of Anti-personnel Landmine
Detection System
With strong expectations from the world community for Japanese
contributions in this area, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology established the Committee of Experts on
Humanitarian Demining Technology in January 2002, believing in
the importance of tackling the technological development of AP landmine detection using advanced Japanese technology. The Committee’s
findings were presented to MEXT in the report, “Promoting R&D
for Humanitarian Demining Technology.”4 Based on this report, the
Japan Science and Technology Agency announced a call for proposals
for R&D projects in humanitarian-demining technology. Out of the
82 proposals, 12 projects were selected, and an R&D project named
“Research and Development of Sensing Technology, Access and
Control Technology to Support Humanitarian Demining of Antipersonnel Mines” started in October 2002.
The JST project is essentially divided into a short-term R&D
project and a medium-term one. Because of the urgent need for this
technology, the short-term R&D project is expected to have prototypes in field trials within three years. The JST medium-term R&D
project is on a five-year schedule. The goal is to develop sensing technologies that can detect the explosive itself, in the range of about 30
to 100 grams.
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All figures courtesy of Japan Science and
Technology Agency.

wave detector, such as an induction coil, detects subsequent NQR
signals from the 14N if any intended target exists, and the resonance
frequency of the signal is unique for each explosive material. Thus
explosives can be identified.
Two research teams on the project are trying to develop detectors
based on the neutron analysis identifying explosives through backscattering of neutrons and detection of specific energy gamma rays

Figure 1a: Detection images from stepped-frequency GPR. Horizontal slices showing two targets at a five-centimeter depth (left) and a target at a
25-centimeter depth (right).
Short-term R&D project. The objectives of
the short-term R&D project are to develop sensing
technology that can safely and efficiently detect AP
landmines based on the physical differences between
landmines and soils, and to develop access devices
and manipulation technology that carry sensors into
minefields and allow them to scan the ground precisely. More specifically, the goal is to develop vehiclemounted GPR+MD dual-sensor systems that make
no explicit alarm and provide operators with clear
subsurface images. This means that the decision to
determine whether or not a shadow in the image is a
real AP landmine is entirely left to the operator, similar to how medical doctors can find cancer by reading
CT images. This feature discriminates the systems
from conventional GPR+MD dual sensors that are
based on alarm tones.
In the short-term project, four sensors and three robotic vehicles have been developed. One of those is the
Mine Hunter Vehicle. The vehicle itself and the manipulator have been
developed by a research team of Professor Kenzo Nonami’s at Chiba
University.5 The MHV can interchangeably mount two GPR sensors
in addition to a commercial, off-the-shelf metal detector.
One sensor is a stepped-frequency GPR developed by Professor
Motoyuki Sato’s team at Tohoku University,6 hereinafter referred to
as MHV #1. Stepped-frequency radar determines distance to a target
by constructing a synthetic range profile, which is a time domain approximation derived from the frequency response of a combination of
stepped-frequency signals via inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT).
The major advantage of the stepped-frequency method is that the
spectrum bandwidth can be easily tuned to fit an optimum value according to environmental conditions such as soil moisture.
The other sensor is an impulse GPR developed by Professor Ikuo
Arai’s project at the University of Electro-Communications,7 hereinafter referred to as MHV #2. This kind of GPR operates by transmitting a very narrow pulse (< 1 nanosecond) of electromagnetic wave, the
advantage of which is that the measurement time required to generate
one range profile is very short. After the GPR scans to acquire a range
profile for every interval of several centimeters,8 GPR tomography gives
subsurface horizontal slices as shown in Figure 1a, and further calculation provides operators with three-dimensional images (Figure 1b).
Professor Toshio Fukuda’s group at Nagoya University developed a dual sensor with built-in stepped-frequency GPR+MD.9
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Figure 2: Multi-Compton gamma camera based on stacked
BGO scintillator rods.

Figure 1b: Detection images from stepped-frequency GPR. Threedimensional image of three targets in the horizontal slices.
The sensor system scans the ground, being carried by a low-reactionforce manipulation frame that has four balloons on the legs to
softly land it on minefields. The manipulation frame is attached
to the top of a boom of a crane vehicle developed by Mr. Tomohiro
Ikegami’s group at TADANO Ltd. The vehicle has a 20-meter
reach for a 200-kilogram payload with a positioning accuracy
of 15  centimeters. These elements have been integrated into the
Advanced Mine Sweeper (AMS), which can adapt to various geographical environments.10
Professor Shigeo Hirose’s team at the Tokyo Institute of
Technology developed the Gryphon buggy system, which can be remotely controlled to access minefields.11 The manipulator mounted
on the buggy has been designed to cancel reaction force induced by
sensor scanning.12 The sensor is a GPR+MD dual sensor named the
Advanced Landmine Imaging System (ALIS), and it can also be used
as a handheld detector.13 ALIS was developed by Professor Sato’s team
and underwent a field trial in Afghanistan in December 2004.
Medium-term R&D project. Professor Hideo Itozaki’s group of
Osaka University is developing a nuclear quadrupole-resonance detector.14   In the analysis, a radio-frequency electromagnetic wave is first
emitted and excites nuclear spin of 14N in explosives. Then a magnetic

Test lanes and landmine surrogates. In constructing test lanes,
all the original soil was removed from a width of 2 meters to a depth
of 0.5 meters in the vertical section, and the lanes were filled with homogeneous and non-mineralized (cooperative) soil. The actual width
of test lanes is 1 meter, and mine surrogates were buried shallower
than or equal to a depth of 0.3 meters (1 foot). The features of each
lane are as follows:
• Lanes 1, 2 and 3 are 15 meters long with a flat surface.
• Lane 4 is 20 meters long, with 15 bumps in the surface, each with
a height of 10 centimeters and a diameter of 60 centimeters,
and small stones are mixed to make the soil heterogeneous.
• Lane 5 simulates minefields in post-clearance inspection after
mechanical demining, with the soil stirred and not packed.
• Lane 6 is wet, with 10 liters of water per square meter sprinkled
one hour before the test starts.
Figure 4 shows four kinds of landmine surrogates used in the test.
The M1419 and PMN220 contain a metal part—an 18-millimeter21
vertical carbon steel pin with a diameter of 3 millimeters—and the
Type7222 has a 4-millimeter vertical carbon steel pin with a diameter of 4 millimeters. The Type72-S23 mine is made by modifying a
product of Amtech Aeronautical Limited 24 and has exactly the same
metal part as the International Test Operations Procedure standard
I0, a 12.7-millimeter vertical aluminum tube. Silicone rubber was
substituted for explosives in all the surrogates.
Experimental design. Through the tests, influences of various factors
on probability of detection should be evaluated. Namely, in Experiment
1, target types, target depth, soil conditions and target angles were chosen as factors to be tested. There are
two or four levels for each factor as
described in Table 1. According to
the soil conditions, for example,
targets (landmine surrogates) that
are classified into “flat,” “wet,”
“stirred” and “rough” are respectively buried in lanes 1–3, 6, 5 and
4 at a specified depth and angle as
defined in Figure 5. Experiment 2
was designed to mainly evaluate

Figure 3: Test-lane layout and the calibration area.
from capture on hydrogen and nitrogen atoms of explosives. Professor
Kiyoshi Yoshikawa’s group from Kyoto University has prototyped an
extremely compact neutron source based on an inertial-electrostatic
confinement fusion device 20 centimeters in diameter.15 Professor
Tetsuo Iguchi’s group of Nagoya University has prototyped another
neutron source, which is an improved Cockcroft-Walton-type accelerator neutron source using a deuterium-deuterium (DD) fusion
reaction. They have also developed a prototype of a multi-Compton
gamma camera, which estimates the incoming direction of 10.8MeV
gamma-rays produced from the nitrogen of the explosive (Figure 2).16
The medium-term R&D project is expected to have prototypes in
field trials within five years, namely in 2007, in combination with one
of the prototypes of MHV, AMS or Gryphon.
Experimental Design17,18
To evaluate the short-term R&D prototypes, a series of tests was
conducted from 8 February to 11 March 2005 in Sakaide City, Japan.
Seven test lanes were constructed using more than 200 landmine surrogates (Figure 4). Since operators’ pre-knowledge of the locations of
buried targets significantly influences the detection results for such
systems that make no explicit alarm, lanes 1 to 6 are designed to be
used for blind tests.

Figure 4: Landmine surrogates used in test.

10.1 | august | 2006 | journal of mine action | research and development | 95  

Figure 5: Definitions of target depth and angle.
the minimum discrimination distance. Two levels were chosen for the
factor “distance to adjacent target” as described in Table 2. One level
consists of pairs of targets in a distance of 15 centimeters and the other
level consists of independent targets, the separation of which shall be
at least 50 centimeters.
Due to the limitation of time for the trial and the number of targets,
it is impossible to test all the combinations of levels in Tables 1 and 2.
To impartially collect unbiased data for statistical analysis under this
limitation, orthogonal experimental designs based on L16 (215) and
L 8 (27) orthogonal arrays were respectively used for Experiments 1 and
2. Assigning the columns of the array to each factor as specified
in Tables 1 and 2 derives a reduced set of combinations, the results of
which are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. For example, the number
of experimental runs can be reduced from 128 (4×4×4×2) to 16
in Experiment 1.
According to Tables 3 and 4 (see opposite page), all the targets
were buried at random locations in the specified lanes and were left
for more than one month before the test began. Testees can submit all
the impartial data needed for statistical analysis by reporting detection results from lanes 1 through 6. In the trial, at least two testees
from every device took the test in all 6 lanes.

4. The testee reports the following data for every detected anomaly:
• Coordinates of the detected target
• Depth of the detected target
• Confidence rating defined in Table 5 and the final decision whether or not to declare the anomaly as a landmine surrogate
5. The tester determines whether the declared anomaly can be
considered to be from the intended targets,26 that is, within a
detection halo, the radius of which is half of the target diameter plus 10 centimeters.27
6. Finally, the tester classifies the reported data into four categories:
• True positive: The testee declared it as a target and this
is true.
• False positive: The testee declared it as a target and this is
not true. This is a false alarm.
• True negative: The testee declared it as a fragment, clutter
or noise and this is true.
• False negative: The testee declared it as a fragment, clutter
or noise and this is not true. This is missing a target.
Completing the tests from lanes 1 through 6 means that the testee
finished all 24 experimental runs of Experiments 1 and 2 described
in Tables 3 and 4.
The most important thing is to practically use these technologies
to improve landmine-detection efficiency and reduce minefields. To
do so, the mine-detection systems must be robust, simple and highly
cost-effective. The Japanese domestic trial is the first step.
Test and Evaluation Results
The following is the data analysis and evaluation of test results for
anti-personnel landmine detection systems using ground-penetrating
radar mounted on robotic vehicles for humanitarian demining.17,18

Table 3: Design result for Experiment 1.

Table 4: Design result for Experiment 2.

Table 5: Definition of confidence rating.

Table 1: Factors A to D and the levels for Experiment 1.

Table 2: Factors A to C and the levels for Experiment 2.
Benchmarking. To compare performance of the GPR+EMI dual
sensors with that of existing metal detectors, a benchmarking trial
was conducted. Namely, a tester who knew the exact positions of targets checked if any metal-detector response occurred just above every
buried target. The result of this test shows the best performance of
the metal detectors used.
Test procedures. Testees took blind tests for each lane following
the procedures as described below:
1. Before the test starts, the tester records temperature, relative
humidity and volumetric water content that is measured by
time domain reflectometry (TDR).25
2. The testee does close-in detection work using a sensor system
cooperatively with vehicle operators.
3. After the work finishes, the tester records temperature, relative
humidity and volumetric water content measured by TDR.
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The test results showed that combining GPR with metal detectors
can improve probability of detection for targets around a depth of 20
centimeters, where it is difficult to detect the targets by using only
a metal detector. It has also been learned that positioning control
must be improved in scanning the ground with a sensor head, which
is key to making the best of use of metal detectors mounted on vehicles. Lessons learned have been reflected in further improvement of
the prototypes. In the following sections, data analysis, methods and
evaluation results are described.
Data analysis. According to the experimental design proposed
above, data from eight testees (two each from every system) have been
acquired. The comprehensive results of probability of detection (PD)
are shown in Tables 6 and 7 and were acquired through Experiments
1 and 2. The systems named are anonymous and described as Device
Continued on page 98, TEST

Table 6: PD of eight testees of Experiment 1. Highlighted data of four testees are analyzed as shown in Figure 13.
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Now, for example, a linear model for the probability of detection p1
can be defined as:

TEST, Continued from page 96
1, 2, 3 and 4. A benchmarking result is also shown in the tables. This
section discusses how the data are analyzed.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA tests are necessary if
there are significant differences of PD between levels for each factor.28
This is useful to check if experiments are well-designed to discuss
influences of the factors on PD and to see how the factors interfere in
PD. Some levels such as a target depth of 30 centimeters have been
set to be very difficult in comparison with the sensor specifications
because an objective of the test is to make the limitations of the sensor
systems clear.
In the following part of this section, an example is given for an
ANOVA of Experiment 2 assuming that an experimental result in
Table 8 is acquired from a system with no repetition. First the mean
of the results is calculated as:

Equation 6
For the ANOVA, four means of squares (variances) are calculated
as follows:
Equation 7

Equation 3

Equation 8
Equation 4

Equation 9

Next, error effects ei for i = 1, L, 8 are calculated as:

As described above, detection results reported by testees are classified into four categories: true positive, false positive, true negative
and false negative. However, the classification based on a testee’s discrimination threshold is a one-sided view, and the number of true
positives and the number of false positives change as the threshold
is varied. An ROC curve shows us the relationship between the true
positive and false positive for a variety of different thresholds, thus
helping the determination of an optimal threshold as well as the comparison of sensor performance.
To plot an ROC curve, two histograms, which are measured on an
interval scale in the confidence rating reported by the testee, are needed. One is from signals of intended targets that consist of true positives
and false negatives, and the other is from signals of fragments, clutters or noise (i.e., true negatives and false positives). According to the
histograms, the ratio of true positive (i.e., probability of detection) is
plotted as a function of the ratio of false positive at every confidence

Equation 10

Equation 1

and the main effect for each level of the factors A, B and C is derived
as follows:

Equation 2

Equation 5

where ƒC and ƒe are the degrees of freedom of factors and error.
By comparing the variances due to levels of each factor (i.e., VA, VB
and VC with the variance due to measurement error (Ve) using F-test),
the significance of the differences between levels is tested. In this test,
the null hypothesis is that the main effects of levels for a factor are all
equal (i.e., there is no difference in influences of levels for the factor
on PD). The computed F statistic in Table 9 follows an F distribution
with corresponding degrees of freedom under the assumption that
variances of PD have homogeneity.29 Therefore, the significance of
F can be determined in the usual way by using the table of F. If the
computed value of F is larger than the tabled value, the null hypothesis is rejected. This means that at least one pair of main effects is
significantly different.

Figure 6: Normalized histogram of signal and noise.

Table 9: Analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The 95-percent confidence limit of each main effect is experimentally derived by using Ve, the mean of squares due to error. For
example, the 95-percent confidence interval of a15cmis given by:

Table 7: PD of eight testees of Experiment 2. Highlighted data of four testees are analyzed as shown in Figure 14.

Equation 11
where nd = 8 is the total number of experiments (the number of experimental runs multiplied by repetitions), and tƒe ,95% is the quantile of the t-distribution for probability 95 percent with ƒe degrees
of freedom.
Receiver operating characteristic curve. It has been 30 years
since radiographic applications of ROC curves were reported30 and it
is well-known that analysis based on ROC curves is suitable for subjective evaluation of imaging equipment. In the test and evaluation
here, ROC curves were also used to evaluate sensor effectiveness in
terms of both PD and false-alarm rate.

Figure 7: Example of ROC curves.

Table 8: Notion of detection of probability for ANOVA example.
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rating (threshold). As shown in Figure 6, if a sensor functions well, a
histogram of targets (solid line) is distributed apart from that of noise
(dotted line), and the resulting ROC curve climbs rapidly toward
the upper left-hand corner of the graph as shown by the solid line in
Figure 7. On the other hand, if another sensor gives a histogram of
targets that is distributed closer to that of noise, the resulting ROC
curve gets closer to a diagonal line as shown by the dashed line in
Figure 7. This means the discriminating power decreases. Once ROC
curves are obtained, there are many methods to test the difference
between ROC curves.31
In the experiment, the number of true positives is controlled,
but the number of false positives depends on how many false alarms
are reported by the testee. Therefore, all the histograms discussed
here are normalized by dividing frequencies by the total number of
the population.
Experimental Results
Figure 8 shows the ground truth of the lane 2, and Figures 9 and
10 shows subsurface images from a sensor system. In this case, it has
been shown that a metal detector can clearly image seven pairs of
Type72 surrogates buried flush (Figure 9), and that a GPR sensor
can display seven PMN2 surrogates at a depth of 20 centimeters

Figure 8: Ground truth of the lane 2; ** shows a pair of Type72 and
shows PMN2.

Figure 9: Detection image from a metal detector.

Figure 10: Detection image from a GPR sensor.
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(8 inches) (Figure 10), where the metal detector was not able to get
any signal. Based on these kinds of images, testees have derived their
detection results, and this section discusses the experimental results.
Probability of detection. The number of testees is eight, the
breakdown of which is two from MHV with a step-frequency
GPR+MD (MHV #1), two from MHV with a pulse GPR+MD
(MHV #2), two from the Advanced Mine Sweeper with a stepfrequency GPR+MD, and two from Gryphon with a pulse
GPR+MD. The eight sets of data were analyzed by ANOVA to see
the effects of factors. Note that the order of the systems is not consistent with devices 1–4 to keep anonymity.
Tables 10 and 11 show ANOVA results for Experiments 1 and
2, respectively, and Figures 11 and 12 show plots of factor effects
(i.e., main effects added to the mean µ with 95-percent confidence
intervals derived in the same way as Equation 11). In Tables 10 and
11, factors, the null hypothesis of which has been rejected at the level
of significance of 0.05/0.01, are indicated by * (0.05) /** (0.01). For
those factors, there have been significant differences in PD between
the levels, and it can be said that it is meaningful to discuss how those
factors influence PD and that the test lanes were well-designed to
evaluate the sensor systems. It has been shown that there is a strong
dependence of PD on target depth and that the developed systems
still have problems for rough and uneven ground surface
(Figures 11 and 12). Regarding factor A of Experiment
2, distance to adjacent target, the ANOVA showed that
there was no significant difference in PD between a pair
of Type72-S surrogates at a 15-centimeter distance and
the other independent Type72-S surrogates.
Averages of PD of four testees, that is, one each from
every system, are plotted in Figures 13 and 14, compared
with the benchmarking result using only a metal detector.
Confidence limits can be calculated the way that K. M.
Simonson discusses in the Sandia Report 32,33 as the number of population for each level is derived from Tables 10
and 11 above. These results showed that the PD for targets
deeper than 10 centimeters can be improved by combining GPR with MD. On the other hand, as also shown
in Figures 13 and 14, some of the GPR+MD results in
shallow levels were worse than those of metal detectors.
This is because sensor height above the ground, which is
controlled by manipulators, is higher than that of manual
scanning of metal detectors, and this is considered to be
improved by modifying the manipulation algorithm of a
robotic part.
Lessons learned. Through the test and evaluation process, many lessons have been learned, some of which are
listed below:
• The provided calibration area should have contained
landmine surrogates for all levels of factors. Coaching
a typical image for each level would much improve the
detection rate.
• In some cases (for example, like Testee 7), high PDs
have been accompanied by high false-alarm rates
around 30 times/square meter,34 and it was also
proven that confirming the source of false alarms
for GPR is much more difficult than those of metal
detectors (i.e., metal fragments). Therefore, another performance index to penalize these GPR false
alarms will be needed.
• PD in deep levels of 20–30 centimeters can be improved by combining GPR with MDs.
Continued on page 102, TEST

Table 10: Eight testees’ result of ANOVA of Experiment 1.

Table 11: Eight testees’ result of ANOVA of Experiment 2.

Figure 11: Factor effects of Experiment 1 with 95%
confidence intervals

Figure 13: Averages of PD for Experiment 1. Testees 7, 2,
3 and 6 were chosen from each device.

Figure 12: Factor effects of Experiment 2 with 95%
confidence intervals.

Figure 14: Averages of PD for Experiment 2. Testees 7, 2, 3 and
6 were chosen from each device.
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Device #1
Testee #1
Testee #2

Device #2
Testee #3
Testee #4

Device #3
Testee #5
Testee #6

Success of Multi-tools in
Mine Action:

Device #4
Testee #7
Testee #8

1

11.3

12.4

1.3

1.6

2.7

2.2

20.9

6.0

2

8.5

6.6

1.7

0.7

1.1

1.9

35.0

7.5
6.4

3

9.3

8.3

3.2

1.0

2.4

2.1

52.5

4

15.4

16.7

4.2

1.3

3.9

3.5

36.9

4.6

5

16.0

9.5

0.5

0.7

6.0

2.5

31.9

8.9

6

9.5

12.3

0.9

1.7

4.5

1.7

20.6

8.5

The Survivable Demining Tractor and Tools
and the Mine-Clearing Survivable Vehicle

Table 12: False-alarm rate (1/square meter) of eight testees for each lane.
TEST, Continued from page 100
Evaluation of FAR. As described above,
ROC curves are useful to see the qualification of sensors, taking into account tradeoff
between PD and false alarm rate. Table 12
shows the FAR of eight testees for each of
the six lanes in the experiment.
Figures 15a through 15d show typical
ROC curves of testees 7 and 3 for lanes 2
and 4. Lane 2 has 21 targets buried as shown
in Figure 8 (see page 102), and lane 4 with
rough ground surface has 77 targets. A horizontal axis of each plot shows the normalized FAR, and the number of false alarms
can be derived by FAR multiplied by the total number of negatives that is shown in each
plot. In the case of Figure 15a, 65 percent of
targets were detected with 100-percent confidence, but the other targets got mixed in
525 negatives. In Figure 15b, 95 percent of
the targets were detected with 100-percent
confidence. Figure 15c for lane 4 shows that
testee 7 could not discriminate the targets
from 738  negatives although the PD was
77 percent. On the other hand, as shown in

Figure 15a: ROC curve for lane 2 (testee 7).
The total number of negatives (fragments,
clutters or noise) is shown.

Figure 15d, testee 3, the PD of which was 50
percent, detected 40 percent of targets with
100-percent confidence. These kinds of data
have been used to optimize the operator’s decision threshold and sensor sensitivities, and
to improve the sensor performance.
Conclusions
Through the test and evaluation, many
lessons have been learned, and these results
were fed back to the testees for further improvement. The next step of the project is
field trials in some mine-affected countries
to confirm the improvements and to evaluate robustness and cost-effectiveness.
The authors would like to thank all the project members, especially the principal partners for
the trial: Tohoku University, Chiba University,
Tokyo Institute of Technology, University of
Electro-Communications, Nagoya University,
Kyoto University, Osaka University, TADANO
Ltd., Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co.,
Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd., TAU GIKEN Co.
Ltd. and Tokyo Gas Co.
See Endnotes, page 112

Figure 15b: ROC curve for lane 2 (testee 3).
The total number of negatives (fragments,
clutters or noise) is shown.
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Figure 15c: ROC curve for lane 4 (testee 7).
The total number of negatives (fragments,
clutters or noise) is shown.

Figure 15d: ROC curve for lane 4 (testee 3).
The total number of negatives (fragments,
clutters or noise) is shown.
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The authors examine the various equipment and
technologies that allow further effectiveness in
demining achievements. Recent developments
in demining tools allow for greater protection of
deminers, in addition to improved search results.
With technological advancements such as the
Survivable Demining Tractor and Tools and the
Mine-Clearing Survivable Vehicle, the authors
express hope for demining centers worldwide.

ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF U.S. HUMANITARIAN DEMINING RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Lane #

Mine Survivable Tractor

by Tinh Nguyen and Charles Chichester [ U.S. Humanitarian
Demining Research and Development Program ]

T

he international demining community continues to seek reliable,
efficient, and cost-effective mine- and vegetation-clearance equipment to assist in demining operations. The U.S. Humanitarian
Demining Research and Development Program is responding to this
need by focusing much of its effort on developing, demonstrating
and validating technologies that help the demining community clear
mines and vegetation faster, safer and more efficiently.
One of the ways in which the Humanitarian Demining R&D
Program brings effective, reliable, yet affordable technologies to the
field is through the adaptation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
equipment. In particular, one of its most successful strategies is
using a COTS platform and adding tool attachments to create a
multi-functioning vehicle. Through past efforts, the HD R&D
Program has proven the concept that using a single prime mover
with a toolkit comprising a well-thought-out selection of tools can
reliably and rapidly perform the demining tasks of land preparation,
mine removal, and area reduction and reclamation, leaving an area
ready for quality-assurance proofing. Two such systems currently
in use by demining programs are the Survivable Demining Tractor
and Tools and the Mine Clearing Survivable Vehicle (aka Mantis).
Both systems use COTS platforms and a variety of attachment tools
to perform multiple demining tasks.
The Survivable Demining Tractor and Tools
The SDTT was first developed in 1997 and is one of the earliest successes of the HD R&D Program. The system uses a modified commercial New Holland 160-90 farm tractor fitted with armor

Grab

plating, optional steel wheels and a variety of specialized implements
used to clear heavily vegetated areas and support various demining
operations from area preparation to quality assurance. Attachments
include rollers, magnets, slashers, forestry toppers, rakes, hedge trimmers, sifters, light and heavy cultivators, large and small buckets,
large and small grabs, pallet forks, and light and heavy tree-pullers.
The system mechanically assists the manual demining process by
providing deminers numerous tools and an armored platform from
which to perform the most hazardous tasks. The versatility of the
system allows deminers to work more efficiently.
The SDTT is currently in use by the Thailand Mine Action
Center to clear vegetation and prepare the land for manual demining.
From 2001 through 2005, the SDTT cleared over 3,862,310 square
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The DCA Approach
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The anti-tank mine threat on access roads in
eastern Angola is the greatest impediment to
infrastructural rehabilitation, economic recovery
and social development in that area. The authors
discuss the method and equipment used by

ed 214.5 kilometres (133.3 miles) of preliminary road surveys in 45 
hours in Moxico province. More than 28,000 targets were detected
during the surveys and approximately 1,812,300 square metres (448 
acres) were searched down to a depth of one metre.2 The combined
WADS-RCT operation successfully completed two days of acceptance field trials in the Luena area in mid-November 2005 and was
accredited by the Comissâo Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e
Assistência Humanitarian/United Nations Development Programme.

DCA Approach
The DCA approach to road verification and clearance in eastern
DanChurchAid to verify and clear roads in Moxico
Angola is comprised of five stages:
1. Road reconnaissance
and Lunda Sul provinces.
2. Road survey and target definition
3. Target reacquisition
by Marcel E. Durocher and Anders Jansson [ DanChurchAid ]
4. Target investigation and clearance
5. Quality-assurance survey
uring three decades of internal conflict, much of Angola’s infraRoad reconnaissance. Prior to undertaking survey, verification or
structure was destroyed. Within Moxico and Lunda Sul provincclearance activities along a given road, DCA compiles available data
es, the constant ebb and flow of military forces left the majority
on the conflict history in the area and mine incidents along the road
of bridges destroyed, a high number of principal
to determine the nature of the threat. Road and
routes mined and access to towns and villages
road-environment attributes impacting subserestricted because of defensive minefields.
quent activities such as road type, road width,
In 2004, DanChurchAid conducted a genroad-surface condition and degree of vegetative
eral assessment of the mine situation within
encroachment are recorded during a reconnaisLunda Sul and Moxico provinces in eastern
sance survey. The data collected during this
Angola. Even though many areas were imphase is stored in a geographic-informationpacted by minefields obstructing construction
system database and is used to produce WADS
or hindering agriculture, the ever-present antiand RCT work plans and maps.
tank mine threat on the major and minor acRoad survey and target definition. Roads
cess roads was determined to be a far greater Figure 1: DCA wide-area detection system.
are surveyed using the vehicle-mounted DCA
impediment to the repatriation of refugees,
WADS. The system is pictured in Figure 1. It is
relocation of internally displaced persons, remodular in nature and the sensor arrays can be
habilitation of infrastructure and distribution
set up with one to eight Ebinger Upex 740 senof essential supplies to isolated villages.
sor coils in different configurations, depending
Because there was no road-verification caon road attributes, the type of survey task and
pacity in Moxico and Lunda Sul provinces,
the nature of the mine threat. In Moxico and
DCA investigated existing verification and
Lunda Sul provinces, 5.5–7.5 metre-wide sensor
detection systems that had been or were bearrays in the 1.0-metre by 1.0-metre and/or 0.5ing used elsewhere. A system similar to the
metre by 0.5-metre configurations are adequate
Kinematic Induction Magnetic Survey, develfor most road survey tasks.2
oped by UXB AFRICA in 2002 to verify roads
At a survey speed of five kilometres per
in the Temporary Security Zone along the borhour (three miles per hour), metal-jacketed
der between Eritrea and Ethiopia, was deemed Figure 2: WADS electronic control module. anti-tank mines, fragmentation mines and
appropriate.1 In mid-2004, DCA decided to
some of the larger anti-personnel mines, such
fund the design, construction and testing of
as the PMN and PPM-2,3 are easily and cona second-generation wide-area detection system (WADS), which was
sistently detected by sensors in the 1.0-metre by 1.0-metre configto be used in conjunction with a road-clearance team (RCT).
uration. Survey speeds of up to 10 kilometres per hour (six miles
The DCA WADS was built in the Republic of South Africa with
per hour) are possible if only large metal-jacketed targets are being
the assistance of Regis Trading International. Its arrival in Luena,
sought. Minimum-metal mines cannot be consistently detected with
Moxico province, in June 2005 was followed by the recruitment and
this configuration.
training of the WADS team and the RCT and the WADS static and
Incoming data streams acquired during the receiver phases of the
dynamic system calibrations. In October 2005, the WADS conductTx/Rx cycles of the sensor coils are acquired by in-vehicle electronic

D

Figure courtesy of Marcel Durocher

Mine Clearing Survivable Vehicle
Based on the success of the multitool-attachments concept used in the
SDTT, the HD R&D Program invested in
the Mantis mine- and vegetation-clearance
system. As its platform, the Mantis uses a
modified and armored John Deere 6920
farm tractor capable of operating a number
of specialized and commercial off-the-shelf
implements to address some of the vegetation clearing, soil preparation, area reduction, quality assurance, and mine removal
and neutralization problems in humanitarian-demining operations. The system is
equipped with front and rear power takeoffs, standard three-point hitches in the
front and rear, and a loader frame. The tractor was modified, armored and reassembled
under contract to the HD R&D Program
by Pearson Engineering Ltd.
The purpose of developing a system such
as the Mantis is to provide deminers with a
mine-survivable vehicle that has multiple
functions and is based on a COTS technology (i.e., John Deere farm tractor). The tractor
has been armored, fitted with a 180-degree
rotating driver’s cab and anti-personnelmine-survivable SETCO wheels with an innovative wheel-hub interface incorporating a
dowel and plate design. This design allows the
wheel to separate from the axle in the event of
an anti-tank mine detonation, thus reducing
the shock effect through the axle. The tractor acts as the prime mover for a toolbox of
COTS and specialized implements generally
used by the construction and earth-moving
industries but also applicable to demining
operations. Along with the mine-resistant
John Deere tractor, this toolbox currently
consists of a rotary mower, area-reduction
roller, rotary mine comb, grab, four-in-one
bucket, heavy cultivator, spring-tine cultivator, bed formers, mine sifter, tree extractor,
magnet and hedge cutter. Together with the
prime-mover tractor, these 12 tools provide
deminers with capabilities to perform their
work effectively and efficiently.
In August 2004, the Mantis and its
complementary tools underwent a thorough
performance evaluation conducted by HD
R&D Program staff members and supported by engineers from the United Kingdom
under the auspices of the International Test
and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian
Demining. For the soil and vegetation
within the environment where the testing
occurred, the results of the performancedemonstration assessment show the Mantis

and its demining and area-preparation
tools can prepare an area for demining,
remove anti-personnel mines and leave an
area ready for quality-assurance proofing
and subsequent use.
Based on the positive results from the
evaluation, the HD R&D Program deployed
the Mantis to Nicaragua in spring 2005 for
an operational field evaluation. Under the direction of the Nicaraguan Army Demining
Units, the Mantis is currently performing in
a minefield 6 kilometers (4 miles) long with
Class II (medium to severe) vegetation and
terrain near the town of Jinotega. In the first
four months of operation in Nicaragua, the
Mantis removed 9,600 kilograms (11 tons)
of metal with the magnet attachment and
cleared 64,050 square meters (16 acres) of
land (clearing vegetation, and cultivating
and sifting soil). NADU members also reported the blast-resistant SETCO tires were
extremely effective in encounters with PMN
mines,1 not incurring any damage to the
wheel when hit. In addition, the roller attachment has encountered and detonated 10
PMN mines and the cultivator has unearthed
numerous UXO items. To date (in combination with the Hitachi excavator), NADU
members have removed 14,529 mines and
cleared 436,175 square meters (108 acres) of
land for further manual and mine-detectiondog quality assurance. In fact, after the mechanical clearance process with the Hitachi
and Mantis, five mines remained in the entire area. Further investigation is underway
to determine why these mines were left in
the ground. Early indications suggest the
mines were outside of the area worked by the
machines, their fuses were non-functioning,
or they were deeply buried.
In the right conditions, mechanical demining with versatile mechanical systems
such as the SDTT and Mantis allow for faster, safer and more efficient mine clearance.
However, minefield locations and conditions
often preclude the use of such machines. For
example, the Mantis is not intended for use in
minefields with the threat of anti-tank mines.
The Nicaraguan mechanical-clearance effort
has not proven to be completely effective because of this fact. However, with continued
effort in developing operating procedures
and development of attachments for multitool systems like the Mantis and SDTT, the
HD R&D Program is confident the SDTT
and Mantis, with their associated tools, will
provide the humanitarian-demining community with highly reliable, cost-effective
systems augment current catalogs of demining tools and expand area-reduction
and demining capabilities.
See Endnotes, page 113

Charles Chichester is Deputy
Program Manager for the U.S.
Humanitarian Demining Research
and Development Program at the U.S.
Army Communications Electronics
Research and Development Command,
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development.
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meters (954 acres) of land in Thailand and
continues to be an integral part of TMAC’s
demining program.
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Figure 5: RCT reacquisition team navigating to a target using work maps and DGPS.

Figure 6: Plot showing the variability of
DGPS data.

Figure 7: Manual deminer investigating a
surficial target.

Figure 8: Manual deminers locating a
deep target.

Figure 9: Armored mini-excavator used to
investigate buried targets.

the hole is filled in and the excavator moves
on to the next target.
When investigating deep targets or suspected anti-tank mine targets, the targets are
marked as shown in Figure 10. The target is
then investigated by excavating a V-shaped
trench on the outside of the marking sticks on
dirt roads or painted lines on asphalt roads.
The excavations, the area between the
excavations and the spoils are checked by a
manual deminer (Figure 10) with a handheld
metal detector to confirm the target location
and to determine if additional excavation is
required. The manual deminer then investigates the target by approaching it laterally
using manual demining methods. Once the
target has been identified, neutralized and
removed, the excavation is filled in and the
excavator moves on to the next target.
Even with a 2-metre by 2-metre search box
for each target, the area requiring additional
treatment for the above-mentioned mine
types is reduced by 98  percent. Using this
methodology, the eight-person RCT has been
able to verify and clear up to two kilometres
(one mile) of road, or 18,000 square metres
(four acres) of land, per day.
Quality-assurance survey. After completion of clearance activities for a given road
segment (five to 10 kilometres) the WADS

team resurveys the road segment. System
configuration and survey parameters during
the road resurvey activities are exactly the
same as during the initial road survey.
Maps from the two survey runs are compared to determine if all targets have been
removed. A 50-metre section of the LuenaLucusse road is presented as an example in
Figure 11. Missed targets and targets for
which the collected target attribute data is
not satisfactory are re-investigated by the
clearance team. The two map sets, as well as
the digital data for the two surveys, are saved
for future reference.

Figure 10: Manual deminer investigating a
deep target.

Figure courtesy of Marcel Durocher

Future Plans
In a 10-kilometre (six-mile) stretch of surveyed road containing 1,296 targets, 82 percent
were comprised of loose scrap metal on the road
surface, 15  percent were comprised of scrap
metal embedded in the road surface and 3 percent were buried in the road base and required
investigation with the mini-excavator. It is clear
that by reducing the number of scrap-metal
targets requiring investigation by the RCT
will result in significant productivity gains.
In 2006, several options are being considered to improve the productivity of the
RCT. Some of the options under consideration include:

Figure courtesy of Anders Jansson

Figure courtesy of Anders Jansson

Figure courtesy of Anders Jansson

Figure 4: RCT reacquisition team marking
a buried target location.

Figure courtesy of Anders Jansson

Figure 4: Cross-section of subsurface volume in which a TM-46 anti-tank mine can be detected when using a 7.5-metre-wide six-sensor array. Sensor array standoff distance is 60 centimetres (24 inches). Horizontal station separation is 100 centimetres (39 inches)
and vertical station separation is 33 centimetres (13 inches).

Figure courtesy of Anders Jansson

is equipped with an Omnistar BD-132, 12-channel GPS receiver and
Omnistar Psion Datalogger, which contains target coordinates for a
given section of road. When receiving differentially corrected satellite
data, sub-metre accuracy is possible and the Psion Datacorder is used to
navigate to within 20 centimetres (8 inches) of the target location.
The cart-mounted GPS antenna allows the reacquisition team to
safely approach to within two metres of the targets (Figure 4). After
the team reaches the target location, a nonmetallic red marker is
placed on the ground surface. The second team member then marks
a 2-metre by 2-metre search box around the target marker by placing
red and white triangular shaped markers at each corner of the search
box. He also assists in the navigation to the different targets using the
work maps, and records the time of the target reacquisition and several key GPS position-fix parameters such as the number of satellites
and Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP) values (Figure 5).5
The rationale for selecting a 2-metre by 2-metre search box is
based on GPS data recordings at the DCA GPS base station in Luena
and on offsets recorded during target reacquisition activities. GPS
readings were collected over a period of five days in September 2005 
to monitor daily variations in DGPS position fixes. Between 5:00
and 11:00, the position drifts are less than one metre, whereas between 11:00 and 17:00 they range between zero and four metres.
Position-fix offsets for 2,190 readings in the 5:00–11:00 window
are presented in Figure 6. Ninety-nine percent of the position fixes are
within one metre of the station location. Less than 1 percent of the
position fixes were more than one metre from the station location.
Offsets between where the target is supposed to be located and
where it is actually located were recorded for 962 surface targets
spread over approximately nine kilometres (about six miles) of road.
Ninety-nine percent (952 targets) were within one metre of their calculated positions. Ten targets (one percent) were at distances greater
than one metre from the calculated positions. On the basis of the
above data, it was decided to conduct survey and reacquisition activities only during the 5:00–11:00 window and to use a 2-metre by
2-metre search box.
Target investigation and clearance. The pinpointed and marked
targets are investigated by the road-clearance team. The presence of
the target within the search box laid down by the reacquisition team
is confirmed by using handheld metal detectors (Figure 7). If the
target is on the surface, the nature of the target and the threat level
are assessed and the target is subsequently removed or neutralized by
the manual deminer. If no targets are located within the search box
with the handheld detectors, the search box is then searched with a
Upex 740 large loop detector (Figure 8) and the exact position of the
target is marked.
Buried targets are investigated using an armored mini-excavator
(Figure 9) and manual deminers. Small buried targets are localized,
marked and then directly excavated. The spoils are then spread out
on the ground beside the excavation and inspected by a manual deminer. After the target has been localized, neutralized and removed,
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control units and subsequently routed to an analog-to-digital converter. The digital-sensor data streams are captured by Ebinger MonMX
data-acquisition software running on a laptop computer. One differentially corrected GPS data stream from the Omnistar Differential
GPS system is also routed through the analog-to-digital converter
and is subsequently acquired by the MonMX software. The in-vehicle
electronics module is shown in Figure 2.
Sensor-array parameters such as number of sensors, sensor-coil
configuration, sensor-array configuration, and longitudinal, lateral
and vertical GPS-sensor offsets are pre-survey inputs. The location
and nature of road environmental events that adversely affect the
quality of the survey data are recorded on a Psion Datalogger and
incorporated into the database as warning flags.
The MonMX software provides a real-time display of sensor-coil
acquisitions and system location. The electromagnetic and GPS data
files saved by the MonMX software are subsequently merged and
saved into a single geo-referenced data file for later processing by the
Ebinger DLMX software.
The Geosoft Oasis Montaj software is used for data processing
and target selection. For a given road segment, one to five kilometres
(0.6 to three miles), all of the geo-referenced data files are merged
into a single database that is subsequently edited to remove erroneous data entries caused by satellite data-feed reception problems.
Warning flags are inserted where road environmental events, such as
large metal items on the side of the road or obstacles such as trees and
bicycles, negatively impacted sensor-coil performance.
The merged and edited data is processed using appropriate mathematical algorithms, and targets are defined. A3 or A4 work maps of
the surveyed road sections showing the location of all of the sensor
readings, target locations, warning flags and a Universal Transverse
Mercator grid are produced for use by the re-acquisition and clearance teams.  
The data used to create work maps was obtained using a 7.5-metrewide six-sensor array. The total search swath width in the example is approximately 9.0 metres. The search depth was approximately one metre.
A cross-section of the subsurface volume in which a TM-46 anti-tank
mine4 can be detected by a 7.5-metre wide six-coil (1.0-metre by 1.0-metre configuration) sensor array is shown in pink in Figure 3.
Digital copies of the work maps along with tables containing all
the relevant information about the targets are downloaded into an
RCT field computer for further analysis using Environmental Systems
Research Institute’s Geographic Information Systems software. Target
location files are also uploaded into Omnistar Psion Dataloggers for use
by reacquisition teams to navigate to the targets.
Sensor and target locations, road attribute event data collected during
surveying activities, and target attribute data collected during reacquisition and clearance activities are also incorporated into a GIS database for
further analysis and the production of thematic maps.
Target reacquisition. Target reacquisition is carried out by a
two-person team that is part of the RCT. One of the team members

Figure 11: Example of initial survey (left)
and post-clearance quality-assurance survey (right). Reference point is “+” symbol
in center left.
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Endnotes
An Alternative Perspective, Weitzel [ from page 10 ]

• Carrying out mechanical and/or manual pre-survey road treatments to reduce the
amount of loose scrap-metal on the road surface
• Combining new explosive-detection technologies with the WADS and/or incorporating them in RCT procedures to reduce the number of targets requiring timeconsuming intrusive interventions
• Increasing the number of road-clearance teams
The authors would like to thank DanChurchAid for assistance in the preparation of the manuscript and for permission to publish this article.
See Endnotes, page 113
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Bosnia and nongovernmental organizations in Sri Lanka and Angola.
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Explosive-sniffing Goats Avoid Offending Muslims
In an effort to protect
security forces in the Muslim
world, 29-year-old Geva Zin, an
Israeli K-9 security trainer,
turned to an unconventional
ally. Zin began training goats
to detect explosive materials
in vehicles and on citizens
examined at checkpoints.

Dogs, although prevalent and
adept at explosive detection,
are offensive to many Muslims
because they are considered unclean. Security forces around
the world were often left with the choice of offending local
Muslim populations or exposing humans to incredible risk at
checkpoints. Zin’s work sought to solve that problem by using
one of the most common animals in Muslim life—the goat.
Zin already has had great success training dogs and even
miniature pigs to detect explosives and uncover mines, but
goats offer a unique solution to security situations in the
Muslim context. First, there is a decreased chance of security
forces humiliating Muslims with searches by dogs. Second, goats
are able to search every suspect and vehicle. Third, their
use protects lawmen by allowing them to keep a safe distance.
Finally, because goats are prevalent in many parts of the
world, their presence in most situations is unobtrusive—dogs
were often denied entry to mosques, private homes, and areas
containing Muslim holy books.
Zin’s goats are trained much like dogs, sitting when they detect
explosives to alert a nearby handler that a person or vehicle
should be searched more carefully.
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2. We are also drawn to the issue by the impassioned pleas of high-profile celebrities such as
the late Princess Diana. Of course, the celebrities who lend their endorsements are compassionate people who believe they are doing what they can to help. All the same, nothing about
being celebrities per se gives them any insight into international relations, military necessity,
the daily lives of those affected by mines, or the logistics involved in improving their living
conditions in the long run. An occupational hazard of fame is that it makes people think
that they are competent to judge complicated matters when they are no more competent
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carried out by tobacco corporations. Why should the concerns about accuracy and neutrality not apply here as well? Is it because people who care about landmines are “good” and
because tobacco corporations are “evil”?
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11. Graeme R. Goldsworthy and Dr. Frank Faulkner. Oct. 13, 2003. “Armed Non-state Actors
and the Ban on Anti-personnel Mines.” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. http://
www.jha.ac/articles/a124.htm. Accessed March 13, 2006.
12. Dino Bulsuladzic. Minefields of Sarajevo. Demining Research at the University of Western
Australia. http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/countries/balkans/sara3.html.
Updated February 2000. Accessed March 13, 2006.

A Firm Foothold, Lundberg [ from page 13 ]
1. One kilometer is equal to 0.62 miles.

Opening Roads to Angola’s Future, Kempf [ from page 15 ]

1. Kuito is the provincial capital of Bie and Menongue is the provincial capital of Cuando
Cubango, the southern province on the border with Namibia.
2. Funge is a cooked porridge-like dish made from corn or yucca flour mixed with water and
seasoned with salt. It is a staple of the Angolan diet in the region the author visited.
3. Information provided by HALO Trust in an e-mail interview with Helen Gray, April
23, 2006.

Mines Awareness Trust, Howard [from page 18 ]
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1. Mines Awareness Trust has a mission to inform, save and aid those who live in environments infested with mines. MAT focuses primarily on children and utilizes entertaining and amusing ways such as puppet shows or performances in order to educate a
younger generation.
2. A submunition is similar to a cluster munition (aka cluster bomb unit). It is a piece of
ordnance that is discharged from a larger “carrier.” Whereas cluster bombs are generally
regarded as being dispersed from aircraft, submunitions are delivered via other means,
such as a mortar. The M79 is a small submunition that is “carried” in a mortar. There are
60 M79 submunitions “carried” in a 120-mm mortar. The mortar is fired and at the predetermined height, the submunitions are dispensed.  The submunition has a cotton loop to
the rear; when this is disturbed by the air resistance, it then arms the device.
3. Comic Relief is a nonprofit organisation based in the United Kingdom. The mission
of Comic Relief is to contribute to organizations battling social injustices and aiding
poorer countries.
4. As of 10 May 2006, £50,000 equals US$88,665.
5. Ground appreciation is a military term indicating the ability to visualize a map into
“real” terrain. Therefore, an individual will look at a map, analyse the information and
begin to “appreciate” the terrain that he or she is about to cover. In a mine-action sense,
it indicates that the individual was able to plan movement better by understanding the
topography of an area.
6. Uganda signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction on 3 Dec. 1997, ratified on 25 
Feb. 1999, and became a State Party to the Convention on 1 Aug. 1999. For more information on the Convention, see http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm.
Accessed 11 April 2006.
7.   To view the International Mine Action Standards see http://www.mineactionstandards.
org/imas.htm. Accessed 15 Feb. 2006.
8. “Seconded” means that they are effectively “on loan” to the Ugandan Mine Action Centre.
At some point the military hierarchy will request them back.
9. “Life support” means that the Ugandans have to provide vehicles for their newly trained
personnel, ambulances, and medical staff for demining and EOD teams, funding for food,
water, and fuel for their personnel when they are deployed on operations.
10. This situation requires a very delicate diplomacy because MAT does not “own” the
Programme. MAT staff is there purely in an advisory capacity. So in theory, the Ugandan
Command structure could ignore MAT’s advice and do whatever they wanted. MAT is trying to help them develop but also insists that they work to the required safety standards.
11. The continued opposition to Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army has caused over
1.4  million Ugandans to become internally displaced persons. They are forced to
move into IDP settlements. Rebels continue to terrorize IDPs even though they are
living in these settlements.

Picking the Right Tool for the Right Task, Frehsee [ from page 21 ]

1. USSR-manufactured stake mine with six rows of fragments. For more information, visit
http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.
html. Accessed March 24, 2006.
2. American-manufactured plastic AP mine. For more information, visit http://www.
eng.wa r wick.ac.uk /DT U/pubs /w p /w p48 /appendi xcminesa ndordina nce.html.
Accessed March 24, 2006.
3. Common and virtually undetectable AP mine. For more information, visit http://
thirda ngle.com/viewphoto.asp?perpage =200&area= -1&CurrPage =9&pid=1794.
Accessed March 24, 2006.
4. Chinese-manufactured, hard-to-detect AP mine. For more information, visit http://
www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
Accessed March 24, 2006.
5. Circular, steel anti-tank mine. For more information, visit http://science.howstuffworks.
com/landmine3.htm. Accessed March 24, 2006.
6. USSR-manufactured anti-tank mine that can have an anti-handling device. For more information, visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/
appendixcminesandordinance.html. Accessed March 24, 2006.
7. Chinese-manufactured bounding AP mine. For more information, visit http://members.
iinet.net.au/~pictim/mines/messages/69.html. Accessed March 24, 2006.
8. Griffiths, A. “Machines Can Get the Job Done Faster.” Journal of Mine Action. Issue 8.2,
November 2004. 105–107. Also available online at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/8.2/rd/
griffiths.htm. Accessed March 24, 2006.

Mine Action in Mauritania, El Hacen [ from page 23 ]

1. “Mauritania.” Landmine Monitor Report. November 2002. International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, http://www.icbl.org/lm/2002/mauritania.html. Accessed March 31, 2006.
2. Sometimes known as M-51, a small plastic circular-shaped mine that comes in two types: no
metal-content and minimal content.
3. Anti-tank and lightweight landmine. Originally from France, made from pressed
sheet metal.
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997; http://www.
icbl.org/treaty/text. Accessed March 28, 2006.
5. The five Ottawa Convention pillars are clearance, mine-risk education, stockpile destruction, victim assistance and advocacy.
6. This mine/UXO clearance was achieved with the help of the following partners: the
Mauritanian government and HAMAP deminers (2003–2004).
7. Editor’s Note: Some countries and mine action organizations are urging the use of the term
“mine free,” while others are espousing the term “mine safe” or “impact free.” “Mine free”
connotes a condition where all landmines have been cleared, whereas the terms “mine safe”
and “impact free” refer to the condition in which landmines no longer pose a credible threat
to a community or country.

Roots of Peace: Angola Project, Wertz [ from page 24 ]

1. Through the Pro-Rural model program, World Vision and Roots of Peace are striving for
farmers’ food prosperity instead of simply farmers’ food security by carefully marketing
farmers’ produce and generating more high-value crops. Another goal the two organizations hope to achieve through the Pro-Rural program is HIV/AIDS awareness and increased involvement of women and young people.

Survivor Assistance, Stanton and Reisinger [ from page 27 ]

1. Category I is the highest level of training for prosthetic and orthotic professionals recognized by International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics, equivalent to a Bachelor of
Science in prosthetics and orthotics. Category I professionals have the title of Prosthetist
or Orthotist.
2. Jacobs, N., ed. (1995). “Report of ISPO Consensus Conference on Appropriate Orthopaedic
Technology for Developing Countries.” ISPO: Phnom Penh.
3. Hughes, J., ed. (2001). “Report of ISPO Consensus Conference on Appropriate
Orthopaedic Technology for Low-Income Countries.” ISPO: Moshi, Tanzania.
4. More information on the RERC is available online at http://rerc.cirnetwork.org. Accessed
Feb. 10, 2006.
5. This work was partially funded by the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation
Research of the U.S. Department of Education under grant number H133E030017.
6. “USAID Global Initiatives: Prosthetics and Orthotics Training and Technologies.” Last
updated May 5, 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_
funds/lwvf/tatcot.html. Accessed Feb. 13, 2006.
7. “Tanzania.” Landmine Monitor Report. October 2004. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/
tanzania. Accessed Feb. 10, 2006.
8. Hughes, J., ed. (2003). “Report of ISPO Workshop on Prosthetics and Orthotics Training
Institutes in Non-Industrial Countries.” ISPO: Copenhagen.

Sudan Launches NMAA, Tariq [ from page 30 ]

1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document was
opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known as the
Ottawa Convention.
2. After 23 years of civil war, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 9 Jan. 2005 
between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement. As
a result of the CPA, two governments were formed in Sudan, the Government of National
Unity, which governs the whole country in terms of foreign policy, defense and trade, and
the Government of Southern Sudan, which governs 10 of the 26 states of Sudan with a
semi-autonomous status. Presently Sudan is one country but with two governments and
the President of the GOSS works as the First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan. The
CPA has a six-year mandate, after which there will be a referendum. This referendum will
decide the status of Southern Sudan either to remain with Sudan or separate from it.
3. Dr. Kai-Kai is the Chief of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Department of United Nations Mission in Sudan. He spoke on behalf of Mr. Manuel
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Aranda da Silva, the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General/Humanitarian
and Resident Coordinator for UNMIS, who was out of the country.
4. The Humanitarian Aid Commission is a department of the Ministry of Humanitarian
Affairs, responsible for the coordination and oversight of humanitarian aid to Sudan. The
Commissioner General of the HAC is Mr. Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman.

Tackling Landmine Problems in Ethiopia, Derebe [ from page 31 ]
1.

“Ethiopia.” Landmine Monitor Report 2005. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/ethiopia. Accessed
Feb. 13, 2006.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18 Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document was
opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known as
the Ottawa Convention.

A Rose by Any Other Name, Dugger [ from page 42 ]

1. Morale effect is the effect weapons have on morale.
2. Information obtained from internal invoice documents of UXB Balkans and UXB Africa.

Tied Campaigns, Collins [ from page 46 ]

1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18 Sept. 1997; http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/
UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document was opened for signature in
Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known as the Ottawa Convention.
2. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva,
Switzerland, 10 Oct. 1980. http://www.ccwtreaty.com/ccwtreatytext.htm. Updated May
18, 2006. Accessed July 1, 2006.
3. The humanitarian impact argument was well along and the ICBL was established by the
time the ICRC held its symposium of military experts (January 1994) and then produced its
report Antipersonnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? in March 1996. That statement, because it
was a declaration of military professionals, and not NGOs (and was endorsed by the politically neutral ICRC), had a much greater impact than the slimness of its text might suggest.
Among its many conclusions, these were some of the most significant:
• “The main characteristic of a mine is that it is designed to be victim-actuated.”
• “Although the military value of anti-tank mines is acknowledged, the value of AP
mines is questionable.”
• “The limited military utility of AP mines is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts.”
4. “Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention) [see endnote
3], 28 Nov. 2003.” International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/IHL.
nsf/FULL/610?OpenDocument. Accessed 5 April 2006.
5. “Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW): Re-focus on Cluster Munitions for 2006.”
Human Rights Watch. 6 March 2006. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/06/
global12768.htm. Accessed 5 April 2006.
6. Mennonite Central Committee, Human Rights Watch, UK Working Group on Landmines
(Landmine Action), ICRC, Campaign Against Landmines—New Zealand and Amnesty
International were among those who called for strong action on cluster munitions early on.
7. “Persian Gulf: U.S. Cluster Bomb Duds a Threat: Warning Against Use of Cluster Bombs
in Iraq.” Human Rights Watch. 18 March 2003. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/18/
usint5409.htm. Accessed 5 April 2006.
8. The definition of ERW evolved. Currently it incorporates UXO plus stockpiles, with APMs
sometimes falling out of the grouping because of their coverage in the Ottawa Convention.
9. “Military Utility of Cluster Munitions.” Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects. Prepared by the United Kingdom. Tenth Session, Geneva, 7–11 March 2005. http://
www.mineaction.org/downloads/GGE%20X%20UK%20paper%20on%20military%20u
tility%20of%20cluster%20munitions.doc. Accessed 14 April 2006.
10. The UK government’s reticence about cluster munitions is shadowed by a significant interest by
its military in retaining an area-target weapon, as is evident in a background paper presented to
the CCW experts’ group.
    “The persistent nature of cluster munitions when they fail to explode forms one of the most
problematic aspects of these munitions. The United Kingdom accepts that its air-dropped cluster bombs have a failure rate that is unacceptably high. This particular weapon will go out of
service in coming years and by 2015 all UK submunitions will contain a self-destruct mechanism reducing their failure rate to less than 1 percent.”
     “Currently cluster munitions represent an essential capacity against area targets, particularly groups of military vehicles. Stringent considerations of the risk of collateral damage are applied each time they are used. In the long term they are likely to be used more
sparingly, as new precision weapons come into service, and may one day be removed from
service altogether.” From “Military Utility of Cluster Munitions.” Group of Governmental
Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects. Prepared by the United Kingdom. Tenth Session, Geneva,
7–11 March 2005. http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/GGE%20X%20UK%20pape
r%20on%20military%20utility%20of%20cluster%20munitions.doc. Accessed 14  April
2006.
11. This is documented by Mennonite Central Committee, Mines Advisory Group, the ICRC and
the GICHD, among others. See for instance the document CCW/GGE/I/WP.5 at: http://
ccwtreaty.com/KeyDocs/GGE1/CCW-GGE-I-WP5-E.pdf. Accessed May 23, 2006.
12. “Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): A Threat Analysis.” Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining. 2002. http://www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/ERW.
pdf. Accessed 5 April 2006.
13. McGrath, Rae. Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
14. King, Colin. Explosive Remnants of War: Submunitions and Other Unexploded Ordnance: A
Study. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2000.
15. Smith, Andy. “Submunitions and Fuzes.” AVS Website on Humanitarian Demining. Last updated April 2006. http://www.nolandmines.com/index%20mines%20subs%20and%20fuzes.
htm. Accessed 17 April 2006.
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16. Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The 13-state working group paper noted, “These
anti-personnel fragmentation weapons tend to have both indiscriminate effects and to cause
unnecessary suffering. At detonation a vast number of small fragments or pellets are dispersed evenly covering a large area with a high degree of probability of hitting any person in
the area. The effect of such a detonation on unprotected persons—military or civilian—in
the comparatively large target area is almost certain to be severe with multiple injuries
caused by many tiny fragments. Multiple injuries considerably raise the level of pain and
suffering. They often call for prolonged and difficult medical treatment and the cumulative
effect of the many injuries increases the mortality risk. … When the normal weapon effect
is so extensive as to cover areas of several square kilometers in an attack by a single aircraft,
these weapons are hardly capable of use anywhere without hitting civilians incidentally.”
17. In the 1960s, the New York Times’ Harrison Salisbury described the U.S. carpet bombing
strategy directed at civilians in Vietnam as a war crime.
18. Fernando Termentini refers to an average 50-percent failure rate of BLU-97 submunitions
in two villages in Afghanistan in “From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Cluster Bombs Again.”
(August 2003) Journal of Mine Action, Volume 7.2, pp. 71–72. http://maic.jmu.edu/
journal/7.2/focus/fernando/fernando.htm. Accessed 7 April 2006.
19. Goose, Steve, personal communication, 12 April 2006.
20. A question period is the debate segment of the Canadian Parliament’s House of Commons
(more or less at the end of each day Parliament is in session).
21. Indirectly, this might have been a goal of the ICRC’s ERW strategy: Peter Herby, a legal specialist with the ICRC, suggested at a workshop in Ottawa in 1996 that it might be
more useful to prohibit a weapon’s effects than a narrowly defined weapon itself. Herby was
concerned that a single-weapon campaign might mean that every time a new weapon was
introduced, a new campaign would need to be launched.
22. Commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross, August 2000.
23. “Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians through an Additional Protocol to the 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.” International Committee of the Red Cross. http://
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList282/6F9EDAB90FFC82FEC1256B66005F9B14.
Accessed 5 April 2006.
24. Knudsen, Kjell. “Landmine Update #6.” International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 1 Dec.
2001. http://www.icbl.org/news/icbl_news/landmine_update_6. Accessed 14 April 2006.
25. In fact, at the Second Prepcom of the 2001 Review Conference of the CCW on 6 April 2001,
the ICBL stated that the Campaign “as a coalition has decided not to add issues such as those
related to anti-vehicle mines and submunitions to its mandate” and told government delegates,
“Do not turn your attention to the humanitarian problem of anti-vehicle mines and submunitions, while still failing to deal with the humanitarian problem of anti-personnel mines.”
26. ICBL Statement on Cluster Munitions and Explosive Remnants of War. International Campaign
to Ban Landmines. 19 Dec. 2001, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.icbl.org/news/archive/
old/137. Accessed 1 July 2006.
27. The US Defense Science Board Task Force on Munitions System Reliability report continues: “The available data is inconsistent, largely anecdotal, and often from questionable sources.
Area attack munitions in particular—designed to produce dispersed battlefield effects—can be
highly effective in combat but difficult to analyse afterward. There is no method in place that
can systematically determine and document the reliability rates of a broad range of munitions
during combat. The largest contributors to the UXO problem are legacy munitions, operational
factors and fuze technologies. There is an enormous stockpile of aging munitions that will have
to be used ‘as is,’ retrofitted or demilitarized, but the Department of Defense (DoD) has no
comprehensive approach in place to address these legacy munitions. Retrofitting the existing
stockpile could easily run into the billions of dollars. Retrofitting is not without other challenges as well, namely meeting revised safety standards and risking the introduction of new failure
points in legacy systems never designed for upgrades. The operational question then becomes
one of priorities and the cost-benefit analysis of retrofitting older munitions at the expense of
developing and fielding more capable, reliable, safe and effective munitions.” It should be noted,
however, that “legacy” weapons highlighted in the task force report are not the precise problem.
Colin King has pointed out in his study of ERW for the Red Cross that it is “neither fair nor
accurate to equate all unexploded submunitions with mines.” While munitions equipped with
problem fusing designs are certainly known to be dangerous, others, like the AO-1SCh fuse,
are “inherently safe.” From Colin King, Explosive Remnants of War: Submunitions and Other
Unexploded Ordnance. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2000.
28. The U.S. military had already recognized that some cluster munitions were problematic
because of their impact on U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. (See: U.S. General
Accounting Office, “GAO-02-1003: Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002)
29. McCormack, Timothy L.H. Mtharu, P. B. & Finnin, S. Report on States Parties’ Responses
to the Questionnaire: International Humanitarian Law & Explosive Remnants of War. 1
March 2006. http://www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/CCW/XIIIth_Mtg_Mar06/GICHD_
Critical_analysis_CCW_McCormack_Report.pdf. Accessed 5 April 2006.
30. The sole exceptions in the Belgian definition of cluster munition were minor but possibly
provide wiggle-room for the military. As of 22 March 2006, the adopted text excluded: “dispensers that only contain smoke-producing material or illuminating material or material
exclusively conceived to create electric or electronic counter-measures; systems that contain
several munitions only designed to pierce and destroy armored vehicles, that can only be
used to that end without any possibility to indiscriminately saturate combat zones, including by the obligatory control of their trajectory and destination, and that, if applicable, can
only explode at the moment of the impact, and in any case cannot explode by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person.”
31. The government of Norway committed in 2005 to “work towards an international ban on
cluster bombs.”
32. The LAUK report, Compelling Options, finds that concerns about the reliability and effects
of “legacy munitions” has resulted in significant international shifts at the state level.
33. One exclusion that has been scrutinized is for individually guided submunitions equipped
with self-destruct/self-neutralisation mechanisms.
34. In March 2003, Human Rights Watch identified four specific U.S. cluster munitions of
concern as likely to be problematic in Iraq due to the Coalition invasion. They called for
a suspension and withdrawal of cluster munitions “that have been tested and identified as
producing high dud rates.” http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/cluster031803.htm.
Accessed 23 May 2006. Colin King listed a range of problem munitions and mechanisms

in his Explosive Remnants of War: Submunitions and Other Unexploded Ordnance: A Study,
ICRC, Geneva 2000. Accessed 7 April 2006.
35. Several governments, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have argued that in the
absence of cluster munitions, they will need to use other weapons with potentially worse
impacts on civilians.
36. Rappert, Brian. Compelling Options: What is the Case for a Ban on Cluster Munitions? (draft).
Commissioned by Landmine Action (UK).

Mines and ERW, Kudyba [ from page 49 ]

1. The Temporary Security Zone is a border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It marks the formal
separation between the two parties and is approximately a 16-mile deep buffer zone. The
UNMEE monitors the TSZ and limits weaponry carried by officials inside the zone.
2. All the tanks and other military vehicles abandoned in former battle areas in the UNMEE
have been subsequently stripped of anything of value that can be transported away.
3. The author was an investigating officer into an incident near Senafe town in the TSZ involving eight boys who entered a mined area. A number were killed or injured in a resulting mine
incident. Interviewing personnel involved in the rescue operation in this incident revealed
some of them were extremely emotionally affected by what they had experienced. Due to the
time taken to raise the alarm and the subsequent loss of daylight, one boy’s body had to be
left until the following morning because it rolled farther down into the minefield. A number
of personnel agonized over whether he was dead at that time or if he died because the rescue
had to be temporarily abandoned and thus they could not reach him in time.
4. There are numerous versions of the Chinese Stick Hand Grenade.
5. Recent wars have revealed the problems of post-conflict clearance involving such items as
depleted-uranium projectiles. Speculation and interest in the potential hazards have resulted in many published articles on the subject, which requires personnel with special training
and equipment to complete a clearance task. See Technical Note for Mine Action: 09.30/2:
“Clearance of Depleted Uranium Hazards.”
6. Specialist training is sometimes required to conduct such tasks. The guidance of such publications as TNMA 09.30/01, relating to clearance of armoured vehicles, should also be
adhered to where applicable.
7. The UNMEE MACC EOD team has been involved in several intricate operations involving
sandbagged walls, rendering safe of fusing systems and partial evacuation of village inhabitants to enable items to be safely removed for destruction at a central demolition point.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

A Primer on Explosive Remnants of War, Ressler [ from page 54 ]

1. This convention is formally known as The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, presently with five protocols. The weapons covered include
weapons that leave undetectable fragments in the body (Protocol I); mines, booby-traps
and other devices (Protocol II, amended in 1996); incendiary weapons (Protocol III);
blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV); and ERW (Protocol V). This convention bans or
restricts weapons that may cause unnecessary or indiscriminate suffering for soldiers and
civilians. The full text can be found at http://www.ccwtreaty.com/keydocs.html. Accessed
March 20, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
2. IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 12: Glossary of Terms and Resources, UNICEF
and GICHD, Geneva, 2005. http://www.mineactionstandards.org/guides/MRE_Guidebook_
12.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006. The IMAS can be found at http://
www.mineactionstandards.org.  Accessed March 27, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
3. The IMAS continue their definition of explosive ordnance to include “bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles, artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition,
all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and
propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised devices;
and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature” (IMAS Guidebook 12,
2005, p.12).
4. The IMAS define a munition as “a complete device charged with explosives, propellants,
pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in
military operations, including demolitions. Note: In common usage, ‘munitions’ (plural)
can be military weapons, ammunition and equipment” (IMAS Guidebook 12, 2005, p.17).
5. Herby, P. and A. Nuiten, “Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians through
an Additional Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”
International Review of the Red Cross, March 2001, No. 841, p.195.
6. The IMAS define a submunition as: “any munition that, to perform its task, separates from
a parent munition” (IMAS Guidebook 12, 2005, p.20) and a cluster bomb unit as: “a bomb
containing and dispensing submunitions which may be mines (anti-personnel or anti-tank),
penetration (runway cratering) bomblets, fragmentation bomblets etc.” (IMAS Guidebook
12, 2005, p.11). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
notes that “failed munitions remain on the ground and may explode with the slightest
touch, when picked up, stepped on or kicked. These munitions become less stable and
therefore more dangerous with each passing year” (p.9). Glossary of Humanitarian Terms:
In Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, New York, 2003. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.
nsf/db900SID/LHON-64UHAE/$FILE/OCHA_Glossary_2004.pdf?OpenElement.
Accessed April 7, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
7. Explosive Remnants of War: Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo, ICRC, Geneva, 2000,
p.8. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0780/$File/ICRC_002_0780.
PDF!Open.  Accessed April 5, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
8. Explosive Remnants of War: Unexploded Ordnance and Post-Conflict Communities, Landmine
Action, London, 2002, p.3. http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Explosive_
remnants_of_war_sum_2.pdf. Accessed April 15, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
9. Hunger, R. “The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: Or, How to Reduce
Human Suffering by Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons”
Strategic Insight, Vol. 2, Issue 3, March 2003, p.3. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/mar03/
wmd.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
10. Protocol V requires each party to an armed conflict to mark and control ERW in territory
they control; provide technical, material and financial assistance to facilitate removal of
ERW due to party military operations that occurred in area not under party control; take all
possible precautions to protect civilians from harm of ERW (including fencing and monitoring of territory and provision of warnings and risk education); and record information of use

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

25.

of explosive ordnance by armed forces to share after conflict with others engaged in ERW
clearance or risk warning programs. See 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
ICRC overview fact sheet (published March 31, 2004) at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNXR/$FILE/1980_CCW.en.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed March
15, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006. Full Protocol V available at: http://www.ccwtreaty.com/
KeyDocs/MainDocs/Protocol-V-E.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
Sanders, C. “Contending with Explosive Remnants of War” Arms Control Association,
September 2004, p.2. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_09/Sanders.asp?print.
Accessed March 27, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
As of March 10, 2006, the CCW has 100 States Parties and an additional six states who
have signed but not yet ratified. As of June 30, 2006, 23 states have consented to be bound
by Protocol V after it comes into force. As of June 30, 2006, the CCW has 100 state parties and an additional six states who have signed but not yet ratified. See the status of these
treaties provided by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs: http://disarmament.
un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf. Accessed June 30, 2006.
CCW, Protocol V, Article 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4. See endnote 10 for link.
Greenwood, C. “Legal Issues Regarding Explosive Remnants of War” (UN Doc: CCW/
GGE/I/WP.10), May 23, 2000, p.4. http://www.ccwtreaty.com/KeyDocs/GGE1/CCWGGE-I-WP10-E.pdf. Accessed March 12, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
Landmines are also legally addressed and defined in the separate, more prominent Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997. This Convention is also known as the Ottawa Convention or
Mine Ban Convention. In this Convention, an APM is defined as “a mine designed to be
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons” (Article 2.1). http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_
trty.htm. Accessed April 14, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
Although they are not defined in Amended Protocol II, anti-vehicle mines are (weakly) regulated by the Protocol’s general rules (Article 3) and a specific rule in Article 6.3. AVMs are
mines that are “designed primarily to be detonated by vehicles, and contain a large explosive
charge capable of destroying or incapacitating such targets” (p. 7). Humanitarian Impact
from Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines, GICHD, Geneva, October 2004. http://www.
gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Humanitarian_Impact_from_MOTAPM.pdf.
Accessed May 5, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
AVMs are explicitly excluded from the Ottawa Convention which prohibits anti-personnel
mines, but are being presently considered for a potential CCW Protocol addition regarding mines other than anti-personnel mines to achieve stronger regulation (see http://www.
ccwtreaty.com). Accessed March 15, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
CCW Protocol II Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other
Devices as amended on 3 May, 1996, defines a booby trap as “any device or material which is
designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a
person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe
act” (Article 2.4). “Other devices” are defined as “manuallyemplaced munitions and devices
including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are
actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time” (Article 2.5).
Full Protocol II amended available at: http://www.ccwtreaty.com/KeyDocs/MainDocs/
Amended-Protocol-II-E.pdf. Accessed April 18, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
Improvised explosive devices can vary widely as they are created with materials originally
manufactured for a different use. GlobalSecurity.org defines an IED as a “‘homemade’ device
that is designed to cause death or injury by using explosives alone or in combination with toxic
chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material” and with the following components: an
initiation system or fuse; an explosive fill; a detonator; a power supply for the detonator; and
a container. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps, http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/intro/ied.htm. Accessed May 23, 2006. CCW Amended Protocol II bans IEDs;
however, due to the great variation in IED construction as well as their varied application in
conflicts, there is a need for clearer understanding of IEDs. Though typically associated with
active battle, IEDs have the potential to be a post-conflict threat if failing to explode or remaining rigged. Consequently, depending on their material construction IEDs may interface
with Protocol V or Ottawa clearance obligations. Discussion and clarification on this subject
is sorely needed to come to terms with these unanswered issues and even address a common
definition of an IED.
Explosive Remnants of War: A “Quick Look” Threat Analysis, Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, 2001, p.4.
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): A Threat Analysis, Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, 2002, p.3–19. Direct citations came from p. 3, 5, 11 and 19.
This list was broadly compiled by this author, from suggestions within numerous publications of what specific munitions and ordnance might be included within the term ERW.
An AFV is defined as a vehicle that “protects crew and passengers from shrapnel and small
arms fire, whilst carrying machine guns, cannon or guided missiles to attack enemy vehicles
and infantry. Examples of armoured fighting vehicles include tanks and Infantry Fighting
Vehicles (IFVs).” http://www.army-technology.com/glossary/armoured-fighting-vehicle.
html. Accessed April 24, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
For more information on SALW, see Cranfield University’s Compendium of Good Practices on
Security Sector Reform, online at http://www.gfn-ssr.org/good_practice.cfm?id=21&p=21.
Accessed April 21, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006. Examples of SALW include “pistols, rifles,
assault rifles, machine guns, light support weapons, grenade launchers, cannon (>37 mm),
light mortars, light anti-tank weapons, shoulder launched surface to air missiles (SAM), high
explosive grenades … and small arms ammunition.” Hughes-Wilson, J. and A. Wilkinson
“Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for
Practical Technical Measures” UNDP, July 2001 (p. 32). http://www.smallarmsnet.org/
issues/themes/undpdes.pdf. Accessed April 21, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
A stockpile is defined as “a large accumulated stock of weapons and explosive ordnance”
(Cranfield online, see endnote 24). A cache is “weapons stored in a remote or concealed,
unmanned site” (Greenwood, p. 4, see endnote 14). Neither term has one accepted definition; this article understands the difference between stockpiles and caches to be the actors
who have control of them.  A stockpile is under official control by state actors while a cache is
an accumulation of stored weapons to be used by non-state actors.  In this sense, a stockpile
under national control would not be legally be considered ERW (though practically it is still
an explosive threat), while a cache could be considered ERW if the supply of munitions or
ordnance is explosive and abandoned by those who stocked it.
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26. “Ammunition Depot Explosion in Lagos-Nigeria, January 27, 2002” United Nations
Environment Program—Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at a Local Level online
summary. http://www.uneptie.org/pc/apell/disasters/lagos/home.html. Accessed April
13, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
27. Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations, U.S. government document,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 2005, p.GL-3. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/
unlimit/3207_01.pdf. Accessed March 17, 2006. Updated May 18, 2006.
28. ICRC Kosovo, 2000, p. 23. See endnote 6.
29. Defense Science Board Task Force on Munitions System Reliability, U.S. government document, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C.,
September 2005, p.56.

RONCO’s Response to ERW, Smith  [ from page 58 ]

1. Static guards control personnel and vehicle access at designated sites. They engage in full
searches, as necessary; verify passes and identification cards; and maintain close control over
temporary workers or other uncleared personnel.  
2. Deminers trained to Level I are qualified to locate, expose and destroy mines under supervision. Level-II deminers may destroy small UXO, including submunitions, grenades
and mortar ammunition. Level-III deminers are qualified to destroy large UXO including
rocket, tank gun and artillery ammunition. These deminers may remove UXO from its
original position to be destroyed at another location.

No Wizards, Weetjens and Kim [ from page 62 ]

1. Clicker training is the process of training an animal using a conditioned reinforcer, which
indicates to the animal the precise behavior that was correct. The name comes from the fact
that the conditioned reinforcer used by many trainers is a small mechanical noisemaker
called a clicker. For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clicker_training.
Accessed April 12, 2006.
2. The Tuberculosis Project is a study hoping to change the way tuberculosis is diagnosed using
the exceptional sniffing abilities of rats. For more information, please see http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/health/3486559.stm. Accessed May 12, 2006.

Medical Challenges in Sudan, Kushner [ from page 68 ]

1. A Type-III landmine injury is a mine-handling injury to the upper extremities and face.
2. Appendectomy: Surgical procedure done to remove the appendix. Hernia: Occurs when
part of an organ (usually the intestines) protrudes through a weak point or tear in the muscular wall that holds the abdominal organs in place. Surgery is performed to fix the protrusion. Thyroidectomy: Surgical procedure done to remove all or part of the thyroid. Burn
contracture release: A burn contracture is the result of a severe burn where the skin and
underlying tissue become immobile. It is possible to cut the scar and then release the underlying muscle and tissue and put a skin graft over the wound. Skin graft: Surgical procedure
that removes a patch of skin from one area of the body and transplants it to another area.
Hemorrhoidectomy: Surgical procedure done to remove hemorrhoids. Psoas abscess
drainage: A psoas abscess is a collection of pus that forms in one of the muscles in the back
along the spine. It is occasionally seen in patients with tuberculosis or HIV and needs to
be incised and drained.
3. Ketamine anesthesia is primarily used in veterinary applications as a tranquilizer. It is also used
as an anesthetic induction agent for diagnostic and surgical procedures in humans, prior to the
administration of general anesthetics. It is occasionally used as a short-acting general anesthetic
for children and elderly patients.
4. Splenic flexure, or left colic flexure, is part of the colon where the transverse colon meets the
descending colon. It is located under the spleen.
5. A colostomy is a surgical procedure where a portion of the large intestine is brought through
the abdominal wall to carry stool out of the body.
6. Cholera is a water-borne disease caused by the bacterium Vibrio cholerae. The disease is
transmitted through ingested feces contaminated with the bacterium. Transmission usually
occurs when untreated sewage is released into waterways affecting the water supply, any
foods washed in the water, and shellfish living in the affected waterway.
7. The first children to arrive that day had been referred from the hospital. At the hospital, they
were initially assessed and an IV was inserted. Other patients presented directly to the CTC.
8. For emergency IV access in children it is possible to start a needle into the upper portion of
the tibia, a few inches below the knee. This allows fluid to enter into the marrow cavity.

Tajikistan Mine Action Programme, Rajabov [ from page 72 ]

1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document
was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known
as the Ottawa Convention.
2. Amended Protocol II (which extended the restrictions of the treaty to include landmines,
provided standards of reliability for remotely detonated mines, and prohibited the use on
non-detectable fragments in anti-personnel landmines; a failure to agree on a total ban on
landmines led to the convening of the Ottawa Convention) of the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.
ccwtreaty.com/ccwtreatytext.htm. Updated May 18, 2006. Accessed July 1, 2006.

The “Poor Man’s Weapon,” Sjöberg [ from page 75 ]

1. Sjöberg, Anki. The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A
Call for Action. Executive Summary. Geneva Call (2004).
2. Geneva Call (2005). Global Report: Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume I: A
Global Report Profiling NSAs and their Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
of Landmines. Text available online at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/testipublications/gc-ansal-oct05.pdf. Accessed March 17, 2006. Hard copies can be obtained
by contacting info@genevacall.org. The report is part of a project supported by the Geneva
International Academic Network, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the government of Italy, and the continued support of Switzerland. Institutions contributing to the
report are the Program for the Study of International Organization(s), the United Nations
Mine Action Service, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the
University of Geneva and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Tables

112 | endnotes | journal of mine action | 2006 | august | 10.1

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

containing landmine information on armed non-state actors were created based on media
reports, the Landmine Monitor, interviews, field trips, emails from non-state actors, etc.
“Mine use” here is referring to the global occurrences of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mine emplacement by NSAs, whether activated by victims, vehicles or at a distance by
command-detonation. This includes factory-made mines as well as booby-traps and IEDs
that act in the same way as mines.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document
was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known
as the Ottawa Convention.
The frequency of mine use is related to the number of reported incidents (i.e., mine blasts)
allegedly caused by an NSA. However, an NSA could also emplace many mines but have
few reported incidents attributed to it. Low reporting of incidents could mean that there are
actually not many incidents, due to mined areas being scarcely populated, the population
being afraid to go into the area, the population being warned about where mines are, etc.
However, it could also mean that incidents that occur are not reported. The lack of reporting could be due to a scarcity of institutions or organizations that gather such information
or due to the fear of reprisal if the incident is reported.
In Madi, Chitwan, a command-detonated landmine was triggered by the CPN–M under a
crowded passenger bus, killing 38 people (35 of whom were civilians) and wounding over 70.1
The contact between the CPN–M and the CPI-M appears to have consisted in informationsharing about arms training, IED production and guerrilla-warfare techniques.2
Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan states that States Parties in a position to do so will
“continue to support, as appropriate, mine action to assist affected populations in areas under
the control of armed non-state actors, particularly in areas under the control of actors which
have agreed to abide by the Convention’s norms.” Text available online at http://www.gichd.
ch/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/6MSP/Nairobi_Action_Plan.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2006.
Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Bernt A Skåra. “Humanitarian Mine Action and Peace
Building: Exploring the Relationship.” Third World Quarterly 24.5 (2003): p. 813.

Power Tillers and Snails, Cepolina [ from page 79 ]

1. Professor James Trevelyan of the University of Western Australia estimates total R&D funding
for demining at about US$300 million per year. See http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/4.3/process.
htm. Accessed April 21, 2006.
2. E.E. Cepolina, C. Bruschini, K De Bruyn, Field Survey Results, EUDEM2 publication,
EUDEM Web site: http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/files/FieldSurvey_Results_V1.0.0.pdf.
Accessed April 21, 2006.
3. J. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin Press: 2005.
4. E.E. Cepolina, C. Bruschini, Catalogue of Demining Technologies in Field
Use, EUDEM2 publication, EUDEM website: http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/files/
FieldSurvey_Catalogue_Techn_V1.0.0.pdf. Accessed April 20, 2006.
5. End-effector is a name commonly used in robotics to indicate the device or tool connected to
the end of a robot arm. It is the tool actually performing the work. Here, end-effector could be
substituted with tool or unit.  

Geneva Diary, Mansfield [ from page 80 ]

1. Formally known as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switzerland, Oct. 10, 1980. http://www.ccwtreaty.com/
ccwtreatytext.htm. Accessed 5 June 2006.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept., 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document
was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known
as the Ottawa Convention.

Minefield as a School Ground, Telefus [ from page 82 ]

1. Also known as the Six-Day War, this war was fought between Israel and its neighboring
Arab nations: Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
2. The funding of mine clearance and the performance of clearance operations were to be
done by the same organization/group.
3. Belgian-manufactured plastic-cased AP blast mine. For more information, visit http://
www.unsudanig.org/programmes/data/ipf/C_%20Assessment%20of%20Land%20Mine
%20Action%20Needs%20for%20developlment.pdf. Accessed April 14, 2006.
4. The majority of Jordanian mines were U.S.-manufactured M14 and M18A1 mines. M14 
mines are pressure-operated blast mines. The M18A1 is a Claymore direction fragmentation
mine.   For more information on the M14  mine, visit http://science.howstuffworks.com/
landmine2.htm. Accessed April 14, 2006. For more information on the M18A1 mine, visit
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m18-claymore.htm. Accessed April 20, 2006.

STEMD Detector Trials, Guelle and Lewis [ from page 84 ]

1. For interested readers, the interim report for the STEMD project is available at http://ipsc.
jrc.cec.eu.int/research.php?unit=serac. Accessed May 26, 2006.
2. For interested readers, the Lao report is available at http://serac.jrc.it/tethud/ of the JRC,
and http://www.itep.ws, homepages for test and evaluation in the area of humanitariandemining equipment. An essentially identical fuse is used in the R2M1 anti-personnel mine
and the RSA No.8 anti-tank mine. Both accessed May 26, 2006.
3. Ground compensation is a feature of the detector to reduce/eliminate the negative influence
of the ground on detector performance. If the detector signals in the absence of metal due to
the magnetic properties of the ground/soil, the GC-function will be used. To carry out soil
compensation with a metal detector means that a certain procedure described in the detectors manual has to be followed.
4. For definitions of each of these munitions, see http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/supplemental/
munitions.htm.
5. One inch = 25 millimetres
6. An essentially identical fuse is used in the R2M1 anti-personnel mine and the RSA No. 8 
anti-tank mine.
7. The authors would like to note that this does not only concern detectors without
ground compensation.

Mine Action Support Group Update, Davis [ from page 91 ]

1. The full text of this newsletter can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/65501.
htm. Accessed May 17, 2006.
2. Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention addresses existing explosive remnants of war and includes a technical annex, which covers recording and provision of information on UXO
and abandoned ordnance, plus risk education and the provision of information. Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18 Sept. 1997; http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/
UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006.
3. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005 as an attempt to bring
the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army together. For more information visit http://www.unmis.org/english/cpa.htm. Accessed
May 17, 2006.
4. The incident began as a disagreement between the Coordinator of the HCND and
the Vice Director of the Faya Logistics Center, which continued for several hours until someone sent for the Presidential Guard and tanks. Panic surged throughout the
community because it was thought this was an attempt to oust the president. Many
attempted to escape from Chad to Cameroon. Finally, all the HCND staff were arrested and jailed, but were released after one week. The Coordinator and the Vice
Director remained in jail for an additional week. An interim Coordinator for the
HCND was appointed by the president and will remain until the Coordinator returns
to his position.
5. The evaluation of the MRE program in Ethiopia was requested by UNICEF and
conducted independently by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining. The results of the evaluation were sought to help provide a better plan for
the program.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

Ottawa Obligations to Victims, Brinkert [ from page 91 ]

1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document
was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known
as the Ottawa Convention.
2. Rutherford, Ken and Jerry White. “The Role of the Landmine Survivors Network,” in To
Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert
J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 114.
3. Maslen, Stuart. Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume I: The Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 56.
4. “Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 1999–
2004.” (Part II of the Final Report of the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 9 Feb. 2005). The First Review Conference
recorded 23, not 24, relevant States Parties. Ethiopia subsequently ratified the Convention
becoming the 24 th relevant State Party for this matter.
5. “Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-personnel Mines: Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009.”
(Part III of the Final Report of the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, 9 Feb. 2005)
6. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, through its Special Appeal Mine
Action 1999–2003 and Special Appeal Mine Action 2004, generated over CHF 100 million
during the period 1999–2004 for curative care and physical rehabilitation.
7. SMART is a common acronym in widespread use. A Google search for “SMART objectives”
will bring up over 19.6 million hits from organizations ranging from online marketing companies to the Shetland Islands Council to the March of Dimes promoting its use.
8. “Zagreb Progress Report.” (Part II of the Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, unofficial version, 2
Dec. 2005)

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.
31.

Japanese Detection Systems, Ishikawa, et al. [ from page 102 ]

1. “Church World Service: Emergency Response Program. Revised Landmine Appeal.” Center
for International Disaster Information. http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/01a/ixl15.html.
Accessed May 1, 2006.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, Norway. 18  Sept. 1997; http://www.
un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed 26 April 2006. The document
was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 Dec. 1997, and thus is commonly known
as the Ottawa Convention.
3. K. Furuta, “Japan Promises New Technologies to Clear Anti-personnel Landmines,” Look
Japan, vol. 48, No. 562, January 2003.
4. Committee of Experts on Humanitarian Demining Technology, “Promoting R&D
for Humanitarian Demining Technology,” Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT), 2002. http://www.mext.go.jp/english/
news/2002/05/020601.htm. Accessed April 12, 2006.
5. K. Nonami and H. Aoyama, “Research and Development of Mine Hunter Vehicle
for Humanitarian Demining,” Proceedings of the IARP International Workshop on
Robotics and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian Demining (HUDEM2005),
pp.76–81, 2005.
6. M. Sato, Y. Hamada, X. Feng, F. Kong, Z. Zeng, G. Fang, “GPR using an Array Antenna
for Landmine Detection,” Near Surface Geophysics, Vol. 2, pp. 3–9, February, 2004.
7. S. M. Shrestha and I. Arai, “High-Resolution Image Reconstruction by GPR using
MUSIC and SAR Processing Method for Landmine Detection,” Proceedings of the 2003
IEEE International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium (IGR ASS2003), pp.
505–508, 2003.
8. There are 2.54 centimeters in one inch.
9. Y. Hasegawa, K. Yokoe, Y. Kawai and T. Fukuda, “GPR-based Adaptive Sensing—GPR
Manipulation According to Terrain Configurations,” Proceedings of the 2004  IEEE/

32.
33.
34.

RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS2004), pp.
3021–3026, 2004.
T. Fukuda, et al., “Environment-Adaptive Anti-personnel Mine Detection System—
Advanced Mine Sweeper,” Proceedings of the HUDEM2005, pp. 33–38, 2005.
E. F. Fukushima, et al., “Teleoperated Buggy Vehicle and Weight Balanced Arm for
Mechanization of Mine Detection and Clearance Tasks,” Proceedings of the HUDEM2005,
pp. 58–63, 2005.
Y. Tojo, P. Debenest, E. F. Fukushima and S. Hirose, “Robotic System for Humanitarian
Demining: Development of Weight-Compensated Pantograph Manipulator,” Proceedings
of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA2004), pp.
2025–2030, 2004.
M. Sato, J. Fujiwara, X. Feng, Z. Zhou and T. Kobayashi, “Development of a Handheld GPR
MD Sensor System (ALIS),” Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 5794, Detection and Remediation
Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, pp. 1000–1007, 2005.
M. Tachiki, et al., “Remote Detection of Nitrogenated Substances by Nuclear Quadrupole
Resonance,” Proceedings of the HUDEM2005, pp. 107–109, 2005.
K. Yoshikawa, et al., “Research and Development of Humanitarian Landmine Detection System
by a Compact DisCharge-Type Fusion Neutron Source,” Proceedings of the HUDEM2005,
pp. 114–117, 2005.
T. Iguchi, et al., “Development of Compact Compton Gamma Camera for Anti-personnel
Landmine Detection with Neutron Induced Prompt Gamma-ray Imaging,” Proceedings of
the HUDEM2005, pp. 110–113, 2005.
J. Ishikawa, M. Kiyota, and K. Furuta, “Experimental Design for Test and
Evaluation of Anti-personnel Landmine Detection Based on Vehicle-mounted GPR
Systems,” Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 5794, Detection and Remediation Technologies for
Mines and Minelike Targets X, 2005.
J. Ishikawa, M. Kiyota, and K. Furuta, “Evaluation of Test Results of GPR-based Antipersonnel Landmine Detection Systems Mounted on Robotic Vehicles,” Proceedings of the
HUDEM2005, pp. 39–44, 2005.
The M14 is a small, plastic blast mine. It is hard to detect with metal detectors because it
has little metallic content. For more information visit, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/
gen2/General2-06.htm. Accessed May 10, 2006.
The PMN2 is a Russian mine that contains a large amount of explosive. The way it is designed makes it nearly impossible to neutralize. For more information visit http://www.
fourmilab.ch/minerats/figures/mines.html. Accessed May 15, 2006.
One millimeter is equivalent to 0.04 inches.
The Type-72 is a Chinese-manufactured circular, plastic blast mine. It is designed to damage or destroy a vehicle. For more information, visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_72.
Accessed May 15, 2006.
The Type-72S is a surrogate mine made to be used for the research outlined in this article.
K.R. Torrance, C.G. Coffey, A.B. Markov and W.S. Myles, “Surrogate AP Mines for
Training Deminers and Evaluating Demining Equipment,” Proceedings of the EUDEM2–
SCOT2003 (International Conference on Requirements and Technologies for the
Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO), 2003.
The measurements of water content range from 6 percent to 16 percent for lanes 1 to 5 and
9 percent to 22 percent for lane 6.
So far the reported detection depth is not used in the judgment, but in considering how to
use the information is a future work.
CEN Workshop Agreement, Humanitarian Mine Action—Test and Evaluation—Metal
Detectors, CWA 14747, 2003.
K. Javaraman, A Statistical Manual for Forestry Research. Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, March 1999. http://www.
fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/003/X6831E/X6831E00.htm.
Accessed April 12, 2006.
Homogeneity of variance is the most important assumption in ANOVA. To keep the assumption, in the case that the observations are proportions or percentages (i.e., probability
of detection), derived from frequency data, the observed proportion p may be transformed
by angular transformation or logit transformation.
D. J. Goodenough, K. Rossmann, and L.B. Lusted, “Radiographic Applications of Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curves,” Radiology, vol. 110, pp. 89–95, 1974.
C. E. Metz, B. A. Herman, and C. A. Roe, “Statistical Comparison of Two ROC-curve
Estimates Obtained from Partially-paired Datasets,” Medical Decision Making, 18, pp.
110–121, 1998.
K. M. Simonson, “Statistical Considerations in Designing Tests of Mine Detection
Systems: I—Measures Related to the Probability of Detection Test Design,” Sandia Report,
SAND98-1769/1, Sandia National Laboratories, 1998.
K. M. Simonson, “Statistical Considerations in Designing Tests of Mine Detection Systems:
II—Measures Related to the False Alarm Rate Test Design,” Sandia Report, SAND981769/2, Sandia National Laboratories, 1998.
One square meter is equivalent to 1.2 square yards.

Success of Multi-tools, Nguyen and Chichester [ from page 104 ]

1. The PMN mine is often fatal due to its large explosive content. It is very difficult to neutralize. http://www.warchild.org/Interactive_Galleries/Landmines/Mines6/mines6.html.
Accessed April 12, 2006.

Angolan Road Verification, Durocher and Jansson [ from page 108 ]

1. Hess, R.R. 2003. “A Fresh Approach to Road Clearance Operations.” Journal of Mine
Action. Mine Action Information Center, Issue 7.1, 2003. pp. 12–15. Available online at,
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.1/focus/hess/hess.htm. Accessed April 24, 2006.
2. One metre is approximately equal to 3 feet.
3. The PMN and the PPM-2 are pressure-operated, anti-personnel blast mines. The PMN
mines were made in the former Soviet Union and the PPM-2 mines were made in the former
East Germany. For more information, visit http://ddasonline.com/index%20mines%20AP
%20blast.htm. Accessed May 18, 2006.
4. The TM-46 is an anti-tank blast mine made in the former Soviet Union. For more information, visit http://ddasonline.com/minesTM46.htm. Accessed May 18, 2006.
5. Position Dilution of Precision is a measure of the quality or accuracy of the GPS position fix.
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Listed Organizations
Organization
             Page number
..............................................................................................................................................................................................
73
Abu Sayyaf
Accelerated Demining Program
83, 84
Adopt-A-Minefield
4
Amtech Aeronautical Limited
96
Angolan Committee of the Red Cross
86
Anti-Mine Network–Rwenzori
16, 17
Anti-Mines Association
36
APOPO
61, 62
AVS Mine Action Consultants
79
Belgian Directorate for International Cooperation
62
Burmese Rohingya Solidarity Organization
74
Center for International Rehabilitation
25, 26, 27
Chadian Army
32
Chiba University
94, 102
Chin National Front
74
Civil Protection and the Engineering Corps of the Libyan Army
36
Cluster Munition Coalition
43, 46
College of the Holy Cross
7
Comic Relief
17
Comissâo Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitarian
86, 87, 105
Committee of Experts on Humanitarian Demining Technology
93
Communist Party of India–Maoist
74
73, 74
Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist
Conservation International
24
DanChurchAid
105, 106, 108
DanChurchAid Mine Action Program–Sudan
59, 61
Danish Demining Group
38
Demining Agency for Afghanistan
57
Department for International Development
17, 18
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
79
Ejército de Liberación Nacional
73
Environmental Systems Research Institute
106
Eritrean Demining Authority
34, 35
Eritrean Demining Operations
34
Ethiopia Mine Action Office
31, 34, 35, 37
European Commission
37, 39
European Union
72, 76, 77
Fondation Suisse de Déminage
12, 71
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
73, 74
Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.
102
Geneva Call
38, 73, 75
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
21, 23, 44, 50, 52, 54, 71, 72, 79, 80, 87, 88
HALO Trust
4, 14, 15
23
Halte Aux Mines Antipersonnel
Handicap International
26, 38, 43
Handicap International–France
86
HELP
32
Human Rights Watch
43, 44, 45
Humpty Dumpty Institute
14, 15
Institut Universitaire d’Etudes du Developpement
76
Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action
85
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
7, 9, 10, 43, 45, 46
International Committee of the Red Cross
26, 44, 45, 50, 65, 68, 71, 72, 86
International Mine Action Training Centre
16, 17, 18
International Mine Action Training Centre–Nairobi, Kenya
20, 86
International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics
25, 26
International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining
104
INTERSOS
86
Iraqi Mine/UXO Clearance Organization
57, 58
Israeli Defense Force
81, 82
Israeli Ministry of Defense
82
81, 82
Israeli Ministry of Justice
James Madison University
4, 5, 6
Japan Science and Technology Agency
93, 102
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission
83
Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kurdistan Workers’ Party
74
Kyoto University
95, 102
Landmine Action–UK
43, 46, 50
Landmine Survivors Network
9
Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies
36
Lord’s Resistance Army
12, 13, 16, 74
Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd.
81, 82
Mauritanian Military Engineers
22
Mauritanian Programme for Mine Action
23
MECHEM Corporation
35
Médecins du Monde
63, 64, 67, 68
Médecins Sans Frontières
64, 67
Mennonite Central Committee
45, 46
Menschen gegen Minen
6
Mine Action Information Center
2, 4, 5, 6, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 59, 61
Mine Action Support Group
85
Mines Action Canada
43
Mines Advisory Group
23, 32, 85
Mines Advisory Group-Laos
45
Mines Awareness Trust
16, 17, 18
MineWolf Systems GmbH
19, 20, 21
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
93
Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co.
102
Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance
74
Mozambican National Demining Institute
84
Nagoya University
94, 95, 102
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Organization
             Page number
..............................................................................................................................................................................................
National Bureau for Humanitarian Demining–Mauritania
22, 23
National Committee to Develop the Northwest Coast and Mine Clearance
33
National Council for Human Rights
33
National Demining Agency–Somaliland
38
National Demining Office–Chad
85
National Demining Office–Mauritania
22
National High Commission for Demining–Chad
32, 85
National Liberation Forces–Burundi
73
National Mine Action Authority–Sudan
28, 29, 30, 86
National Mine Action Center–Khartoum
28, 30, 86
National Mine Action Office–Khartoum
12
National Program to Remove Landmines and Rehabilitate Land–Libya
36
Nicaraguan Army Demining Units
104
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
71, 72
Norwegian People’s Aid
19, 20, 34, 59, 79
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
71, 72
Organization of American States
4
Osaka University
94, 102
Pax Christi
43
Pearson Engineering Ltd.
104
Puntland Mine Action Centre
39
Rahanwein Resistance Army
73
Regional Mine Action Center in Southern Sudan–Juba
28
Regis Trading International
105
Rehabilitation and Development Organization
35, 87
Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center on Improved Technology Access for Landmine Survivors
26
RONCO Consulting Corp.
4, 11, 12, 13, 35, 56, 57, 58
Roots of Peace
24
Rotary International
5
Science Applications International Corporation
4
Securatec
18
Sendero Luminoso
73
Somaliland Mine Action Center
38
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
11, 12
TADANO Ltd
94, 102
Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
70, 71
Tajikistan Red Crescent Society
71, 72
Taliban
74
Tanzania Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists
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Errata
The editorial staff of the Journal goes to great effort to make sure that what is printed in our magazine is accurate, properly documented and unbiased. However, in issue 9.2, the photo used on the back cover (and also
in our 10.2 Call for Papers, printed separately) should have been credited to the photographers, Vinicius Souza
and Maria Eugênia Sá of Media Quatro.

